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1. General Introduction
“Collective Decision Making” is a subfield of microeconomics that investigates
how public decision-making processes and public organizations work or alterna-
tively how they should work. This dissertation consists of three self-contained
papers related to this subfield. In the broadest terms, these papers investigate
public decision making processes, i.e., they ask how a decision that involves sev-
eral individuals is or should be made. The question is not trivial, in particular if
these individuals have potentially different preferences and have private informa-
tion that is relevant to the decision.
If the question is how the the decision making process should be designed, the
answer can be found using the tools of mechanism design. Chapter 2, which is
joint work with Vincent Meisner, is such a mechanism design exercise. We derive
the mechanism that allows for the optimal procurement of projects by a budget-
constrained procurement agency under ex-post constraints.
In Chapter 3, I use game theory to analyze a particular decision-making process:
voting. In the context of a committee voting on a reform, I ask whether how
the possibility of pre-vote cheap talk communication affects outcomes, when the
committee consists of two distinct groups.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I look at voting from an empirical perspective. Using data
from local elections in Thuringia, I investigate how a small party winning rep-
resentation on the municipal council affects the council’s policies and the party
itself.




In this chapter, we investigate how to design a specific decision-making process. In
particular, we ask ourselves how to organize public procurement. Public procure-
ment is an immensely important part of the economy, amounting to, for example,
16 percent of GDP in the EU.1
We have a specific public procurement situation in mind. We consider a procure-
ment agency that has a fixed budget and cannot go over budget. It wants to
procure projects from different suppliers who propose one project each. The pro-
curement agency knows how much it values each project but the projects’ costs
are the suppliers’ private information. The agency aims to maximize the aggregate
value of implemented projects. We want to design a mechanism for this problem
that is as robust as possible. Therefore, we impose that all constraints (budget,
incentive, and participation) have to hold ex-post.
Our leading example for a concrete procurement problem is that of a development
fund that has a fixed budget to build wells in different areas. It knows how valuable
a well is in a given community, but it does not know how much money is necessary
to build the well.
If costs were not private information, this problem would be the classical knapsack
problem: An individual (development fund) has a knapsack that can carry a cer-
tain amount of weight (budget). It wants to maximize the value of items (wells) it
carries in this knapsack. However, the total weight of carried items (sum of costs
of built wells) cannot exceed the capacity of the knapsack.
With private information, this problem becomes a mechanism design problem.
However, given our set of constraints, it cannot be solved with the standard
pointwise-optimization techniques. Instead, we derive characteristics that the op-
timal procurement mechanism must have. Those characteristics imply that the
optimal mechanism lies within the class of DA-auctions, a class of mechanisms
proposed by Milgrom and Segal (2014). As DA auctions are equivalent to clock
auctions, this result implies that our optimal procurement mechanism has a cor-
responding descending-clock auction.
If projects are ex-ante asymmetric, we find a novel and interesting quantity-quality
tradeoff: out of two projects the procurement agency must sometimes implement
1Source: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/public-procurement/
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the inferior project in order to get both projects with a high probability. This novel
tradeoff occurs because here, in contrast to similar mechanisms, the quantity of
procured projects is endogenously determined.
Chapter 3
This chapter is about analyzing voting as a decision-making process from a game-
theoretical perspective. In particular, it contributes to the literature on the strate-
gic interaction of cheap talk and voting. In it, I consider a committee that consists
of two differently sized groups, each with members that have homogeneous prefer-
ences. The committee must vote on whether to implement a reform that impacts
all members of the committee. Committee members have private information
about the probability of success of the reform.
Thus, voting can be seen as a way to aggregate this private information. However,
there are other ways to aggregate information. In particular, individuals on the
committee could talk to each other prior to voting. This communication is modeled
as cheap talk. The novelty in this model is that the committee consists of two
different groups whose members can both talk to each other and to the other
group.
In this model, I find that among the implementable social choice functions there
always exists one Pareto-dominant social choice. This result allows for the com-
parison of outcomes under two different voting rules: majority rule and unanimity.
Surprisingly, there exist parameters such that both groups, including the minority,
prefer majority rule and other parameters such that both groups, including the
majority, prefer unanimity.
Chapter 4
In this chapter, I empirically investigate representative democracy as a decision-
making process. For each party, there is a threshold of minimum votes that the
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party would need to get in order to win seats2 on the municipal council. This
threshold is a function of how many votes all other parties obtained and follows
from the seat-allocation method, which translates vote shares into the number of
seats. If a party obtains a number of votes that is very close to this threshold, it
can be considered close to random whether this party made it onto the municipal
council or not. In most cases in which the party does make it, it gains its seats
from other parties who would have been on the municipal council even if the party
close to the threshold would not have made it. Thus, in most cases, a small party
narrowly making it onto the municipal council implies that there is one additional
party on the council.
Using the quasi-randomness in close cases, I can use a regression discontinuity
(RD) design to estimate the effect of having seats on the council on the party
itself and the effect of having an additional party on the council on the council’s
policies. I find that a party that narrowly wins seats is 35 percent less likely
to drop out in the subsequent election. This result, however, precludes me from
estimating a precise incumbency effect, i.e., the effect of being on the council on
the vote share in the next election. Estimating bounds on the effect, I find no
evidence of a statistically significant incumbency effect.
On the municipal level, I find evidence of an effect on public spending. One
additional party leads to an increase in investment spending of almost 50 percent
compared to the average level. This increase is larger, the stronger the additional
party changes the overall composition of the municipal council.
2I use the plural “seats” as in some cases getting an additional vote can make the difference
between winning no seats or several seats. In the elections in my dataset, there is a minimum
threshold of 5 percent of the vote to win seats. But, on large councils, 5 percent of the vote
translates into more than one seat. Thus parties with a vote share of 5 percent can win several
seats but parties with 4.99 percent win none.




We study the problem of a procurer who can spend a fixed budget on any of n avail-
able projects which differ in the value the designer derives from them. Projects
(agents) have private information about their costs and want to get funding beyond
the necessary minimum. The designer’s goal is to select an affordable set of max-
imal aggregate quality. In other words, she faces a mechanism design variant of
the knapsack problem with strategic behavior due to informational asymmetries.1
Essentially, we approach this problem as an “up to possibly n-units” procurement
problem with n agents with single-unit supply where demand quantity is deter-
mined after observing projects’ reports under a budget constraint. The budget
constraint, the individual rationality constraints, and the incentive compatibility
constraints are imposed ex-post, i.e., for any cost realization, implemented projects
are always at least fully compensated, the sum of transfers must not exceed the
budget, and truth-telling must be a (weakly) dominant strategy. We find that the
optimal mechanism can be implemented with a descending-clock auction with a
deferred acceptance rule. Because of a tradeoff between quantity and quality, an
optimal price clock may have to stop for a period of time leading to instances in
which an inferior project is implemented instead of a superior one.
This framework matches a large range of allocation problems, in which a designer
needs to allocate a divisible but fixed capacity among agents. Allocation problems,
1The knapsack problem is a classical combinatorial problem, dating as far back as 1897. A
set of items is assigned values and weights. The knapsack should be filled with the maximal
value, but can carry only up to a given weight. For an overview of the literature on knapsack
problems, see Kellerer, Pferschy, and Pisinger (2004).
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in which a financial budget constraint represents the fixed capacity, include the
procurement of bus lines, bridges, and streets, or the allocation of subsidies or
research money. Alternatively, the capacity constraint can represent the payload
limit on a freighter or on a space shuttle,2 or a limited amount of time to be
devoted to several tasks. Out of many suitable applications, we employ as our
leading example a development fund that desires to distribute money to nonprofit
projects with nonmonetary benefits.
Our paper not only helps to understand a class of economically relevant problems,
the framework also presents a novel methodological challenge. The ex-post nature
of both the participation and the budget constraint precludes the use of standard
pointwise optimization techniques a` la Myerson (1981). Nonetheless, rewriting the
problem involves expressing expected transfers in terms of the allocation function
as an auxiliary step. As the designer maximizes expected payoff including residual
money, we can employ the procurement analogue of Myerson’s notion of “virtual
values”. However, our results qualitatively translate to a setting in which the
designer does not value residual money.
By focusing on strategyproof deterministic mechanisms, we can reduce the prob-
lem to finding a set of optimal cutoff functions zi that, for each project i, map the
cost vector of other projects c−i into a cutoff cost level. Project i is conducted
if and only if i’s cost report falls weakly below cutoff zi(c−i) and the correspond-
ing compensation payment for that case equals the cutoff zi(c−i). In optimum,
these cutoff functions implement an allocation rule that exhibits certain properties.
First, the optimal allocation rule has substitutes: Given a project is implemented
for some cost vector, it is also implemented when, all else being equal, the cost
of a rival project is increased. Second, the optimal allocation rule has non-bossy
winners: A single project that is implemented cannot affect the allocation without
changing its own allocation status. Third, the optimal allocation rule excludes all
projects with negative “virtual surplus” from the allocation.
By virtue of these properties, any optimal mechanism has an equivalent deferred
acceptance (DA) auction representation as described in Milgrom and Segal (2014).
A DA auction is an iterative algorithm that computes the allocation and transfers
of an auction mechanism and possesses attractive features with respect to bidders’
2Clearly, the capacity of a space shuttle is limited. The problem of optimally allocating
the capacity and incentivizing projects to reduce payload is economically relevant, see Ledyard,
Porter, and Wessen (2000).
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incentives that go beyond dominant-strategy implementability. First, in any DA
auction, revealing the type truthfully is an “obviously dominant strategy” as de-
fined by Li (2015).3 Second, any DA auction is weakly group-strategyproof. In
other words, it is impossible for a coalition of projects to coordinate their bidding
strategies such that it strictly increases the utility of all projects in the coalition.
Third, the dominant strategy equilibrium outcome of any DA auction is the only
outcome that survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies in the correspond-
ing full information game with the same allocation rule but where players pay
their own bid. Therefore predicting the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome
in a DA auction can be considered robust.
Milgrom and Segal (2014) argue that these properties make DA auctions suit-
able for many challenging environments such as radio spectrum reallocations.
Most importantly, they show that every DA auction can be represented by a
descending-clock auction. Among several potential applications, they also con-
sider our budget-constrained procurement setup (Example 5: “Adaptive Scoring
for a Budget Constraint”). However, they do not show optimality of the DA auc-
tion. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to do so in a nontrivial setting.
Therefore we can strengthen the argument in favor of DA auctions. The tech-
niques established in our paper may be helpful to prove optimality of DA auctions
in the other settings mentioned in their paper.
Reducing the set of candidates for optimality to a special kind of DA auction
implies that any optimal allocation can be implemented with an appropriately
designed descending-clock auction: Any project faces a clock with a continuously
decreasing price on it, and indicates whether it is willing to conduct its project at
this price. In this auction it is a weakly dominant strategy for any project to exit
the auction once the clock price hits the project’s cost level. At first, we focus on
the case in which all projects are ex-ante symmetric: They have the same value
and costs are drawn from the same distribution. Here, we show that it is optimal
to rank projects according to their cost and “greenlight” the cheapest ones. In
optimum, price clocks run down synchronously and hence projects exit in order of
their costs until the budget suffices to pay the current clock price to all remaining
active projects.
3There does not exist any deviation such that, in any information set in which a deviat-
ing action is played, the best-case deviation payoff (against even the most favorable profile of
strategies of the other players that is consistent with this information set) is strictly larger than
the worst-case payoff from truthful bidding (achieved against the least favorable such strategy
profile).
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Next, we examine the case of ex-ante asymmetric projects, i.e., costs are drawn
from different distributions and/or project values differ. Here, we restrict atten-
tion to the two-project case because it conveys the main insights while retaining
tractability. In applications, the designer may prefer some projects over others and
might have different information over cost distributions. In standard procurement
settings, the quantity of units to be procured is not endogenously determined
as in our model, but it is exogenously fixed to be some quantity k. It is well
known that in k-unit procurement auctions the k projects with the greatest non-
negative virtual surpluses are implemented, e.g., Luton and McAfee (1986). In
the asymmetric case, the ranking implied by costs and the ranking implied by
virtual surpluses do not necessarily coincide. Broadly speaking, the designer dis-
criminates against stochastically stronger projects, and favors projects with higher
values. The asymmetry requires that each project faces an individual clock and
prices decrease asynchronously. In optimum when quantities are exogenous, the
clocks’ speed is adjusted such that the virtual surplus of marginal projects is kept
equal at all times, see Caillaud and Robert (2005, Proposition 1).
Interestingly, the optimal allocation of this environment does not simply translate
into the asymmetric case of our environment. In contrast, projects are not always
greenlighted in order of their virtual surpluses. Therefore we cannot adopt the
approach of Caillaud and Robert (2005). Instead, the descending-clock imple-
mentation of the optimal allocation includes individual clocks stopping at certain
times. Here, the quantity-quality tradeoff kicks in: We show that the optimal allo-
cation generically features instances in which out of two rival projects the project
with lower virtual surplus is chosen. The reasoning behind this result is that the
number of procured units is endogenous. In the asymmetric case, always green-
lighting in order of virtual surplus reduces the expected number of greenlighted
projects compared to the optimal mechanism. Strategyproofness creates a trade-
off between quantity and quality of the procured projects. This discrimination of
the stronger project is employed on top of the discrimination due to stochastic
domination through the virtual costs.
Clock auctions are generally easy to understand and hard to manipulate. Fur-
thermore, they are less information hungry than, for example, sealed bid auctions.
In descending-clock auctions, the designer only learns the private information of
those projects that are not greenlighted. In fact, Milgrom and Segal (2014) show
that clock auctions are the only strategyproof mechanisms that preserve winners’
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unconditional privacy: Winners only need to reveal the minimum of their private
information that is necessary to prove that they should be winning. These features
of clock auctions make them attractive for applications in which there is limited
trust between the involved parties. In practice, clock auctions are commonly used
to sell fish in Japan and they are often found in the public sector, e.g., when the
US Department of the Treasury sells warrant positions.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the only one that considers purely
ex-post constrained optimal procurement design. Such a restrictive setting can
be seen as a “worst-case scenario” for the designer, suiting many economic ap-
plications. In our leading example of the development fund, an ex-post budget
constraint appears natural as budgets are usually fixed. The nonprofit nature of
the projects might prohibit acquiring additional money on the financial market.
Information rents are necessary, because a project might want to spend money on
extra equipment that is convenient for the project’s staff but has no value for the
designer. In practice, such incentive problems are often resolved using dominant-
strategy implementable mechanisms. In strategyproof mechanisms, agents have
no incentive to invest in espionage activities or to hire consultants to avoid mis-
specification of beliefs. Mainly, dominant strategies are desirable as they are easy
to explain and not prone to manipulation. For similar reasons, we restrict at-
tention to deterministic mechanisms. Deterministic mechanisms obviate the need
for a credible randomization device and are therefore more easily applicable in
practice. Finally, ex-post participation constraints are necessary because projects
simply cannot be conducted with insufficient funds, and the designer wants to
avoid costly renegotiations when the projects default.
Literature
Even though the knapsack problem has a wide range of economic applications,
there are relatively few publications in economics on this issue. Most prominently,
Maskin (2002), in his Nancy L. Schwartz memorial lecture, addressed the related
problem of the UK government that put aside a fixed fund to encourage firms to
reduce their pollution. The government faces n firms that have private marginal
cost of abatement θi and can commit to reduce xi units of pollution. To reduce pol-
lution as much as possible, the government pays expected compensation transfers
ti to the firms, who report costs and proposed abatement to maximize ti−θixi. For
some distributions, Maskin (2002) proposes a mechanism that satisfies an ex-post
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participation constraint, an ex-post incentive compatibility constraint, and the
condition that the budget is not exceeded in expectation. In response to Maskin
(2002), Chung and Ely (2002b) look at a more general class of mechanism design
problems with budget constraints and translate them into a setting a` la Baron
and Myerson (1982). Their approach nests Maskin (2002) and also Ensthaler and
Giebe (2014a) as special cases. However, Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a) more ex-
plicitly derive a constructive solution. In contrast to us, they all consider a soft
budget constraint that only requires the sum of expected transfers to be less than
the budget. By incorporating the budget constraint into a Lagrangian function
and ignoring the monotonicity (incentive) constraint, they find a mechanism that,
under the standard regularity condition, indeed is incentive compatible.
In addition, Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a) use AGV-budget-balancing (such as
Bo¨rgers and Norman, 2009) to obtain a mechanism which is ex-post budget-
feasible. However, transformation into a mechanism with an ex-post balanced
budget in such a way comes at the cost of sacrificing ex-post individual rational-
ity. Many applications do not allow this constraint to be weakened. For instance,
subsidy applicants usually cannot be forced to conduct their proposal when re-
ceiving only a small or possibly no subsidy. Alternatively, limited liability justifies
insisting on ex-post individual rationality. Because we want both constraints to
hold ex-post, we cannot build on their techniques and, thus, we approach the
problem by characterizing the optimal allocation rule.
To the best of our knowledge, no paper exists that jointly considers optimal mech-
anism design under ex-post budget balance and ex-post individual rationality in
a procurement setting. Ensthaler and Giebe (2014b) propose a belief-free clock
mechanism that coincides with our optimal mechanism in the symmetric case for
many parameterizations4 but differs in the asymmetric case by holding the cost-
benefit-ratio equal among projects. By simulating different settings, they conclude
that this mechanism outperforms a mechanism used in practice. In contrast to
their setting, the mechanism designer in our model values residual money. In Sec-
tion IV, we discuss the meaning of residual money and find that our main results
qualitatively carry to the case where residual money is neglected.
4For all parameter constellations such that virtual surplus is always nonnegative.
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Because of the appeal of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DIC) mech-
anisms compared to Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) mechanisms, many re-
searchers have produced valuable BIC-DIC equivalence results. These results char-
acterize environments in which restricting attention to the more robust incentive
criterion comes without loss. Our setup is not contained in these environments.
For any BIC mechanism, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) show that one can
construct a DIC mechanism implementing the same ex-post allocation rule, when-
ever this allocation rule is monotone in each coordinate. However, the ex-post
transfers of the constructed DIC mechanism are not guaranteed to satisfy ex-post
budget balance. More recently, Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi
(2013) employ a definition of equivalence in terms of interim expected utilities
introduced by Manelli and Vincent (2010). For any BIC mechanism, including
the optimal one, they construct a DIC mechanism that yields the same interim
expected utilities. Here, the ex-post allocation as well as the ex-post transfers
might differ between the two. Therefore a DIC mechanism equivalent to a feasible
BIC mechanism might violate the ex-post constraints in our setting.
Our budget-constrained procurement setup with ex-post constraints has received
much attention in the computer science literature. Instead of specifying the opti-
mal mechanism, the authors in this literature typically aim to construct allocation
algorithms that give good approximation guarantees. In other words, they try
to maximize the minimal payoff an algorithm can guarantee compared to the full
information knapsack payoff. Apart from the seminal paper by Singer (2010), the
works of Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer (2011) and Chen, Gravin, and Lu
(2011) are notable examples of this approach. Anari, Goel, and Nikzad (2014)
present a stochastic algorithm and show that it gives the best possible approxima-
tion guarantee in the many projects limit in which any individual project’s costs
are small compared to the budget. While the above papers examine the belief-free
case, Bei, Chen, Gravin, and Lu (2012) propose an algorithm for setups in which
the designer knows how the private information is distributed.
Other auction theoretic papers featuring “knapsack auctions” deal with a slightly
different problem compared to us. Aggarwal and Hartline (2006) consider a set-
ting in which each agent is characterized by his object of commonly known size
and a privately known valuation for having his object placed in the auctioneer’s
knapsack with commonly known capacity. They are looking for the truthful auc-
tion that best approximates the optimal full-information monotone pricing rule
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which maximizes the auctioneer’s profit. Mu’Alem and Nisan (2008) cover the
case of an auctioneer maximizing social welfare instead. Du¨tting, Gkatzelis, and
Roughgarden (2014) study the performance of DA auctions for knapsack auctions,
i.e., they show DA auctions fail to achieve a constant factor approximation of
the optimal social welfare in knapsack auctions Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu
(2011) investigate a similar knapsack problem of a profit maximizing auctioneer
in a dynamic setting: Agents sequentially arrive over time and are either included
in the knapsack immediately or lost forever. Thereby they avoid combinatorial
issues, which gives rise to a threshold property of the optimal mechanism. In such
knapsack auctions, the mechanism designer maximizes the sum of transfers, and
the value only enters the individual projects’ payoff while the capacity constraint is
imposed on the weight assigned to agents. In our framework, the value is collected
by the auctioneer and the capacity constraint is imposed on the sum of transfers.
Because of the latter, knapsack auctions and our knapsack procurement auctions
are not dual problems
There seems to be no reasonable analogy for our setting to another setting in
which the mechanism designer is a similarly constrained seller and the agents are
buyers. The literature on group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, initiated
by Moulin (1999), considers the dual of a “surplus-sharing” problem. The crucial
difference between this problem and our “budget-sharing” problem is that the
agents themselves produce the output to be distributed, while in our case the
budget to be distributed is fixed and unrelated to the surplus created by the
agents, which is collected by the mechanism designer. Budget-constrained buyers
in auctions have been discussed in the literature, e.g., by Che and Gale (1998) or
Pai and Vohra (2014). However, these authors study budget-constrained agents
whereas in our setting the designer is budget-constrained.
In the following section, we introduce the model. In Section III, we rewrite the
problem as a problem of finding the optimal cutoff functions and derive a set of
properties that any optimal mechanism must have. Sections III.i and III.ii cover
symmetric and asymmetric environments, respectively. We discuss extensions and
possible modifications to the model in Section IV. Finally, we conclude in Section
V.
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Model
We consider a set of n projects I = {1, . . . , n} and one mechanism designer. Each
project can be conducted exactly once. The designer gains utility vi if and only
if project i ∈ I is conducted. We consider projects to be utility maximizing
agents. If project i is executed, it incurs cost ci ∈ Ci := [ci, ci], where in the
following we restrict c = 0.5 Let C := ×i∈ICi and C−i := ×j∈I\{i}Cj. Let the
realization of a cost vector be denoted by c ∈ C. The costs are the projects’ private
information and are independently drawn from a distribution Fi. We assume Fi
to be continuously differentiable with a strictly positive density fi on the support.
The value of the project vi and the distribution Fi are common knowledge.
To compensate project i for its cost, the designer pays transfer ti. A direct mech-
anism is characterized by 〈qi, ti〉. It is a mapping from the vector of cost reports
c ∈ C into provision decisions and transfers. We denote the allocation function by
γ : C → P(I), and it maps a cost vector into the set of “greenlighted” projects,
an element of the power set of I. Correspondingly, we call I \ γ(c) the set of
“redlighted” projects.
We restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. This restriction implies that
once all cost reports are collected, we know with certainty which project is selected
by the mechanism. In other words, the decision of implementation qi is binary,
qi(c) = I(i ∈ γ(c)),
where I denotes an indicator function that is one if the corresponding condition is
true and zero otherwise. We employ a revelation-principle argument and without
loss of generality only consider direct mechanisms.6
5The impact of this assumption it discussed in Appendix VI.D.
6In general, the revelation principle does not hold when restricting attention to deterministic
mechanisms: Deterministic direct mechanisms are unable to replicate mixed strategy equilib-
ria in deterministic indirect mechanisms, as noted by, e.g., Strausz (2003). However, in our
setting we do not lose generality. A mixed strategy equilibrium consists of a distribution over
pure strategy profiles. Because the mechanism is implementable in dominant strategies any of
these pure strategy profiles also constitutes a pure strategy equilibrium, in particular the pure
strategy equilibrium associated with the designer’s most preferred outcome. Similarly, because
the mechanism is ex-post constrained, this outcome is feasible. Therefore, while there are al-
locations that (in the class of deterministic mechanisms) can only be implemented by indirect
mechanisms, the designer’s most preferred feasible allocation can truthfully be implemented in
a direct mechanism.
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Project i’s utility ui is given by its transfer minus the cost it bears,
ui(c) = ti(c)− qi(c)ci.
The designer derives value vi from each greenlighted project i while having to
pay the sum of transfers. Therefore she wants to maximize the aggregate value
of greenlighted projects net of transfers paid. Her (ex-post) utility function uD








We impose an ex-post participation constraint. That is, if i is greenlighted the
transfer must be at least as high as the cost,
ti(ci, c−i)− qi(ci, c−i)ci ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, (ci, c−i) ∈ C. (PC)
In addition, the designer has a budget constraint which is “hard” in the sense that
she cannot spend more than her budget B for any realization of the cost vector.
That is, the designer can never exceed her budget,
∑
i
ti(c) ≤ B ∀c ∈ C. (BC)
Finally, incentive compatibility has to hold ex-post. Alternatively, we can say
that the mechanism has to be implementable in (weakly) dominant strategies7 or
that the mechanism must be strategyproof. Therefore for every realization of the
cost vector, project i’s truthful report must yield at least as much utility as any
possible deviation,
ti(ci, c−i)− qi(ci, c−i)ci ≥ ti(c˜i, c−i)− qi(c˜i, c−i)ci
∀i ∈ I, c−i ∈ C−i and ci, c˜i ∈ Ci. (IC)
7In our private value environment, these two concepts are equivalent in a direct revelation
mechanism. In general, however, ex-post incentive compatibility is essentially a generalization
of dominant-strategy implementability to interdependent value environments. See Chung and
Ely (2002a).
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Analysis
We search for the direct mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the
designer and refer to this mechanism as the optimal mechanism. One may think
that a natural approach to this problem would be to express the ex-post transfer
ti(ci, c−i) as a function of the ex-post allocation decision qi(ci, c−i), taking c−i as
given, and applying the envelope theorem. In that case, it would be possible to
restrict attention to the allocation in order to solve for the optimal mechanism.
However, this approach does not reduce the complexity of the problem. The reason
is that the ex-post transfers and allocation for one cost vector restrict transfers and
allocation for other cost vectors through the budget constraint in a manner much
more involved than standard monotonicity. In particular, the budget constraint
with the ex-post transfer expressed as a function of the ex-post allocation may be
ill-behaved. Therefore we cannot straightforwardly arrive at sufficient conditions
using convex optimization.8
Instead, we derive a set of properties that every mechanism must inherit to be
optimal. In general, we establish these properties by showing that the expected
payoff yielded by any feasible mechanism not having one of the properties can
be increased by adopting the properties. For some of the following lemmata, we
provide the proof for the two-project case in the main text and provide the proof of
the general case in the appendix. Our first step is to show that strategyproofness
implies that the optimal mechanism has to be a cutoff mechanism.
Lemma 2.1. The optimal mechanism can be represented by cutoff functions zi :
C−i → Ci, such that project i is greenlighted whenever it reports a cost weakly less
than its cutoff,
qi(ci, c−i) = I(ci ≤ zi(c−i)).
The transfer to project i equals its cutoff whenever it is greenlighted and zero
otherwise,
ti(ci, c−i) = qi(ci, c−i)zi(c−i).
Proof. For any two cost reports ci, c
′
i ∈ Ci of project i and for some c−i ∈ C−i,
(IC) implies that if the allocation of i is the same, qi(ci, c−i) = qi(c′i, c−i), also the
transfer has to be the same, ti(ci, c−i) = ti(c′i, c−i). Otherwise, project i could, as
one of the cost types, deviate to the report yielding the higher transfer.
8Requiring either the budget or the participation constraint to hold only in expectation would
enable us to use the techniques employed by Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a).
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Conditional on i’s allocation and given any cost reports c−i, the transfer is fixed
and does not vary with i’s cost report. Hence, given c−i, there can only be two




Define zi(c−i) := t
qi=1
i (c−i)− tqi=0i (c−i). Then, (IC) implies
qi(ci, c−i) =
1 if ci ≤ zi(c−i)0 if ci > zi(c−i) .
Suppose to the contrary that for some realization ĉi < zi(c−i) and some other
c˜i < zi(c−i), qi(ĉi, c−i) = 0 and qi(c˜i, c−i) = 1. Then, type ĉi can profitably
deviate to reporting c˜i to ensure the green light which yields a utility increase of
zi(c−i)− ĉi. An analogous argument applies for ĉi > zi(c−i) > 0.9
The last step is to show that tqi=0i (c−i) = 0. This result follows from the mechanism
being optimal, i.e., maximizing expected utility of the designer.
As a direct consequence of dominant-strategy implementability, Lemma 2.1 shows
that allocation and transfers are characterized by cutoffs. Project i is greenlighted
whenever it reports a cost that lies weakly below the cutoff. Crucially, these cutoffs
are functions of the other cost reports c−i. However, the optimal cutoffs remain
to be determined. The maximization problem of the designer is given by
max{zi}i∈I Ec [
∑
i qi(c)vi − ti(c)]
s.t. (BC),
qi(c) = I(ci ≤ zi(c−i)) ∀c ∈ C,
ti(c) = I(ci ≤ zi(c−i))zi(c−i) ∀c ∈ C.
(2.2)
9When ci = zi(c−i), (IC) permits both qi(ci, c−i) = 0 and qi(ci, c−i) = 1. By convention,
we assume qi(ci, c−i) = 1 in this case. However, writing a mechanism this way precludes the
specification of tie-breakers, which might be necessary to conserve budget balance. For example,
in a two-project example we would write down the mechanism “greenlight the cheaper project”
as z1(c2) = c2 and z2(c1) = c1. If c1 = c2 a tie-breaker is needed to select a project. As this
is a zero-probability event, the choice of the tie-breaker does not impact the designer’s payoff.
Similarly, as projects are indifferent, their ex-post utility is unaffected. Therefore we refrain
from specifying a tie-breaker and proceed with our analysis as if both projects are greenlighted
in these cases.
Ex-post Optimal Knapsack Procurement. 17
Here, qi and ti are determined by the cutoff function zi. Incentive compatibility
and participation constraints, thus, hold by construction.
The next step towards solving this problem involves applying standard methods
introduced by Myerson (1981). Let the conditional expected probability of being
greenlighted and the conditional expected transfer be
Qi(ci) = Ec[qi(ci, c−i)|ci]
and Ti(ci) = Ec[ti(ci, c−i)|ci].
The interim incentive compatibility required by Myerson (1981) is weaker than
our condition (IC). Consequently, the expected transfer is determined by the al-
location, Ti(ci) = Qi(ci)ci +
∫ ci
ci
Qi(x)dx. The usual monotonicity condition is
trivially fulfilled as we are dealing with cutoff mechanisms. This reformulation
in turn allows us to rewrite the objective function as a function of the alloca-




i I(ci ≤ zi(c−i))
(




I(ci ≤ zi(c−i))zi(c−i) ≤ B ∀c ∈ C.
(2.3)
We call ϕi(ci) := ci+
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
the virtual cost of project i and ψi(ci) := vi−ϕi(ci) the
virtual surplus. Here, ϕ and ψ are the procurement analogues to standard auction
terminology. We can directly see from problem (2.3) that the optimal mechanism
maximizes the expected sum of greenlighted virtual surpluses.
Note that constrained optimization by Lagrangian is not straightforward here be-
cause of the nondifferentiability of the indicator function. Instead, in the following
we derive useful properties of the optimal cutoffs that can be exploited to charac-
terize the optimal mechanism. A cutoff mechanism is by construction monotonic
in the following sense:
Definition 2.2. An allocation rule γ is monotonic in costs if i ∈ γ(ci, c−i) and
c′i < ci imply i ∈ γ(c′i, c−i) for all c−i ∈ C−i.
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In words, if a project gets greenlighted for some cost vector, it also gets green-
lighted when, all else equal, its cost is lower. To proceed, we restrict the class of
distributions from which costs can be drawn.
Assumption 1 (Log-concavity). For all i, the cumulative distribution function Fi
is log-concave.
This assumption is standard in information economics. It is equivalent to the
reverse hazard rate function f/F being a weakly decreasing function or the ratio
F/f being weakly increasing. Hence, the standard regularity condition is implied:
ϕi is strictly increasing and ψi is strictly decreasing. A decreasing reverse hazard
rate is the procurement analogue to the assumption of increasing hazard rate
functions in seller auction settings.
Regularity ensures that a lower cost ci translates to a higher virtual surplus ψi(ci).




i (0) if ψ
−1
i (0) ∈ Ci
ci otherwise
, (2.4)
where regularity implies the invertibility of ψi and thus allows for the above def-
inition of z∗∗i . In the symmetric case, z
∗∗
i = z
∗∗ for all i ∈ I. Let ζ∗∗ be the
n-dimensional vector with z∗∗i as i-th element for all i ∈ I.
Definition 2.3. An allocation rule γ is ζ∗∗-exclusive if, for all i ∈ I, ci > z∗∗i
implies that i 6∈ γ(ci, c−i) for all c−i ∈ C−i.
A cutoff mechanism is ζ∗∗-exclusive if and only if zi(c−i) ≤ z∗∗i for all c−i ∈ C−i
and for all i ∈ I. If the budget sufficed, a designer would want to greenlight all
projects with nonnegative virtual surplus. Crucially, the arguments leading to this
statement also imply that it is never optimal to greenlight a project with negative
virtual surplus.
Lemma 2.4. The optimal mechanism is ζ∗∗-exclusive. In the trivial case,
∑
z∗∗i ≤
B, the optimal cutoffs are independent of the cost reports,
zi(c−i) = z∗∗i ∀c−i ∈ C−i and ∀i ∈ I.
The proof of this lemma is standard and hence omitted. It immediately follows
from the rewritten objective function (2.3): Greenlighting a project with negative
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virtual surplus decreases the designer’s payoff and uses part of the budget. Guar-
anteeing the green light for high-cost types comes at the cost of having to pay
higher information rents to all cost types. For the same reason, also a budget-
unconstrained designer would implement a ζ∗∗-exclusive mechanism, even when
the surplus vi − ci is positive for all projects. Next, we show that an optimal
mechanism possesses the following property:
Definition 2.5. An allocation rule γ has substitutes if i ∈ γ(c) and c′j > cj for
some j 6= i implies i ∈ γ(c′j, c−j).
That is, if a project gets greenlighted for some cost vector c, it is also greenlighted
when, all else equal, another project’s cost is increased. This property relates to
the cross-monotonicity defined in the cost sharing problem of Moulin and Shenker
(2001): an agent’s cost share cannot increase when the allocation set expands.
Having in mind a setting with an exogenously determined amount of projects to
be procured and without a budget constraint, this property is clearly optimal,
because if i is among the projects with the highest virtual surpluses for some cost
vector, it is also among them when the cost of some other project j is increased,
i.e., when j’s virtual surplus is decreased. However, with the budget constraint,
this property does not hold in a full-information setting.10 A cutoff mechanism
has substitutes if all functions zi are weakly increasing in each argument.
Lemma 2.6. The optimal mechanism has substitutes,
zi(c˜j, c−i−j) ≥ zi(ĉj, c−i−j) for almost every c˜j > ĉj and c−i−j ∈ C−i−j. (2.5)
Proof. (with n = 2, see appendix for the general proof)
For a graphical representation of the proof, consult Figure 2.1. We show that for
any feasible cutoff mechanism that does not have substitutes, there exists a feasible
alternative mechanism with substitutes that outperforms the initial candidate in
terms of the designer’s payoff. In fact, the alternative mechanism outperforms the
initial candidate state-by-state and not only in expected terms.
As a first step, we can, without loss of generality, restrict the range of any optimal
function zi: By ζ
∗∗-exclusivity, any optimal functional value zi(c−i) cannot exceed
10For example, there are two projects, v1 > v2. Under full information, both projects get
implemented for a cost vector (c1, c2) = (B − z, z). Then, increasing c1 would kick project 2
out of the allocation. In contrast, in our asymmetric-information setting where c2 pins down a
cutoff z1(c2) for project 1, project 1 instead loses the green light status, when its cost increases
while c2 remains constant.
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z∗∗i .
Next, fix an arbitrary feasible pair of cutoff functions {z1, z2} as a candidate for
optimality. Contrary to (2.5), suppose that z2 is decreasing on a set with positive
Lebesgue-measure. Then, there exist sets C˜1 and Ĉ1 with positive Lebesgue-
measure, such that
z2(ĉ1) > z2(c˜1) for all ĉ1 ∈ Ĉ1, c˜1 ∈ C˜1,
and ĉ1 < c˜1 for all elements of the corresponding sets.
Figure 2.1: The alternative cutoff mechanism {z1, z′2} outperforms the initial






















Now, consider an alternative cutoff mechanism {z1, z′2} that leaves cutoff function
z1 unchanged, but modifies the cutoff function of project 2 in the following way
z′2(c1) =
z2(ĉ1) if c1 ∈ C˜1z2(c1) otherwise ,
with an arbitrary ĉ1 ∈ Ĉ1. In words, the alternative flattens z2 over region C˜1 and
otherwise leaves the initial mechanism as it is. This alternative cutoff function is
depicted in Figure 2.1 as the thick flat line.
The alternative mechanism implements the same allocation, except in the gray
area depicted in Figure 2.1 where it additionally greenlights project 2. Because
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z2(ĉ1) ≤ z∗∗2 by ζ∗∗-exclusivity, the alternative mechanism clearly yields a higher
payoff.
It remains to be shown that the alternative mechanism is not only more profitable
but also feasible. First of all, the initial mechanism is, by assumption, budget-
feasible everywhere. In particular, it is feasible at any point (ĉ1, c˜2) with ĉ2 ≤ z2(ĉ1)
and ĉ1 ∈ Ĉ1. Formally, for any such points, the budget constraint holds,
q1(ĉ1, c˜2)z1(c˜2) + q2(ĉ1, c˜2)z2(ĉ1) ≤ B. (*)
To any point (ĉ1, c˜2), there is a range of corresponding points (c˜1, c˜2) with c˜1 ∈ C˜1.
We now check feasibility for any such point (c˜1, c˜2). Referring to Figure 2.1, we
are addressing all points that live in the rectangle below the thick flat line of z′2.
Under the alternative mechanism, for all c˜1 ∈ C˜1, q′2(c˜1, c˜2) = q2(ĉ1, c˜2) = 1.
Regarding ĉ1, there can be two cases:
Case 1: If ĉ1 ≤ z1(ĉ2), then q1(ĉ1, c˜2) = 1, i.e., both projects are implemented and









1(c˜1, c˜2)z1(c˜2) + z2(ĉ1)
≤ z1(c˜2) + z2(ĉ1) ≤ B,
where the final inequality follows from (*).
Case 2: If ĉ1 > z1(ĉ2), then q1(ĉ1, c˜2) = 0, i.e., only project 2 is financed. The







2(c˜1) = 0 + z
′
2(c˜1)
≤ z2(ĉ1) ≤ B,
where the first equality follows from c˜1 ≥ ĉ1 > z1(c˜2) and the final inequality again
follows from (*).
Since, for any feasible cutoff mechanism with a cutoff function that is somewhere
decreasing, we can find an alternative more profitable cutoff mechanism with cutoff
functions that are weakly increasing, the optimal mechanism’s allocation rule must
have substitutes.
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Lemma 2.6 establishes that optimal cutoff functions are weakly increasing in each
of their arguments. The intuition is straightforward. The cost realizations of all
projects are independent. Therefore project i’s cost report only influences the
allocation of project j 6= i via the budget constraint. Project i’s cost report only
influences the budget through exceeding or lying below the cutoff. If project i
exceeds its cutoff, this frees budget to be distributed among the other projects.
Consequently, their cutoffs should remain constant or increase. While the intuition
is the same for both n = 2 and n > 2, the proof is more involved in the general
case. The reason is that the cost report of the project with the decreasing cutoff
does not simultaneously pin down all other cutoffs and the remaining budget - as
it does when n = 2. We cannot trivially extend the proof above, if some cutoff of
a third project z3 increases in c1 while z2 decreases. The intuition of the general
proof is that a decreasing cutoff cannot be optimal, because it essentially implies
exchanging project 2 for project 1 while the virtual surplus of project 2 decreases
relative to the virtual surplus of project 1.
We continue by establishing the next property of the optimal mechanism:
Definition 2.7. An allocation rule γ has non-bossy winners if for any i ∈ I,
c ∈ C, and c′i ∈ Ci, i ∈ γ(c′i, c−i) ∩ γ(c) implies γ(c′i, c−i) = γ(c).
In words, a non-bossy winner cannot affect the allocation without changing its own
green-light status. In restricted environments, it can be shown that the optimal
allocation rule is non-bossy: γ(c′i, c−i)∩ {i} = γ(c)∩ {i} implies γ(c′i, c−i) = γ(c).
However, we only need the winners to be non-bossy and examples of environments
with bossy losers in the optimal mechanism can be constructed, see Appendix
VI.D.
Given some cost vector, let G represent the set of greenlighted projects and R
represent the set of redlighted projects. In the following lemma, we show that
given that only the projects in some set G are greenlighted and given the re-
maining projects’ costs cR, for all g ∈ G all functions zg intersect at some point
(aG1 (cR), a
G
2 (cR), ...). This point only depends on cost reports cR of redlighted
projects. Intuitively, optimal cutoffs cannot depend on greenlighted projects’ cost,
because for these projects the cutoff coincides with the transfer. For the two-
project case, Figure 2.2 illustrates that (BC) must bind when both projects are
greenlighted. However, then project 1 influencing project 2’s cutoff would change
the remaining budget which is equal to project 1’s transfer, given that (BC) binds.
This contradicts the notion of a cutoff mechanism.
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Lemma 2.8. For any cost vectors (cG, cR) ∈ C and (c′G, cR) ∈ C such that
G = γ(cG, cR) = γ(c
′
G, cR) and R = I \ γ(cG, cR), the optimal cutoff function zg
for all g ∈ G is (almost everywhere) independent of the costs of all greenlighted
projects cG. That is,
zg(cG−g, cR) = zg(c′G−g, cR),
for all cG−g and c′G−g such that G is the set of greenlighted agents.
Proof. (with n = 2, see appendix for the general proof and consult Figure 2.2 for
intuition)
By Lemma 2.1, the optimal mechanism has to be a cutoff mechanism. What
remains to be shown is that the cutoff functions {zi}i∈I only depend on cR. When
γ(c) is a singleton, i.e., when only one project is greenlighted, the statement follows
from the nature of a cutoff function. Hence, we need to show that the cutoffs
must be constants whenever γ(c) = {1, 2}. Therefore suppose that γ(c) = {1, 2}
is induced with positive probability.
Figure 2.2: In Lemma 2.8, we show that in the nontrivial two-project case
whenever G = {1, 2} both projects get constant transfers summing up to the
budget. For instance, the candidate mechanism (with substitutes) depicted








Take any feasible candidate mechanism with any increasing cutoff functions zi and
define
a1 = max{c1|∃c2 : c2 ≤ z2(c1), c1 ≤ z1(c2)}
a2 = max{c2|∃c1 : c1 ≤ z1(c2), c2 ≤ z2(c1)}, (2.6)
i.e., ai is the highest cost of project i such that both projects are implemented.
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Whenever greenlighting both projects, the sets over which we have defined a1 and
a2 must be non-empty. The maximum exists by left-continuity of any optimal
function zi.
11 Hence by definition of a1, there exists c˜2 such that a1 = z1(c˜2).
Similarly, there exists c˜1 such that a2 = z2(c˜1).
By definition, (c˜1, c˜2) ≤ (a1, a2) and at cost realization (c˜1, c˜2) both projects are
implemented. The budget feasibility of the candidate mechanism implies a1 +a2 ≤
B.
Now we show that, in optimum, z1(c
′
2) = a1, for all c
′
2 ≤ a2, and z2(c′1) = a2, for
all c′1 ≤ a1. Suppose not. Suppose (without loss of generality) there is some set
Ξ ⊂ [0, a2] with positive Lebesgue-measure such that z1(c′2) < a1 for all c′2 ∈ Ξ.
Denote zΞ1 := maxc2∈Ξ z1(c2). Since a1 + a2 ≤ B, changing the mechanism to
z1(c
′
2) = a1, ∀c′2 ≤ a2 does not violate the budget constraint and increases the
payoff by
∆ > Pr(c2 ∈ Ξ)
∫ a1
zΞ1
ψ1(c)dF (c) > 0.
In fact, this alternative mechanism outperforms the initial candidate state-by-state
and not only in expectation.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.8 combined with
monotonicity and bidder substitutability. It establishes that any optimal mecha-
nism satisfies non-bossiness of greenlighted projects.
Corollary 2.9. For any optimal mechanism with G = γ(cG, cR) for some (cG, cR) ∈
C, also γ(c′G, cR) = G for any cost vector (c′G, cR) ∈ C with c′g ≤ cg for all g ∈ G.
Hence, for all i ∈ I, for all c−i ∈ C−i, and for all ĉi, c˜i ∈ Ci with ĉi < c˜i, in any
optimal mechanism,
ĉi < c˜i ≤ zi(c−i) implies γ(ĉi, c−i) = γ(c˜i, c−i).
Taking stock, among all mechanisms satisfying (PC), (BC) and (IC), any mecha-
nism that maximizes the designer’s expected payoff (2.1) belongs to a certain class
11We can replace any function zi with a left-continuous function that is identical up to a set
of points with Lebesgue-measure zero. Hence, if there exists an optimal function zi that is not
left-continuous, then there also exists a left-continuous version of the same function that yields
the same payoff and hence is also optimal.
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of mechanisms: We have shown that the optimal mechanism is characterized by a
set of cutoff functions {zi}i∈I and the corresponding allocation rule is
Property 1 monotonic in costs,
Property 2 ζ∗∗-exclusive,
Property 3 has substitutes, and
Property 4 has non-bossy winners.
Being able to restrict attention to mechanisms with these properties is highly
useful, as these mechanisms are a much more tangible class than the substantially
larger set of all permissible cutoff mechanisms. In addition, all mechanisms with
these properties can be implemented with a DA auction as proposed by Milgrom
and Segal (2014). To this end, we first restate their definition adapted to our
setting.
Definition 2.10 (DA auction). A deferred acceptance (DA) auction is an iterative
algorithm defined by a collection of scoring functions
sAi : Ci × CI\A → R+
that are weakly increasing in ci for all i ∈ A and for all A ⊂ I. Let At ⊂ I denote
the set of active bidders in iteration t and initially A1 = I. The algorithm stops
in some period T when all active projects have a score of zero, sATi = 0 for all
i ∈ AT . Then the set of greenlighted project is AT . Otherwise, at each iteration
t, the project with the highest score is removed. The payment pti of project i at
iteration t is either given by the highest possible cost that i could have had without
being removed from the set of active bidders or by the last iteration’s payment,






i, cI\At) < s
At
j (cj, cI\At)} for j ∈ At \ At+1,
min{sup{c′i : sAti (c′i, cI\At) ≤ 0}, pt−1i } if t = T.
The algorithm is initialized with p0i = min{ci, z∗∗i , B}.12
The main appeal of DA auctions lies in their incentive guarantees. They are
not only strategyproof, they are obviously strategyproof, as defined by Li (2015).
12Compared to Milgrom and Segal (2014), we slightly tweak the updating function of payments
without changing the deferred acceptance nature of the algorithm and any of its properties.
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Moreover, DA auctions are weakly group-strategyproof. That is, no coalition of
projects can manipulate their reports such that it strictly increases the utility
of all projects in the coalition: At least one member of the coalition receives a
weakly worse payoff whenever other coalition members benefit. Because collusion
in auctions is generally illegal, compensating the worse off coalition member is
not contractible. In addition, the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome in a
DA auction can be interpreted as robust in the following sense: Consider the
full-information game in which all cost reports are observed, projects can report
any cost, the allocation is determined according to the DA auction’s allocation
rule, but projects receive their own report as payments. The dominant-strategy
equilibrium outcome of the DA auction is the only outcome that survives iterated
deletion of dominated strategies in this game.
Proposition 2.11. Any optimal mechanism has a DA auction representation and
can be implemented with a descending-clock auction.
The proof of Proposition 2.11 is relegated to a separate section in the appendix.
Milgrom and Segal (2014) show that with a finite type space, any mechanism
satisfying monotonicity, bidder substitutability, and non-bossiness of winners can
be implemented by a myopic clock auction.
The symmetric case
In this section, we focus on symmetric projects, i.e., environments with vi = v
and Fi = F for every project i ∈ I. An implication of this assumption is that
the order of costs coincides with the order of virtual surpluses and that z∗∗i = z
∗∗
for all i ∈ I. We show how to utilize the established results to characterize the
optimal allocation and also how to implement it. As in previous proofs, the proof of
Proposition 2.12 considers the two-project case while the general proof is relegated
to the appendix. In the two-project case, the designer’s optimization problem can
be reduced to optimally solving for a single constant. Nevertheless, we discuss
possible alternatives to the optimal mechanism in greater detail to foreshadow the
complications which arise in asymmetric environments.
Proposition 2.12. Arrange the projects in ascending order of their reported costs,







symmetric case, the cutoff mechanism with zi(c−i) = zk
∗
is the optimal mechanism.
The optimal number of accepted projects k∗ is given by k∗ := max{k|ck ≤ zk}.
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Proof. (with n = 2, see appendix for the general proof)
In Proposition 2.11, we have shown that the optimal mechanism must be a special
kind of DA auction. We call the mechanism in the proposition the proposed
mechanism and, as a candidate for optimality, consider {z1, z2}, some different
cutoff mechanism with the properties we derived. Suppose {z1, z2} greenlights both
projects with nonzero probability and that it differs from the proposed mechanism
in a way such that a1 = z > B/2 and a2 = B − z < B/2 with ai defined as in
(2.6). For graphic intuition of the deviation consult Figure 2.3.
By Lemma 2.4, any optimal mechanism must never greenlight a project with
negative virtual surplus. This property is depicted as the kink at (z∗∗, z∗∗).
In the area northwest of the dashed budget line, c1 + c2 > B, the designer can,
by (BC) and (PC), only execute one of the two projects. It can be directly seen
from objective function (2.3) that the designer prefers the project with the higher
virtual surplus, i.e., the one with lower cost. It does not, however, follow directly
that zi(cj) = cj whenever B−ci < cj < z∗∗. It could be optimal for the designer to
forgo executing the lower-cost project for some cost vectors (shaded triangle and
crossed square in Figure 2.3) in order to execute both projects in an additional
area (horizontally lined, Figure 2.3). In such a case, the designer is forced by
incentive compatibility to execute the higher-cost project (for cost vectors in the
shaded triangle or the square that is both horizontally and vertically lined).
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By Lemma 2.8, both cutoffs must be constant whenever both projects are executed.
In optimum in that case, there can be no slack in the budget constraint and zi is
flat in that region. Otherwise increasing one of the cutoffs until the budget binds
is both feasible and profitable.
Formally, candidate mechanism {z1, z2} is given by
z2(c1) =

z∗∗ if c1 ≥ z∗∗
c1 if z < c1 < z
∗∗
B − z if c1 < z
and z1(c2) =

z∗∗ if c2 ≥ z∗∗
c2 if B − z < c2 < z∗∗
z if c2 < B − z
. (2.7)
For ease of exposition, let A = B
2
. Let ∆ be the increase in the designer’s expected
payoff from implementing the proposed mechanism instead of candidate {z1, z2}.













ψ(x2)dF (x2)− (F (c)− F (A))ψ(x1)dF (x1) (shaded)
where the patterns represent the area in Figure 2.3 where the allocation changes.
Everywhere else the allocation and payoff remain the same.
To rewrite ∆, define ξ(x) = F (x)(v − x) with ξ′(x) = ψ(x)f(x):
∆ = F (z)(ξ(A)− ξ(B − z))− F (A)(ξ(z)− ξ(A))
+ F (A)(ξ(z)− ξ(A)) +
∫ z
A
ξ(x1)− ξ(A)− F (x1)ψj(x1)dF (x1)
= F (z)(ξ(A)− ξ(B − z))− F (A)(ξ(z)− ξ(A))
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∆ > F (z)(ξ(A)− ξ(B − z))− ξ(A)(F (z)− F (A)) + F (A)2(z − A)
= F (A)2(v − A+ z − A)− F (z)F (B − z)(v −B + z)
= (v −B + z)(F (A)2 − F (z)F (B − z))
> 0 ⇔ F (A)2 > F (z)F (B − z).
This statement is true under Assumption 1, log-concavity. Maximizing F (z)F (B−




F (B − z)
f(B − z) (2.8)
which is only true at z = B/2 since F/f is an increasing function. For the same
reason, the left-hand side is greater (less) than the right-hand side for z > B/2(<
B/2) making z = B/2 the maximum.
We have assumed that in the optimal mechanism both projects get greenlighted for
some cost vectors. It remains to show that the optimal mechanism beats the best
mechanism in which at most one project gets greenlighted. The best mechanism
that selects at most one project always greenlights the project with higher virtual
surplus. Clearly, the proposed mechanism outperforms this mechanism as it also
always greenlights the project with higher virtual surplus, and it, additionally,
sometimes greenlights a second project with positive virtual surplus.
To sum up, in the symmetric case, the optimal allocation rule takes a simple
form: The cheapest projects are greenlighted and the mechanism greenlights as
many projects as the budget allows, while each procured project receives the same
compensation. Any project that is redlighted prefers this allocation status over
having to conduct the project with the associated compensation.
There are two rationales for greenlighted projects to get the same transfer. First,
as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.12, this cutoff rule maximizes the probability
of getting as many projects as possible. Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility
prevents the budget from being shifted away from projects with low cost reports to
projects with high costs. Therefore offering equal cutoffs is the best the designer
can do. Second, as seen in (2.3), the rewritten maximization problem of the
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designer, the expected utility of the designer is given by the sum of virtual surpluses
of greenlighted projects. Therefore she wants to greenlight those projects with
the highest virtual surpluses. That goal is consistent with offering equal cutoffs
to greenlighted projects and excluding those with higher cost. In the optimal
allocation, greenlighted projects have higher virtual surplus than those which are
not greenlighted. The compatibility of the two goals - get as many projects as
possible and get those with the highest virtual surpluses - is a special feature of
the symmetric case. It generically fails in the asymmetric case, as we demonstrate
in the next section.
























Figure 2.4 illustrates the optimal budget-constrained allocations in an example
with two projects. Panel 2.4b shows the fully-constrained optimal allocation jux-
taposed with the relaxed optimal allocation when (IC) is neglected, shown in
Panel 2.4a. First, note that in this example v ≥ c and c < B. Therefore a
fully-unconstrained designer with full information would always greenlight both
projects, and a budget-constrained designer with full information would always
greenlight at least one project. However, since z∗∗ < c, there exist realizations
of c (the upper-right corner of Panel 2.4b) such that no project gets greenlighted
in the (IC)-constrained optimal allocation, even though doing so would be prof-
itable from an ex-post perspective. The negative virtual surpluses of the projects
in these cases indicates that the cost of allocating to such a project - incentive
compatibility requires higher transfers for other cost types - outweighs the benefit
from an ex-ante perspective. The second major difference between the relaxed
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optimal allocation and the optimal allocation can be seen for those realizations of
costs such that allocating to both projects would be feasible only in the relaxed
problem. This difference is a result of the designer’s inability to shift budget from
low-cost to relatively higher-cost projects with a strategyproof mechanism.
Corollary 2.13. In the symmetric case, the optimal direct mechanism can be
implemented by a descending-clock auction. The clock price, denoted by τ , starts
at z∗∗ and descends continuously and synchronously down to B
n
. Projects can drop
out at any price but cannot re-enter. The auction stops once the clock price can
be paid out to all projects remaining in the auction.
In any iteration, a scoring function of the corresponding DA auction is
sAti (ci, At) = max
{
ci − B|At| , 0
}
.
We consider the descending-clock auction of Corollary 2.13 to be a natural indirect
mechanism that implements the outcome of the optimal allocation. Project i’s
equilibrium strategy, which implements this outcome, has it staying active as long
as the price is weakly larger than its private cost, τ ≥ ci. It is easily verifiable
that this is a weakly dominant strategy for project i.
The asymmetric case
In this section, we demonstrate why the logic of the optimal mechanism in the
symmetric case does not carry over to the asymmetric case. To preserve tractabil-
ity, we restrict the analysis to the two-project case which conveys the intuition
behind the forces at work in the general case. However, we allow for general val-
ues v1 and v2 as well as differing cost distributions F1 and F2. We consider the
non-trivial case, z∗∗1 + z
∗∗
2 > B
Since we did not impose symmetry to prove Proposition 2.11, we can without loss
of generality restrict attention to mechanisms inheriting the optimal properties
to find an optimal mechanism for the asymmetric case as well. The rewritten
maximization problem of the designer (2.3) for the asymmetric two-project case










v2 − c2 − F2(c2)f2(c2)
) ]
s.t.
I(c1 ≤ z1(c2))z1(c2) + I(c2 ≤ z2(c1))z2(c1) ≤ B ∀(c1, c2) ∈ C.
(2.9)
By Lemma 2.8, the cutoffs must be constants whenever both projects are green-
lighted. Since we consider the non-trivial case, these constants must sum up to
the budget. Otherwise, increasing one of the cutoffs until the budget binds is
both feasible and profitable. Let project 1’s cutoff for this case be z1(c2) = z and
project 2’s cutoff be z2(c1) = B − z. By virtue of the optimal properties, the de-
signer must greenlight a project once its cost is below the constant cutoff zi(c−i).
If both projects report greater costs, the designer is free to choose one of them. A
glance at the objective function (2.9) reveals that in such a case it is desirable to
greenlight the project with greater positive virtual surplus, if feasible. This result



















∫ min{ψ−12 (ψ1(c1)),z∗∗2 ,B}
B−z
ψ2(x)dF2(x)dF1(c1).
In the symmetric case, the ranking of virtual surpluses coincides with the reversed
order of costs. Hence, the optimal DA auction in the symmetric case rejects in each
round the least attractive project in terms of virtual surplus. A natural extension
of this mechanism to the asymmetric case would involve adjusting the cutoffs so
that they equalize virtual surplus. This modification ensures that again in each
round the least attractive project in terms of virtual surplus is rejected. We call
this the candidate allocation.
The condition for optimality of the candidate allocation is stated in (2.11). To
implement the candidate allocation, the constant cutoffs at which both projects
are greenlighted must be a pair (a1, a2) = (z, B− z) such that ψ1(z) = ψ2(B− z).




. The intuition behind
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this statement is straightforward. Selecting z in order to satisfy ψ1(z) = ψ2(B−z)
allows the designer to always program the price clocks such that they greenlight
the project with the higher virtual surplus, whenever it is not feasible to greenlight




the cutoffs z and B−z do not maximize
the probability to greenlight both projects. Consequently, the designer can adjust
the cutoffs {z,B − z} to trade off a higher probability of implementing the most
favorable allocation (γ(c1, c2) = {1, 2}) against a positive probability of having to
implement the less preferred of two possible singleton allocations (γ(c) = j, when
project j has lower virtual surplus).
Therefore the two aspects of the designer’s payoff maximization - getting projects
with high virtual surplus and getting as many projects as possible - are only
aligned if condition (2.11) is met. In the symmetric case, the condition holds by
construction. However, in an asymmetric environment it is generically violated.
Proposition 2.14. In the nontrivial asymmetric two-project case, i.e., n = 2
and z∗∗1 + z
∗∗
2 > B, in which values or cost distributions differ across projects, it
is generically not optimal to always greenlight the project with the higher virtual
surplus. That is, under the optimal allocation rule γ, there may exist cost vectors
(ci, cj, c−i−j) ∈ C such that
i 6∈ γ(ci, cj, c−i−j), and j ∈ γ(ci, cj, c−i−j)
although
ψi(ci) > ψj(cj).
Proof. To obtain the derivative of pi(z) given in (2.10) with respect to z we can use
the rules for differentiation under the integral sign.13 Given the max operators,
the derivative takes a different form depending on whether ψ1(z) ≷ ψ2(B − z).










+ ψ1(z)f1(z)F2(B − z)
− ψ2(B − z)f2(B − z)F1(ψ−11 (ψ2(B − z))).
13Define g(z, c2) :=
∫min{ψ−11 (ψ2(c2)),z∗∗1 ,B}
z







= g(z, b(z))b′(z)− g(z, a(z))a′(z) + ∫ b(z)
a(z)
gz(z, c2)dc2.
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= 0⇔ F2(B − z)




a nongeneric case. Consequently, it is generically not optimal to always allocate
to the project with the higher virtual surplus.
Proposition 2.14 is driven by a tradeoff between quantity and quality: Even though
the designer always prefers the project with the higher virtual surplus, if she
greenlights a single project she sometimes greenlights the project with lower virtual
surplus out of two rival projects, as quantity is endogenous here. The simplest
way to lay out the intuition behind Proposition 2.14 is by an example.
Example 2.1. There are two projects, (n = 2) with v1 = 5, v2 = 4.5 and c1 and
c2 are uniformly distributed on support [0, 1]. The budget is given by B = 1. The
optimal cutoff functions are given by:
z1(c2) =

0.53 if c2 ≤ 0.47
c2 + 0.25 if 0.47 < c2 ≤ 0.75
1 if c2 > 0.75
z2(c1) =
0.47 if c1 ≤ 0.72c1 − 0.25 if c1 > 0.72.





c1 + 0.47 if 0.53 < c1 < 0.72





2c2 + 0.25 if c2 > 0.470 otherwise
s
{1}
1 (c1) = 0
s
{2}
2 (c2) = 0.
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The corresponding optimal allocation is:
(q1, q2) =

(1, 1) if 0 ≤ c1 ≤ 0.53 and 0 ≤ c2 ≤ 0.47
(1, 0) if 0 ≤ c1 ≤ 0.72 and c2 > 0.47
(1, 0) if c1 > 0.72 and ψ1 ≥ ψ2
(0, 1) if 0.53 < c1 ≤ 0.72 and c2 ≤ 0.47
(0, 1) if c1 > 0.72 and ψ1 < ψ2.
The corresponding transfers are:
t1(c1, c2) =

0.53 if c2 ≤ 0.47 and c1 ≤ 0.53
c2 + 0.25 if 0.47 < c2 ≤ 0.75 and c1 ≤ c2 + 0.25




0.47 if c1 ≤ 0.72 and c2 ≤ 0.47
c1 − 0.25 if c1 > 0.72 and c2 < c1 − 0.25
0 otherwise.
Consider Example 2.1. The candidate allocation demands cutoffs such that z˜1(c2) =
0.625 and z˜2(c1) = 0.375 for allocating to both projects. At these cutoffs, the prob-
ability of greenlighting both projects is 0.625 · 0.375 ≈ 0.234. This allocation is
depicted in Panel 2.5a. In contrast, the maximal feasible probability to greenlight
both projects is at equal cutoffs, ẑ1(c2) = ẑ2(c1) = 0.5. The corresponding area is
the dotted square in the lower-left corner of Panel 2.5b. However, at these cutoffs
it is not incentive compatible to guarantee the green light for the project with
higher virtual surplus in every case. More specifically, it is not incentive compat-
ible to allocate along the dotted14 diagonal line, if at least one project exceeds
ẑi(c−i). Hence, strategyproofness introduces a tradeoff between maximizing the
probability of greenlighting both projects and allocating to the preferred one if only
one project is feasible. Consequently, the optimal cutoffs (z∗1 , z
∗
2) for greenlighting
14Not to be confused with the dashed diagonal representing the budget constraint.
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both projects do not lie at (0.625, 0.375) but rather at (0.53, 0.47). Importantly,
this optimal discrimination of the stronger project is pursued independently of the
discrimination due to the stochastic dominance reflected in the virtual costs.
Given the optimal allocation in Example 2.1, there are some realizations of the cost
vector for which the designer greenlights the project with lower virtual surplus.
These realizations are represented by the shaded area in Panel 2.6a. Here, (IC),
(PC), and the choice of (z1(c2), z2(c1)) force the designer to greenlight project 2,
even though project 1 has the higher virtual surplus.
The cost vectors for which the designer implements both projects are repre-
sented by the rectangular area in the lower-left corner of Panel 2.6a. Any point
(z1(c2), z2(c1)) on the dashed line representing the budget constraint satisfies z1(c2)+
z2(c1) = B. Moving this corner point southwest along the dashed budget line has
two effects: shrinking the shaded area and shrinking the area of the rectangle,
which in this example represents the probability that both projects are conducted.
While it is desirable to shrink the shaded area, in which the designer must allocate
to project 2 despite its lower virtual surplus, shrinking the size of the rectangle
lowers the probability of allocating to both projects. Given that we have an in-
terior solution in this example, at (z1(c2), z2(c1)) these two effects balance each
other out.



















Graphically, the fact that there is no slack in the budget constraint whenever both
projects are greenlighted implies that the area representing points at which both
projects are executed touches the dashed line at least once, as can be seen, for
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example, in Panel 2.6b. In fact, it can touch the (BC)-constraint exactly once, as it
is not possible to greenlight both projects when c1 > z1(c2) or c2 > z2(c1) without
violating (BC) sometimes. This result means that the area where both projects
are greenlighted is the rectangle with corners (0, 0) and (z1(c2), z2(c1)). Then,
if c1 < z1(c2) but c2 > z2(c1), the nature of cutoffs prevents the designer from
greenlighting project 2. Therefore project 1 must be greenlighted, as represented
by the lightly shaded area in Panel 2.6b. A similar argument applies to the darkly
shaded area. Thus, looking at Panel 2.6b, the choice of (z1(c2), z2(c1)) determines
the allocation for all cost realizations except those in the upper-right corner. Here,
the designer is free to choose the allocation, as long as the line delineating whether
project 1 or 2 gets greenlighted is (weakly) increasing or vertical. Not surprisingly,
it is optimal to greenlight the project with the higher virtual surplus.
Figure 2.6: Greenlighting the project with lower virtual surplus and (IC)-






















(b) (IC)-constraints on the alloca-
tion.
By Proposition 2.11, the optimal allocation can be implemented with a descending-
clock auction. In the following, we show how to accommodate the tradeoff between
quantity and quality in a modified clock auction.
Corollary 2.15. In an optimal implementation with descending price clocks, the
clocks not only run at individual speeds, occasionally some clocks also have to halt.
A crucial difference to the symmetric case is that each project must have an individ-
ual price clock, because heterogeneous virtual surplus functions require individual
speeds. Interestingly, an implication of the quantity-quality tradeoff is that some-
times one clock has to halt. For Example 2.1, the clock prices, denoted by τi, are
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depicted in Figure 2.7 as a function of time. The entire (maximal) duration of the
auction can be divided into three segments. The auction starts with both clocks
at z∗∗1 = z
∗∗
2 = c. First, τ2 decreases while τ1 is held constant, which happens
until both clock prices lead to the same virtual surplus, i.e., ψ2(τ2) = ψ1(c2). Sec-
ond, both τ1 and τ2 decrease simultaneously, but asynchronously keeping virtual
surplus equal, ψ1(τ1) = ψ2(τ2), until τ2 = z2(c1). Third, only τ1 decreases until
τ1 = z1(c2). If at this point both projects still remain in the auction, the auction
stops and both are greenlighted. Otherwise, the inferior project 2 is greenlighted.











The cost vectors for which the designer greenlights project 2 despite its lower
virtual surplus, represented by the shaded area in Panel 2.6a, are also represented
graphically in Figure 2.7: If the auction ends in the third time segment (shaded
area of Figure 2.7) before both projects can be greenlighted, project 1 must have
exited because τ1 dropped below c1. Project 2 is greenlighted and receives transfer
z2(c1) even though project 1 has the higher virtual surplus. Therefore if cost
vectors in the shaded area of Panel 2.6a realize, the optimal descending-clock
auction ends in the third time segment.
We should emphasize again a novel feature of this descending-clock auction. The
clocks of both projects are paused asynchronously over some time of the auction.
One project’s clock runs down while the other project’s clock stops. Since we have
examined a very simple example, each project’s clock is paused only once. In a
more general setting, the projects’ clocks may pause and resume several times.
Given the complexity of our problem, we do not find a simple and general (n >
2) full characterization of the optimal mechanism in the asymmetric case. In
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our examples with two projects, the problem boils down to finding one point,
(z1(c2), z2(c1)), with respect to one crucial tradeoff. Naturally, the number of
relevant tradeoffs increases with the number of projects. Therefore unfortunately,
optimization with a larger set of projects quickly loses tractability.
Discussion
With our model as a starting point, there are several interesting modifications. In
this section, we address the most natural alternative models or extensions.
vi as private information, potentially correlated with ci - The designer can
neglect asking for vi directly since no meaningful non-babbling equilibria in the
vi-dimension exist. If the conditional density of vi|ci has full support, project i
cannot credibly announce being a “high” type, say vi. If we slightly change the
regularity assumption such that E[vi|ci]−ci− F (ci)f(ci must be strictly increasing, our
results generalize by exchanging the previously commonly known vi with E[vi|ci].
This regularity condition mildly restricts the degree of positive correlation.
Interdependent types - We can interpret the symmetric case as a setting in
which identical projects are provided at individual costs. Hence, one may wonder
about a setting in which projects only draw an imperfect signal about the cost,
which finally depends on other projects’ signals as well. In a clock auction in such
an environment, active projects update their belief about the cost whenever a
project drops out. Moreover, the designer learns this information as well. There-
fore the design of the optimal mechanism crucially depends on the information
structure. This analysis is left for a follow-up paper.
Residual money
Whether it is reasonable to assume that the designer values residual money de-
pends on the setting. In Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a), money does not enter the
objective function, only the constraints. To clarify the relation to their paper, we
introduce a linear weighting λ ∈ [0, 1] of residual money, and provide comparative
statics on parameter λ. The objective function can be rewritten as in (2.3),
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max{zi}i∈I Ec
[∑










I(ci ≤ zi(c−i))zi(c−i) ≤ B ∀c ∈ C.
This objective function highlights one difference to the original setting. Instead of
ζ∗∗-exclusive the optimal mechanism is ζ∗∗λ -exclusive: Define ψi,λ(c) = vi − λ(c +
Fi(c)
fi(c)
) as the λ-adjusted virtual surplus and define the vector ζ∗∗λ with i-the element
z∗∗i,λ = min{ci, ψ−1i,λ (0)}.
It can be shown that the other properties that are sufficient to allow a DA-auction
implementation continue to hold. In fact, the optimal allocation in the symmetric
case remains unchanged if ζ∗∗λ = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) for all λ ∈ [0, 1], i.e., when the
original optimal mechanism did not exclude any cost types. For any combination
of cost supports and values, there exists a sufficiently small λ′ > 0 such that
the designer’s ranking over projects is lexicographic. In other words, λ′ must
be sufficiently small such that no λ′-weighted difference in cost can offset any
difference in values.
Figure 2.8: Decreasing λ augments the quantity-quality tradeoff: The gray








In the asymmetric case, however, the quantity-quality tradeoff is affected as well.
To illustrate how the optimal allocation varies when λ is perturbed, we consider
the example again, see Figure 2.8. A lower λ means that the designer prefers the
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high-value project 1 for higher cost reports relative to the low-value project 2 for
a given cost report. This difference is illustrated by a right-shift in the diagonal
that represents the loci such that both projects have equal (λ-adjusted) virtual
surplus.
Reducing the weight of residual money increases the measure of cost reports for
which the optimal mechanism implements project 2 despite project 1 having the
larger λ-adjusted virtual surplus. Thus changing λ directly affects the quantity-
quality tradeoff. As illustrated in Figure 2.8, reducing λ means that in the optimal
mechanism the cutoffs at which both projects are greenlighted moves southeast,
thus reducing the probability to greenlight both projects. The reason is that for
lower λ a higher weight is placed on the high-value project 1.
Conclusion
Despite their importance, knapsack problems with private information have been
somewhat overlooked by the economics literature. We examine a setting in which
a budget-constrained procurer faces privately-informed sellers under ex-post con-
straints. Amongst many possible economic problems, this setting particularly ap-
plies to development funds, which are typically endowed with a fixed budget and
want to finance both many projects and projects of high quality. Such problems
often entail relationships in which sellers can renege on the terms of the agree-
ment ex-post. To avoid nondelivery, shelving the project or costly renegotiation,
it is appropriate to impose ex-post constraints on the agents’ participation. For
such settings, we have shown that a subset of DA auctions constitutes the class of
optimal deterministic strategyproof mechanisms.
An optimal mechanism is described by a set of cutoff functions: All projects that
report costs below their cutoff are greenlighted and receive a transfer equal to
the cutoff. These cutoff functions are weakly increasing in other projects’ costs,
which means that the optimal allocation rule has substitutes: Given a project
is implemented for some cost vector, it is also implemented when, all else being
equal, the cost of a rival project is increased. Moreover, we show that the optimal
allocation rule has non-bossy winners: A project that is implemented cannot affect
the allocation without changing its own allocation status. In particular, if two
different realizations of the cost vector lead to the same allocation, then the cutoffs
of conducted projects only vary in the costs of projects not conducted. Finally,
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the optimal allocation rule excludes all projects with negative “virtual surplus”
from the allocation.
These properties allow for a characterization as a deferred acceptance (DA) auc-
tion, introduced by Milgrom and Segal (2014). The DA auction representation
provides a simple implementation via descending-clock auctions, which are easy
to understand and usable in practice. In addition, DA auctions have attractive
properties regarding incentive compatibility which make the prediction of equilib-
rium play more robust.
We fully describe the optimal allocation and the corresponding descending-clock
auction in an environment in which projects are ex-ante symmetric. The optimal
mechanism is monotone in the sense that the cheapest projects are greenlighted
and all projects conducted receive the same transfer. This transfer either corre-
sponds to the lowest cost among redlighted projects or the budget is distributed
equally. The equivalent clock auction features a single price clock that continu-
ously descends until all active projects can be financed.
For asymmetric environments, in which values and/or cost distributions differ,
we demonstrate a novel tradeoff between quantity and quality of the greenlighted
projects. The designer values both quantity and quality of the projects: She
prefers projects with high virtual surplus over projects with low virtual surplus
and she prefers more projects over fewer projects. In models in which the designer
wants to procure a fixed number of projects, she would always choose the projects
with the highest virtual surpluses. If quantity is endogenously determined by the
mechanism, as in our setup, it is ex-ante not always desirable to conduct the best
projects. When the best projects are always conducted, incentive compatibility
would force the designer to reduce the expected number of greenlighted projects.
This insight entails a consequence for the corresponding descending-clock auction.
Clocks not only run asynchronously, but also periodically have to stop for certain
projects.
Other interesting extensions are left for future research, for example, multiple
projects per agent or projects that are complements instead of perfect substitutes.
For practitioners, a simple approximately optimal mechanism may be of great
value. The characterization of the optimal mechanism as a DA auction sheds
light on how to construct such an approximately optimal mechanism. Halting
clocks should be a key feature for the corresponding clock auction in asymmetric
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environments. However, we showed that the optimal strategyproof mechanism is
not detail-free.
In conclusion, our methodological approach contributes to a better understanding
of a class of relevant problems and opens the door for future research in this
area. Furthermore, we provide an elegant indirect mechanism that can be easily
implemented in practice.
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Appendix
Properties of optimal mechanisms: General proofs
Lemma 2.6. The optimal mechanism has substitutes,
zi(c˜j, c−i−j) ≥ zi(ĉj, c−i−j) for almost every c˜j > ĉj and c−i−j ∈ C−i−j. (2.5)















(b) Intuition for the tilde devi-
ation.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that somewhere z2 is decreasing in c1. Then there
exist some c1
M and η > 0 such that z2(c1, c−1−2) > z2(c1, c−1−2) for all c1 ∈
(c1
M − η, c1M), for all c1 ∈ (c1M , c1M + η), and for all c−1−2 ∈ χ−1−2 ⊂ C−1−2, and
χ−1−2 has positive Lebesgue-measure.
With more than two projects, the simple deviation of the two-project case - flat-
tening the decreasing cutoff - is not necessarily feasible. It may be the case that
other projects’ cutoff functions are strictly increasing in c1 over the same region
and that for some cost vectors these cutoffs have to be paid along z2. Then simply
flattening z2 could violate the budget constraint.
Suppose no other cutoff function is increasing while z2 is decreasing. Then the
decrease of z2 cannot be optimal and flattening z2 increases the designer’s payoff
much in the same way as in the two-project-case. Otherwise, pick a subset of
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(b) Intuition for the tilde devi-
ation.
χ̂1 ⊂ (c1M , c1M + η) (with pos. Lebesgue-measure) such that w.l.o.g. project 3’s
cutoff increases in c1 in the analogous sense to the decrease of z2 defined above -
for cost vectors where both project 2 and project 3 are eventually greenlighted,
i.e., z2 and z3 both need to be paid.
The set
Ξ̂23(c1, c−1−2−3, δ) = {(c2, c3)|c2 ∈ (z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3), z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) + δ];
c3 ∈ (z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3)− δ, z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3)]}
must have positive measure on R2 for all c1 ∈ χ̂1 and for any c−1−2−3 ∈ χ−1−2−3,
where χ−1−2−3 is a set with positive Lebesgue measure where the cutoff of project
2 is decreasing while the cutoff of project 3 is increasing. It is the set of (c2, c3)
tuples, where c2 just exceeds z2 by no more than δ, while c3 lies just below z3 by
no more than δ - given c−1−2−3 and c1. By Ξ̂223(c1, c−1−2−3, δ) we denote the set
of project 2 components of tuples in the set Ξ̂23(c1, c−1−2−3, δ), and similarly for
project 3.
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Now deviate from the candidate mechanism in setting
ẑ2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) := z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) + δ
ẑ3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) := z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3)− δ
for all
c1 ∈ (ĉ1, ĉ1 + ε)
c2 ∈ Ξ̂223(c1, c−1−2−3)
c3 ∈ Ξ̂323(c1, c−1−2−3)
c−1−2−3 ∈ χ̂−1−2−3 ⊂ χ−1−2−3.
We call this deviation the hat deviation. The intuition for this deviation is the
following. For an ε-environment of c1 to the right of c
M
1 (i.e., ĉ1 > c
M
1 ), in-
crease the decreasing cutoff z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) by δ for all c3 that drop out of
the allocation if z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) (at c2) is decreased by δ. Likewise only in-
crease z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) by δ for those c2 that are additionally greenlighted if
z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) is increased by δ. Therefore if the deviation changes the alloca-
tion, project 2 is now greenlighted whereas project 3 is not.
This deviation is feasible. Remember that there must be enough budget to pay
both z2 and z3 - otherwise flattening z2 would have been possible. But then there









c1 ∈ (ĉ1, ĉ1 + ε)
c−1−2−3 ∈ χ̂−1−2−3.
In words, to bound the change in payoff we let ĉ2 be the highest cost type gained
by the deviation and we let ĉ3 be the lowest cost type lost by the deviation. Then
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the change in payoff for the hat deviation is bounded in the following way:









If ∆̂ > 0, we have found a profitable deviation. If not, then consider the following
tilde deviation.
Analogously to Ξ̂23 we define the set
Ξ˜23(c1, c−1−2−3, δ) = {(c2, c3)|c2 ∈ (z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3)− δ, z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3)];
c3 ∈ (z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3), z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) + δ]}
which again must have positive measure.
Now, we deviate for an ε-environment to the left of cM1 (i.e., c˜1 < c
M
1 ). But instead
of increasing z2 and decreasing z3, we increase z3 and decrease z2:
z˜2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) := z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3)− δ
ẑ3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) := z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) + δ
for all
c1 ∈ (c˜1 − ε, c˜1)
c2 ∈ Ξ˜223(c1, c−1−2−3)
c3 ∈ Ξ˜323(c1, c−1−2−3)
c−1−2−3 ∈ χ˜−1−2−3 ⊂ χ−1−2−3.








c1 ∈ (c˜1 − ε, c˜1)
c−1−2−3 ∈ χ˜−1−2−3.
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And this gives the following bound for the payoff









By appropriately choosing δ, Ξ̂−1−2−3, and Ξ˜−1−2−3, we can ensure that ĉ3 > c˜3 and
ĉ2 < c˜2. This follows simply from the notion of increasing/decreasing cutoffs and is
illustrated in Figures 2.9 and 2.10. Therefore ∆̂ ≤ 0 implies ∆˜ > 0. Consequently,
there is always a profitable deviation and our candidate mechanism could not have
been optimal.
Lemma 2.8. For any cost vectors (cG, cR) ∈ C and (c′G, cR) ∈ C such that
G = γ(cG, cR) = γ(c
′
G, cR) and R = I \ γ(cG, cR), the optimal cutoff function zg
for all g ∈ G is (almost everywhere) independent of the costs of all greenlighted
projects cG. That is,
zg(cG−g, cR) = zg(c′G−g, cR),
for all cG−g and c′G−g such that G is the set of greenlighted agents.
Proof. Take any feasible candidate mechanism with any set of increasing cutoff
functions {zi}i∈I for any individual project. Assume that for some cost vectors
with positive Lebesgue-measure, only all projects in set G ⊆ I are executed while
all projects of set R are not conducted. Therefore there exists a set, CGR , with
positive Lebesgue-measure containing the part of the cost vector for the projects
in setR such that the partition {G,R} is induced given some c where the redlighted
projects have costs cR ∈ CGR . Then aGi (cR) according to the following definition
aGi (cR) = max{ci|∃cG−i : ci ≤ zi(cG−i, cR),
and cg ≤ zg(cG−j, c−G)∀g ∈ G,
and cr > zr(cG, c−G−r)∀r ∈ R} (2.12)
exists for all i ∈ G given cR ∈ CGR . In words, aGi (cR) is the highest cost of project i
such that, given some cost vector cR of projects that are not executed, there exists
some vector cG−i of costs of competing projects that induces a cutoff zi(cG−i, c−G)
above said cost while each element cg of the vector cG−i is lower than the cutoff
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induced by aGi (cR) and the elements of the cost vectors cR and cG−i−g,
∀g ∈ G \ {i}, cg ≤ zg(cR, cG−i−g, aGi (cR)).
Simultaneously, it must hold that these costs induce a cutoff such that no project
r ∈ R is conducted
∀r ∈ R, cr > zr(cR−r, cG−i, aGi (cR)).
Moreover, we can replace any function zi with a left-continuous function that is
identical up to a set of points with Lebesgue-measure zero. Hence, the limit is
reached from below and there exists at least one cost vector (ĉ−i, aGi (cR)) where
G is the set of executed projects and aGi (ĉR) = zi(ĉ−i) holds. Now, notice that
ĉg ≤ aGg (ĉR) ∀g ∈ G \ {i},
because, given ĉR, there cannot exist a cost vector where only all projects in G are
executed and the cost of project g exceeds aGg (ĉR) by its construction. Moreover,
we have established that every cutoff function zi is weakly increasing in each
argument. Thus,
aGi (ĉR) = zi(ĉ−i) ≤ zi(aGG−i(ĉR), ĉR), (2.13)
where aGG−i is the vector of all a
G
g defined according to (2.12) except a
G
i . This in-
equality tells us that, whenever some vector (cR, cG−i) ≥ (ĉR, aGG−i(ĉR))15 realizes,
a sufficient condition for project i ∈ G to be executed is ci ≤ aGi (ĉR).
The same logic also applies to all projects in G other than i. Therefore at least
all projects g ∈ G are conducted whenever a cost vector realizes such that cg =
aGg (cR).





−g(cR), cR) ≤ B. (2.14)
Furthermore, given cR, for all projects g ∈ G, zg(c−G, cR) = aGg (cR) if cG−g ≤
aGG−g(c−G). That is, the cutoffs are constant given the cost vector of redlighted
projects.
15When x and y are vectors, x ≥ y means that every element xi of x weakly exceeds the
corresponding element yi of y.
16aGi (cR) is only defined if C
G 6= ∅ and cR ∈ CGR , but this does not hinder the proof.
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Suppose to the contrary that zi(c−i) < ai(cR) for some i ∈ G and for all c−i ∈
Ξ ⊂ CG−i with Ξ having positive Lebesgue measure.
Define Ξ(cG−i−j, cR) ⊂ [0, cj] where zi(cG−i−j, cj, cR) < aGi (cR) for all cj ∈ Ξ(cG−i−j, cR).
For any cG−i−j ≤ aG−i−j(cR), let
zΞi (cG−i−j, cR) := max
cj∈Ξ(cG−i−j ,cR)
zi(cG−i−j, cj, cR)
By (2.14), changing the mechanism to
zi(cG−i,−j, cj, cR) = aGi (cR), ∀cj ≤ aGj (cR)
does not violate the budget constraint. This deviation increases the payoff condi-








Given that Ξ has positive Lebesgue-measure, this deviation also strictly increases
the unconditional payoff.
Constructing a scoring function: Proof of Proposition 2.11
To prove Proposition 2.11, it is helpful to consider the following lemmata. While
Lemma 2.8 (non-bossy winners) is a statement that conditions on a fixed alloca-
tion, it also has implications on the cutoffs resulting from different cost vectors
that induce different allocations.
Lemma 2.16. Take any mechanism and any two cost vectors c 6= ĉ that induce
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that is, c and ĉ induce the same allocation.
Proof. Given cost vector c, define a new cost vector c′, where c′i = min{ci, ĉi} for
all i ∈ G ∩ Ĝ and c′R∪R̂ = cR∪R̂. By Lemma 2.8, c′ induces allocation {G,R}.
Similarly, a perturbation of cost vector ĉ in the same way with ĉ′i = min{ci, ĉi}
for all j ∈ G∩ Ĝ and ĉ′
R∪R̂ = ĉR∪R̂ must induce allocation {Ĝ, R̂}. But c′ = ĉ′ by
construction. Hence, G = Ĝ and R = R̂.
Lemma 2.17. Take any mechanism and any two cost vectors c 6= c˜ that induce
partitions {G,R} and {G˜, R˜}, respectively. Then
zi(cG∩G˜, cR∪R˜) = zi(c˜G∩G˜, cR∪R˜)
zj(c˜G∩G˜, c˜R∪R˜) = zj(cG∩G˜, c˜R∪R˜)
for all i ∈ G and for all j ∈ G˜, respectively.
Proof. By Lemma 2.16, the vector (c˜G∩G˜, cR∪R˜) leads to allocation {G,R} and
the vector (cG∩G˜, c˜R∪R˜) leads to allocation {G˜, R˜}. The rest follows directly from
Lemma 2.8 (non-bossy winners).
Having established these properties we can prove Proposition 2.11 by induction.
We construct a DA scoring function for each iteration. Conditional on all previous
iterations having been constructed correctly, we can demonstrate how to construct
an appropriate scoring function for any iteration.
Proposition 2.11. Any optimal mechanism has a DA auction representation and
can be implemented with a descending-clock auction.
Proof. This proof is structured as follows. First, we construct scoring functions
for each iteration of the DA auction. Then we explain how the zeros of the scoring
functions are derived. Finally we show by induction that the constructed DA
auction implements the same allocation as the underlying z-mechanism.
Scoring functions
First, we introduce some notation. Let At be the set of active projects in iteration
t and let Ot := I \ At be the set of inactive projects (O as in “out”). Let Otj :=
Ot ∪ {j} be the union of dropped out projects and some individual project j.
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Fix an optimal z-mechanism and consider the corresponding DA auction with
scoring functions {sAi }A⊂I,i∈A
sAi (ci, cO) =







where aAi (cO) is defined as in (2.12) and b
j
Oi(ci, cO) is defined as
bjOi(ci, cO) := max
{




cj : ∃c˜−Oi−j : ci > zi(cj, c˜−Oi−j, cO),
and co > zo(ci, cj, c˜−Oi−j, cO−i)∀o ∈ O,
and cg ≤ zg(ci, cj, c˜−Oi−j, cO)∀g ∈ A \ i
}
.
In words, bjOi(ci, cO) is the highest cost of project j such that given the vector cOi
the corresponding z-mechanism implements the allocation partition R = Oi and
G = A \ i for some realization of the cost vector c˜−Oi−j.
Zeros of the scoring functions
Suppose the DA auction ends in the t-th iteration. Then all projects i ∈ At
have score sAti = 0 and the cost vector must induce G = At in the underlying
z-mechanism. By non-bossiness of winners, cutoffs of projects in G are constant
in the part of the cost vector cAt for all cost vectors inducing the same allocation.
Therefore we can characterize the zeros of the scoring function by a threshold and
sAti = 0 whenever project i’s cost is below this threshold. The threshold is given
by aAti (cO) as defined in (2.12). Notice that ci ≤ aAti (cO) implies that project i is
not eliminated in the t-th iteration, even if other projects exceed their threshold.
This implication does not rule out permissible z-mechanisms. Conditional on cOt ,
some projects exceeding their threshold can at most lead to a higher cutoff for
project i due to monotonicity.
Further notice that if ci > a
At
i (cO), there always exist cost vectors with cOt for
previously eliminated projects that induce G = At \ {i}. For example, all cost
vectors with cj ≤ aAtj (cOt) for all j ∈ At \ {i} induce that allocation. However,
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this condition is sufficient for G = At \ {i} but not necessary. There can be other
cost vectors inducing the same allocation.
Iteration 1
If multiple projects have a positive score, it also holds that
If ĉ induces R̂ = {i} then sIi (ci) > sIj (cj) for all j 6= i (2.16)
The meaning of R̂ = {i} is that ĉi > zi(ĉ−i) and ĉj ≤ zj(ĉ−j). Hence, by construc-
tion
ĉj ≤ zj(ĉ−j) ≤ bji (ĉi) (2.17)





Suppose that the contrary holds, then there exists a vector c˜−i−j such that
ĉi ≤ zi(ĉj, c˜−i−j)
and allocation R˜ = {j} is implemented. By Lemma 2.17 we know that the cutoffs
z are constant in costs of projects Ĝ ∩ G˜ = I \ {i, j}. Consequently, we arrive at
ĉi ≤ zi(ĉj, c˜−i−j) = zi(ĉj, ĉ−i−j)
which means that i is greenlighted for vector ĉ, a contradiction to our initial
assumption that ĉ implements R̂ = {i}.
Next, we show
bki (ĉi) ≥ bkj (ĉj) for all j 6= i and k 6= i, j. (2.19)
By definition
bki (ĉi) = zk(ĉi, c˜−i−k) for some c˜−i−k,
bkj (ĉj) = zk(ĉj, c˙−j−k) for some c˙−j−k.
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Because projects −i−j−k are greenlighted for both cost realizations (ĉk, ĉi, c˜−i−k)
and (ĉk, ĉi, c˙−i−k), it follows by Lemma 2.17 that
bki (ĉi) = zk(ĉi, c˜−i−k) = zk(ĉi, ĉ−i−k),
bkj (ĉj) = zk(ĉj, c˙−j−k) = zk(c˙i, ĉ−i−k).
Furthermore, it must hold that ĉi > c˙i, otherwise vector ĉ would not optimally
redlight project i while vector (ĉ−i, c˙i) optimally greenlights project i. Then by
bidder substitutability,
bki (ĉi) = zk(ĉ−k) ≥ zk(c˙i, ĉ−i−k) = bkj (ĉj).
Combining (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19) leads to (2.16). We have shown that the
scoring function eliminates the correct project when |R| = 1, i.e., the redlighted
project.
Finally, we need to show that if |R| > 1, the project removed in the first iteration
is redlighted in the allocation implemented by the underlying z-mechanism, i.e.,
A1 \ A2 = {k} ⇒ k ∈ R.
Now take cost vector c˜ with allocation {G˜, R˜} and let i ∈ G˜ be some greenlighted
project and and let j ∈ R˜ be some redlighted project, respectively. Since project j
is redlighted, it must have cost c˜j > a
I
j . Hence there exists some cost vector ĉ with
ĉj = c˜j such that R̂ = {j}. By Lemma 2.17, we can assume ĉi = c˜i since i ∈ G˜∩Ĝ.
As our scoring function correctly matches all cases in which |R| = 1, it must be
that sj(c˜j) > si(c˜i). Given that we have chosen i and j arbitrarily, we have shown
that any project removed in the first iteration must be in the redlighted set, which
was to show.
Iteration 2
We can show with the same arguments as above, that the previously stated scoring
function is correct for t = 2 as well. To this end, we inductively rely on the fact
that the project k removed in the first iteration is indeed redlighted by the z-
mechanism - as we have shown above.
Iteration t ≥ 3
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With the appropriate scoring functions used in all previous iterations, we can
then show that the t-th iteration removes the correct project for all cost vectors
inducing |R| = t given a z-mechanism and otherwise removes some project i ∈ At,
where i ∈ R, for all cost vectors inducing |R| > t.
The symmetric case
Proposition 2.12. Arrange the projects in ascending order of their reported costs,







symmetric case, the cutoff mechanism with zi(c−i) = zk
∗
is the optimal mechanism.
The optimal number of accepted projects k∗ is given by k∗ := max{k|ck ≤ zk}.
Proof. The case n = 2 has been proven in Section III.i.
Now, consider n = 3. Fix any c3 and any mechanism as candidate for optimality.
Either c3 > z3(c1, c2) or c3 ≤ z3(c1, c2). In the first case, project 3 is not executed
and the budget remaining for the other two is still B. In the second case, project
3 is executed and the budget remaining for the other two becomes B − z3(c1, c2).
Now, consider deviating to the proposed mechanism only for project 1 and 2. The
change in profit looks like a probability weighted sum of terms similar to the two-
project case, only that the distributions F are conditional on c1 and c2 being in
some interval (that induces z3 > or < c3) and the budget must be adjusted.
Because log-concavity of F implies log-concavity of F (c)−F (a)
F (b)−F (a) this deviation is al-
ways positive like in the case n = 2. The same logic can be applied to any
n, changing any mechanism by selecting two projects and then adjusting their
cutoffs in the following way: The budget is shared equally if both projects are
executed; if only one project is executed, it has to be the one with higher virtual
surplus; never execute projects with negative virtual surplus. Iterating over these
steps ultimately arrives at the proposed mechanism which has to be optimal.
Bidder Substitutability and Complementarity
In the main text, we made the crucial assumption that c = 0. As a consequence,
complementaries as in the following example are excluded. The example shows
that an optimal mechanism may not have substitutes. When the lower bound of
all projects’ costs is zero, it is always possible to improve a mechanism that does
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not have substitutes. The idea of the proof of optimality of bidder substitutability
in Appendix A is that it cannot be optimal to decrease i’s cutoff to the benefit of
increasing j’s cutoff when some third project’s cost increases from ck to c
′
k > ck,
because then it would either be better to raise project zj(·, ck) at the cost of
lowering zi(·, ck) as well or it would be better to raise zi(·, c′k) at the cost of lowering
zj(·, c′k).
In the following example, this approach is not feasible. Through the lower cost
bounds and the values, projects 1 and 2 inherit endogenous complementarities.
The designer prefers implementing 1 and 2 together over implementing 3 alone,
but once either 1 or 2 becomes too expensive the other project is dropped as well
in favor of implementing only project 3.
Example 2.2. Suppose I = {1, 2, 3} and B = 300. Let the costs be arbitrarily
distributed on the following supports:
c1 ∼ [200, 400], c2 ∼ [20, 200], c3 ∼ [290, 300],
and let the values be
v1 = 700, v2 = 500, v3 = 1000.
Let the corresponding optimal mechanism be given by
z1(c2, c3) =
250 if c2 ≤ 500 otherwise , z2(c1, c3) =
50 if c1 ≤ 2500 otherwise ,
z3(c1, c2) =
300 if c2 > 50 or c1 > 2500 otherwise .
Bidder substitutability fails because, e.g., as c1 increases from 249 to 251, project 2
with, say, cost 40 gets dropped from the allocation set. The designer cannot, as in
the main text with c = 0, lower z3(40, 249) as it is already zero or profitably raise
z2(251, ·) at the cost of project 3 as the lower cost bounds prohibit that projects
2 and 3 are ever conducted together and implementing G = {3} is preferred to
G′ = {2}.
However, it is still possible to construct an implementation with price clocks: All
clocks start at the upper bounds. Then (at arbitrary speed) the prices of 1 and
2 decrease to (250, 50). If both projects are still active, the price for project 3
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decreases to zero while clocks 1 and 2 halt: 1 and 2 are implemented. If any
project i ∈ {1, 2} drops out earlier, then the price for j 6= i, j ∈ {1, 2} drops to
zero, while price 3 remains at 300. 3 is implemented.
The next example features another kind of complementatity. In this example
project 3 can be a bossy loser. Again, there exists a DA-auction implementation.
The lower cost bounds of the (stochastically) identical projects 1 and 2 are too
high for both projects to ever be conducted together. The cheaper of the two is
greenlighted. Project 3 is then only implemented if enough money remains.
Example 2.3. Suppose I = {1, 2, 3} and B = 300. Let the costs be arbitrarily
distributed on the following supports:
c1, c2 ∼ [151, 200], c3 ∼ [50, 300],
and let the values be
v1 = v2 = 1000, v3 = 500.
Let the corresponding optimal mechanism be given by
z1(c2, c3) = c2, z2(c1, c3) = c1, z3(c1, c2) = B −max{c1, c2}.
Suppose c2 > c1, then project 2 can be a bossy loser: It can increase its cost report
without changing its status to the green light and thereby kick project 3 out of
the allocation.
While substitutes and non-bossiness are sufficient for an implementation with a
DA auction, they are clearly not necessary. From the matching literature, it is
apparent that some kind of substitutes condition is needed and non-bossy winners
seem to be important for DA implementations. We have constructed a scoring
function that implements the exemplary allocations above. However, in the proof
of non-bossiness of winners, we need the strong substitutes condition for inequality
(2.13).
A weaker substitutes condition, such as our groupwise substitutes, does not suffice
for the optimality of non-bossy winners. This condition is satisfied by the examples
above and is helpful for the construction of a scoring function.
Definition 2.18. An allocation rule γ has groupwise substitutes, if
∑
g∈G zg(c−g)
is increasing in any cost report cr with r 6∈ G for all allocation sets G that are
admitted by γ.
3. Groups, cheap talk, and voting
Introduction
In settings in which several individuals have to make a collective decision, voting
is a very common if not the most common decision-making process. As such,
voting is a method to aggregate private information from different individuals. In
some cases, however, in particular when voters act strategically, voting might not
be the best way to aggregate information. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), for
example, point out this inferiority of voting in the context of a jury in a criminal
trial. When voting is the only way to aggregate private information about guilt
or innocence and unanimity is needed to convict, the resulting outcome can be an
excess of convictions. However, in their model this problem vanishes once jurors are
allowed to talk prior to voting. Given that talking to each other is usually possible,
this example serves to demonstrate the importance of the strategic interaction of
information aggregation through voting and through talking, i.e., through cheap
talk.
Often committees that vote on an issue consist of different groups. Political parties
in a parliamentary committee are one example of such a situation. On such a
committee, the way in which individuals talk to each other is different from the
way they talk to each other in the absence of groups. Normally, members of the
same party would first talk amongst their fellow party members before talking to
members of other parties.
To investigate the interaction between this form of group-to-group communication
and voting, I consider a model of a reform decision made by a committee consisting
of two groups, a majority with 3 members and a minority with 2 members. Each
individual receives a (binary) private signal about the (binary) state of the world,
which is whether the reform would be a success if implemented. A successful reform
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gives every individual the same benefit but implementing the reform is associated
with different costs for the majority and the minority. Costs and benefit of the
reform are such that all individuals would want to implement a successful reform
and not implement an unsuccessful reform, if the state of the world was known.
Both groups are risk-neutral and weigh the probability of success of the reform
against their costs of implementing the reform.
For my analysis, I consider each group to act as a player in a two-player game.
The implicit assumption in this model choice is that both groups pool their pri-
vate information within the group and then perfectly coordinate their strategies
afterwards. As both groups are perfectly homogeneous, this assumption is plau-
sible and the resulting equilibrium also exists in a game in which each individual
is a single player instead of the group. However, less plausible equilibria in which
groups fail to coordinate are ruled out.
The timing is as follows. First, both groups can simultaneously send a cheap
talk message about their groups’ signals to the other group. Then both groups
simultaneously vote, where the number of votes of each group equals its number
of members. Depending on the voting rule, the reform either needs a majority or
a unanimous pro-reform vote to pass.
For this game, I characterize the set of implementable deterministic social choice
functions, i.e., the mapping from signals to the outcome, and specify strategies
with which any such social choice function can be implemented. These strategies
are such that only one group conveys information through cheap talk. Thus no
social choice function requires for implementation that both groups talk instead
of babbling. Moreover, if the set of implementable social choice functions is not a
singleton, one social choice function must Pareto-dominate the others. This result
allows me to compare outcomes under the two different voting rules: majority
rule and unanimity. Interestingly, there exist parameters such that both groups
strictly prefer majority rule and other parameters such that both groups strictly
prefer unanimity. Consequently, understanding whether a committee consists of
different groups and, if so, how these groups communicate can have important
implications for the choice of the voting procedure.
There is an extensive literature on the influence of cheap talk (Crawford and So-
bel, 1982) prior to voting. The seminal paper by Austen-Smith (1990) is one of
the earliest contributions in this strand of the literature, of which a good overview
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is provided by Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2009). The role of voting thresholds
with pre-voting communication has been analyzed by Gerardi and Yariv (2007).
They very elegantly point out that the set of implementable outcomes is not af-
fected by the choice of the voting rule, as long as the rule is non-unanimous.
However, their argument hinges on achieving an outcome using voting strategies
with which no single voter is ever pivotal. Thus all voting strategies are necessar-
ily equilibrium strategies. This result, however, is no longer plausible when there
exist voter groups that can potentially coordinate their behavior.
With majority rule, my model is close to the model of Ishida and Shimizu (2016),
who consider cheap talk between an informed sender and an informed receiver,
where the latter makes a decision affecting both. Their setup is therefore directly
related to settings in my model in which the minority sends a cheap talk message
to the majority who can then decide afterwards. However, in contrast to me, they
focus on conditions for full communication, in particular when sender and receiver
receive signals with different precision.
The importance of considering groups in the context of communication and vot-
ing is also not completely novel. In their overview, Austen-Smith and Feddersen
(2009) call for research in this area. To my knowledge, Thordal-Le Quement and
Yokeeswaran (2015) and Hummel (2012) have provided the only studies with this
focus, apart from this paper. Both Hummel (2012) and Thordal-Le Quement and
Yokeeswaran (2015) consider within-group cheap talk followed by voting. Contrary
to Thordal-Le Quement and Yokeeswaran (2015) and me, Hummel (2012) focuses
on the large committee limit. He shows that in the limit, the presence of groups
who can communicate via within-group cheap talk can lead to the probability of
making a correct decision going to 1.
Probably most closely related to this paper is the recent work of Thordal-Le Que-
ment and Yokeeswaran (2015), who also consider a committee with two groups.
The crucial difference is that they consider communication within a group followed
by coordinated voting by both groups while I consider group-to-group cheap talk
prior to coordinated voting, which is a richer communication protocol. For any
equilibrium under their communication protocol there exists one under my com-
munication protocol giving the same outcome. However, the converse is not true.
Keeping the voting rule - unanimity - fixed, they then make a welfare comparison
between three different communication protocols: subgroup deliberation (cheap
talk within the group), plenary deliberation (cheap talk among all committee
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members), and no deliberation. They find that the outcome with the first protocol
Pareto-dominates the outcome with the second protocol, which Pareto-dominates
the outcome with the third protocol. I, on the other hand, keep the communi-
cation protocol fixed (group-to-group cheap talk) and make a welfare comparison
between two voting rules: majority rule and unanimity.
Finally, the information structure in my model can be considered the work horse
of the cheap talk and voting literature. Albeit usually framed a bit differently in
the context of a jury trial, the same structure of binary private signals, a binary
state of the world, and a binary collective decision is used by Feddersen and Pe-
sendorfer (1998), Doraszelski, Gerardi, and Squintani (2003), Ishida and Shimizu
(2016) (when we interpret sender and receiver as groups), Thordal-Le Quement
and Yokeeswaran (2015), Hummel (2012), and many others. Thus, the basic struc-
ture of their models and my model is either the same or at least isomorphic for
relevant parameter values.
Model
A committee consisting of two groups has to make a binary decision a ∈ {0, 1}.
This decision is about a reform with a = 1 signifying the reform’s implementation.
From an ex-ante perspective, the reform, if implemented, will be successful, s = 1,
with probability 1
2
. There are two groups, majority M with 3 group members and
minority m with 2 group members. I number the individuals starting with the
majority. An individual i will thus be from the majority group if i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
i will be from the minority group if i ∈ {4, 5}. The assumption about the size of
groups M and m is made for the sake of exposition. I conjecture that one can also
derive the main results of this paper with larger groups, albeit with vastly bigger
case distinctions in some of the proofs.
The benefit from the proposed reform will depend on the true state of the world
s ∈ {0, 1} and is identical for all individuals from both groups. The benefit is
normalized to 1 if the reform is successful (s = 1) and 0 if the reform fails (s = 0).
However, individuals from the majority and individuals from the minority have
to bear different costs for implementing the reform. If the reform is implemented,
denoted by a = 1, members of the majority bear cost cM ∈ [0, 1] and members of
the minority bear cost cm ∈ [0, 1] - regardless of the reform’s success. Hence, the
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ex-post utility function of group x ∈ {M,m} is given by
ux = a(s− cx).
Each individual i is endowed with a private signal si ∈ {0, 1} that is correlated with
the true state of the world with precision p, i.e. Pr(si = 1|s = 1) = Pr(si = 0|s =
0) = p, p ∈ (0.5, 1). As all signals are drawn with the same precision, an individual
from any group weighs all signals he can observe equally and the relevant statistic
to judge the reform is the sum of positive signals. To an individual who observes k
out of n positive signals the posterior probability of the reform’s success and thus
the expected benefit from the reform to this individual is given by:
β(k, n) :=
pk(1− p)n−k
pk(1− p)n−k + (1− p)kpn−k .
As individuals in both groups are risk-neutral, an individual that could observe
all 5 signals wants to see the reform implemented if
β (k, 5)− cx ≥ 0,
where x ∈ {M,m} denotes the individual’s group and k = ∑5i=1 si.
The eventual decision whether to implement the reform is made by voting. Each
individual can cast a vote ai ∈ {0, 1} and the reform is implemented if the number





I use two different voting rules, majority rule with τ = 3 and unanimity with
τ = 5.
Voting occurs after an initial round of communication. The goal of this paper is
to illuminate the interaction of information transmission between different groups
with different incentives through cheap talk and through subsequent voting. To
this end, from here on, I consider each group to act as a single economic agent.
Thus both M and m are agents who only differ in the number of individuals they
represent and therefore in the number of signals and in the number of votes they
are endowed with. For readability, I use female pronouns for M and male pronouns





si ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} = SM , sm :=
5∑
i=4
si ∈ {0, 1, 2} = Sm,
denote the number of positive signals observed by M and m, respectively. Thus I
call sM M ’s signal and sm m’s signal. Alternatively, one can interpret sM and sm
as M ’s and m’s respective types in a common values public good decision setup.
While at first the restriction of considering both groups as two agents seems per-
haps parsimonious, it does not really exclude any interesting equilibria because the
interests within each group are perfectly aligned. Therefore, it is not unreasonable
to assume that group members within each group act in unison. Consequently, all
the results of the following analysis can also be derived in an alternative model
in which instead each individual is an economic agent, and individuals in both
groups can first communicate within their group and then from group to group.
In the relevant equilibria both groups pool their information, and then coordinate
their behavior. This restriction does, however, rule out some implausible equilibria
which hinge on the groups failing to coordinate and often can only be supported
by a construction in which no single individual is pivotal.
With respect to both cheap talk and voting, the timing is as follows. First, both
groups observe their respective signals. Then both groups simultaneously exchange
messages about sM and sm. The majority announces message rM ∈ SM and the
minority announces message rm ∈ Sm. Then the both groups simultaneously cast
their affirmative votes, aM ∈ SM for the majority and am ∈ Sm for the minority.
The reform is implemented if aM +am ≥ τ , in which case the success of the reform
s is revealed and payoffs realize.
Analysis
In this section, I derive all my results with respect to the model described in the
previous section. Statements that require a proof (Lemma 1, Lemma 2, Lemma
3, and Proposition 3.2) are proved in the Appendix. Other statements either
follow directly from previously established results (Corollary 3.1) or are shown by
example (Proposition 3.3). The relevant equilibrium concept for this analysis is
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To obviate the need for equilibrium refinements I
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Figure 3.1: An example with the same threshold of doubt qM = qm = 3
without a conflict of interest (top) and with different thresholds of doubt qM =
2 < qm = 3 and thus with a conflict of interest (bottom). A circle with number
x marks the posterior β(x, 5) if x out of 5 positive signals realize for precision
p = 0.66.
0 1
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only consider equilibria in which all available messages are played on path in the
cheap talk stage. With cheap talk, this restriction is without loss of generality,
as for any message strategy that does not use all available messages there exists
an alternative strategy that uses all messages and conveys the same amount of
information.1
A useful concept that is often employed in models with the same type of informa-
tion structure as in this model (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998; Thordal-
Le Quement and Yokeeswaran, 2015) is the notion of the threshold of reasonable
doubt qx. It is defined as the lowest number of positive signals out of the total
number of available signals such that group x wants to implement the reform.
Therefore, a threshold qx > 0 satisfies
β(qx − 1, 5) < cx ≤ β(qx, 5).
Information sharing in the context of this model means making the outcome con-
tingent on the signals of both groups. Depending on the mode of voting, τ , in-
formation can be shared between both groups using communication, using voting,
or using both. Consider an example with majority voting, τ = 3. Suppose in
this example m wants to allow M to condition the outcome on his own signal sm.
In particular, M wants to implement the reform whenever sm ≥ 1. One way to
achieve this outcome is to reveal sm at the communication stage, i.e., rm = sm.
Then M could vote aM = 3 whenever rm ≥ 1, achieving the desired outcome.
Alternatively, m could simply cast a number of affirmative votes corresponding
1For a more detailed version of this argument see Farrell (1993, Section 3).
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to his signal, i.e., am = sm. Then, aM = 2 also achieves the desired outcome,
implementing the reform whenever sm ≥ 1, regardless of the information conveyed
at the communication stage.
In terms of payoff in equilibrium, it is not important whether information was
conveyed through cheap talk or through voting. As information sharing through
cheap talk and through voting are at least to a degree substitutable, there can be
several equilibria with different strategies at the cheap talk and at the voting stage
that are equivalent in terms of payoff. Instead, the equilibrium can uniquely be
characterized payoff-wise by a social choice function α, mapping from both group’s
signals into outcomes. For the sake of tractability, I only consider equilibria that
implement a deterministic social choice,
α : {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2} → {0, 1}.
This restriction is not without loss of generality. In particular, it rules out equi-
libria in which there is mixing at the voting stage between two different strategies
that could lead to different outcomes. However, I believe that the restriction is
comparatively innocent in this setting as there could only be a limited amount of
mixing in any case.
To illustrate this point, consider the following example in a setup with majority
rule (τ = 3). Suppose that m plays a mixed strategy at the voting stage for some
realization of sm, e.g., sm = 1, and after receiving some message rM . Suppose m
mixes between am = 2 and am = 1. Mixing only meaningfully affects the outcome
if M sometimes votes aM = 1 given sM and rm, so that am = 2 and am = 1
lead to different outcomes. Therefore, m must be indifferent whether the reform
is implemented given his information, sm = 1, rM , and what he can infer about
sM from M voting aM = 1. But if M is indifferent for sm = 1 he must strictly
prefer the reform not to be implemented for sm = 0 and he must strictly prefer the
reform to be implemented if sm = 2. Consequently, conditional on the information
transmitted before the voting stage, m can only mix between am = 1 and am = 2
for one of the three possible realizations of sm in a way that affects the outcome.
Additionally, the decision to limit attention to deterministic social choice func-
tions has the advantage of preserving comparability to Thordal-Le Quement and
Yokeeswaran (2015). For those equilibria with the communication protocol that
is closest to my setup, subgroup deliberation (SD) equilibria, they consider two
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groups that first pool their information within the group and then all vote for
reform (or in their case for conviction) if the number of positive signals is weakly
greater than some threshold and all vote against otherwise. By construction, this
class of equilibria leads to a deterministic social choice function. Moreover, the
set of social choice functions that can be implemented by SD equilibria is a subset
of the set of implementable social choice functions. The additional cheap talk be-
tween groups with my communication protocol does not eliminate SD equilibria,
as both groups can simply babble and then follow the equilibrium voting strategy
of an SD equilibrium. Therefore, all their welfare comparisons between SD equi-
libria and other equilibria under other communication protocols also hold in my
model, whenever their and my model coincide.2
As established above, information sharing can occur both through cheap talk and
through voting. Therefore, the amount of information shared in equilibrium can
only be meaningfully quantified based on the social choice function α. To this end,
I distinguish between information transmission, full information transmission and
partial information transmission.3
Definition 1 (Information transmission). An equilibrium has information trans-
mission if it implements a social choice α such that
α(sM , sm) 6= α(s′M , sm) for some sM , s′M , sm
α(sM , sm) 6= α(sM , s′m) for some sm, s′m, sM .
Having an equilibrium with information transmission means that the social choice
function is contingent on both groups’ signals. Thus information from both groups
is used in determining the outcome.
Definition 2 (Full information transmission). An equilibrium satisfies full infor-
mation transmission if there exists an equilibrium implementing the same social
choice α in which both groups truthfully reveal their signals at the communication
stage in equilibrium.
2The models do not always coincide, as Thordal-Le Quement and Yokeeswaran (2015) assume
max{cM , cm} > 0.5. In other words, based solely on the prior, the group paying a greater cost
for reform dislikes the reform. In terms of their court application, the doves on the jury favor
acquittal without information. They do not claim that this assumption is necessary, but they
use it in their proofs.
3Thordal-Le Quement and Yokeeswaran (2015) have similar categories. Their notion of a fully
reactive equilibrium coincides with my notion of an equilibrium for which the corresponding social
choice function has (partial) information transmission.
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In contrast, full information transmission is stronger than information transmis-
sion.4 An equilibrium has full information transmission if no group would want to
deviate at the voting stage, even if it was fully informed about the other group’s
signal. Therefore, each group either receives or can infer all the information it
seeks from the other group. It is well known (e.g., Coughlan, 2000, Proposition
5) that full information transmission can generally only be achieved if M and m
have the same preferences, i.e., qM = qm.
5 While the full information transmission
case is straight-forward, the interesting case for this analysis is the case of partial
information transmission, the case in which information transmission is feasible
but full information transmission is not.
Definition 3 (Partial information transmission). An equilibrium satisfies partial
information transmission if the social choice α exhibits information transmis-
sion but not full information transmission.
In order to examine partial information transmission social choice functions, I first
need to establish if and when such social choice functions can be implemented
in equilibrium. This is not a trivial task, since I have shown that there can be
different combinations of communication and voting strategies that implement the
same social choice function α. Therefore, showing that some set of strategies that
would implement α is not an equilibrium does not automatically rule out other
strategies that might implement α in equilibrium.
This is not a Mechanism Design problem, as the rules of the game that both
groups play are fixed. Nevertheless, I follow an approach similar to the reve-
lation principle approach in Mechanism Design to tackle this problem. First, I
formulate necessary conditions that the social choice function α must satisfy in
any equilibrium. Then I characterize strategies that implement α and show that
these strategies constitute an equilibrium whenever the necessary conditions are
fulfilled. Therefore, these conditions are both necessary and sufficient for α to be
implementable in equilibrium.
4I assume qM , qm ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in this statement. This assumption rules out situations in
which group x is never interested in the other group’s signal because it is always for the reform
(qx = 0) or always against the reform (qx > 5). If the other group cannot be swayed, then it is
an equilibrium strategy to truthfully reveal one’s signal. Thus such a social function would have
the silly property of having full information transmission but not information transmission, in
the sense of the definitions.
5Full information transmission can also be achieved in the non-generic case in which |qM −
qm| = 1 and one of the groups, group x, is indifferent with respect to the reform’s implementation
if qx positive signals realize: cx = β(qx, 5).
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The first condition any α must satisfy to be implementable in equilibrium is mono-
tonicity (MON). If the reform is implemented given signals (sM , sm), it must also
be implemented for any signals (s′M , s
′
m) that are weakly larger in both dimensions.
α(s′M , sm) ≥ α(sM , sm) ∀s′M , sM ∈ SM ; s′M > sM ; sm ∈ Sm (MON)
α(sM , s
′
m) ≥ α(sM , sm) ∀s′m, sm ∈ Sm; s′m > sm; sM ∈ Sm
An equivalent statement is that any monotone α can be represented by thresh-
old rules ψM(sm) and ψm(sM) for each group. Then, for example, the reform is
implemented given sm only when sM ≥ ψM(sm).
ψM(sm) := min{ŝM |α(ŝM , sm) = 1}
ψm(sM) := min{ŝm|α(sM , ŝm) = 1}
The necessity of monotonicity follows almost directly from the fact that the re-
form decision is monotone in the number of yes-votes. To see this point, suppose
monotonicity fails. Then, receiving a larger signal must induce one group to cast a
lower number of yes-votes, after having received some message of the other group.
Suppose that, after having received some message rm, M votes aM given sM but
votes a′M < aM given s
′
M > sM . Voting aM leads to reform whenever a
′
M leads
to reform. In addition, for monotonicity to fail aM must lead to reform in some
cases in which a′M does not. As M votes aM with signal sM , the posterior belief
in the reform’s success must exceed cM , given sM , given m’s message, and given
what M can infer about sm when aM leads to reform but a
′
M does not, Thus M
wants to chose aM instead of a
′
M . But she also wants to do so given s
′
M > sM ,
contradicting our initial assumption that she votes aM .
Apart from (MON), any equilibrium must satisfy the incentive constraints (ICM)
and (ICm). These constraints ensure that M and m weakly prefer following their
equilibrium strategies given signal sM or sm rather than deviating and following
the strategy prescribed for some other signal ŝM or ŝm.
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∑
sm∈Sm
Pr(sm|sM)α(sM , sm)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cM) ≥ (ICM)∑
sm∈Sm
Pr(sm|sM)α(ŝM , sm)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cM) ∀sM , ŝM ∈ SM∑
sM∈SM
Pr(sM |sm)α(sM , sm)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cm) ≥ (ICm)∑
sM∈SM
Pr(sM |sm)α(sM , ŝm)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cm) ∀sm, ŝm ∈ Sm
The final set of constraints depends on the choice of τ . With majority rule,
τ = 3, the constraints (IR1M) and (IR
0
M) ensure that the majority does not want
to deviate given sM and unilaterally prevent the reform - ensured by (IR
1
M) - or
unilaterally force the reform - ensured by (IR0M) - regardless of sm. For unanimity,
τ = 5, I need constraints (IR1M) and (IR
1
m), as both groups can prevent the reform
unilaterally but neither can force it:
Additional constraints with majority rule:∑
sm∈Sm
Pr(sm|sM)α(sM , sm)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cM) ≥ 0 ∀sM ∈ SM
(IR1M)∑
sm∈Sm
Pr(sm|sM)(1− α(sM , sm))(β(sm + sM , 5)− cM) ≤ 0 ∀sM ∈ SM
(IR0M)
Additional constraints with unanimity:∑
sm∈Sm
Pr(sm|sM)α(sM , sm)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cM) ≥ 0 ∀sM ∈ SM
(IR1M)∑
sM∈SM
Pr(sM |sm)α(sM , sm)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cm) ≥ 0 ∀sm ∈ Sm
(IR1m)
Having established necessary conditions for α to be implementable in some equi-
librium, I can construct specific strategies that implement any α in equilibrium,
as long as α satisfies these conditions. These strategies are stated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. With the following strategies any α that is feasible given majority rule
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(τ = 3) and any α that is feasible given unanimity (τ = 5) can be implemented in
equilibrium of the communication and voting game with the appropriate τ :
1. M babbles at the communication stage by mixing over all messages with
equal probability.
2. Given sm, m mixes over all messages rm ∈ {ŝm|α(sM , ŝm) = α(sM , sm)∀sM ∈
SM} with equal probability.
3. M votes aM = 3 if α(sM , rm) = 1 and aM = 0 if α(sM , rm) = 0.
4. m votes am = 2 at the voting stage unless α(sm, sM) = 0 for all sM ∈ SM
given sm.
Lemma 1 is useful insofar as it allows me to now only consider the strategies from
the lemma for the remaining analysis. Moreover, in any equilibrium constructed
with the strategies described in the lemma, m uses one out of four distinct com-
munication strategies. These strategies are described in Corollary 3.1: A strategy
for full information transmission, two distinct strategies for partial information
transmission, termed communication strategy (a) and communication strategy (b),
and a strategy for babbling. Consequently, for the focus of this analysis, equilib-
ria with partial information transmission, it is sufficient to consider two different
strategies, which considerably simplifies the analysis. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
construction of such an equilibrium under majority rule.
Corollary 3.1. Any social choice α can be implemented in an equilibrium in which
the minority m uses one of the following four communication strategies:
1. Full information transmission: rm = sm
2. Communication strategy (a):
rm =
0 if sm = 0∈ {1, 2} with equal prob. if sm ∈ {1, 2}
3. Communication strategy (b):
rm =
∈ {0, 1} with equal prob. if sm ∈ {0, 1}2 if sm = 2
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4. Babbling: rm ∈ {0, 1, 2} with equal probability
In a first step, I can use Lemma 1 and Corollary 3.1 to investigate the limits of
information transmission. Like full information transmission, partial information
transmission is limited by the degree of conflict between M and m. While full
information transmission is only feasible when preferences are perfectly aligned, i.e.
when qM = qm, partial information transmission is only feasible if preferences are
sufficiently aligned. Lemma 2 gives the necessary condition for partial information
transmission in this setup, |qM−qm| ≤ 1 . This condition is not general, but specific
to the setup in this paper. With larger groups, this condition, i.e., the maximal
difference of qM and qm, will increase, as a difference of the same size represents a
smaller degree of conflict with larger groups.
Lemma 2. Information transmission can only occur in equilibrium as long as |qM−
qm| ≤ 1.
Having established Lemma 2, I derive Lemma 3 in order to further characterize
how an implementable social choice α is implemented with the strategies described
in Lemma 1. This result is useful as it allows me to focus on a manageable number
of possible equilibria in the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Lemma 3. In an equilibrium that implements a social choice α with partial in-
formation transmission and which is constructed with the strategies described in
Lemma 1, the communication strategy of m depends on τ , qM , and qm in the
following way.
With majority rule (τ = 3):
• If qm < qM : m uses communication strategy (a).
• If qm > qM : m uses communication strategy (b).
With unanimity (τ = 5):
• If qm < qM : m uses communication strategy (a).
• If qm > qM : Either communication strategy can occur.
Proposition 3.2 is a crucial result that makes all subsequent observations possible.
Both models with voting and and with cheap talk generally allow for a multitude of
equilibria. As a result, there might be more than one social choice function that is
implementable in equilibrium. Therefore, I need to select one social choice function
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to make meaningful comparisons between outcomes for different cost parameters
or to compare voting with majority rule and with unanimity.
Proposition 3.2. If several social choice functions are implementable in equilib-
rium, there is always a Pareto-dominant one.
Proposition 3.2 establishes that if several social choice functions are implementable
for a given setup, one always Pareto-dominates the others. This social choice is
thus a natural candidate for selection. In all subsequent comparisons I only con-
sider Pareto-dominant implementable social choice functions. Thordal-Le Que-
ment and Yokeeswaran (2015, Lemma 6 and Proposition 8) have a comparable
argument in their setup. While conceptually similar, it does not, however, easily
extend to my setup.
With unanimity the set of implementable social choice functions with my group-
to-group communication protocol rule is a superset of the implementable social
choice functions with their subgroup deliberation (SD) communication protocol.
Therefore, the best implementable outcome in my setup weakly Pareto-dominates
the best outcome in their setup. Now I can use their main results (Propositions
7-9), which state that the outcome with the SD communication protocol Pareto-
dominates the outcome with a plenary deliberation (PD) protocol, where cheap
talk messages are received by all individuals (not just their own group). This out-
come in turn Pareto-dominates the outcome with a no deliberation (ND) protocol,
where no cheap talk is permitted. Therefore, whenever max{cM , cm} > 0.5 (one
of their assumptions), the outcome under my group-to-group protocol not only
Pareto-dominates the SD outcome, but also the PD and ND outcomes.
The proof of Proposition 3.2 consists of an extensive and thus slightly tedious
case distinction, in order to show that whenever several social choice functions
are implementable, one of those social choices Pareto-dominates the others from
an ex-ante perspective. In all cases, similar arguments can be used to prove this







m). Unfortunately, even though the proofs in all
these cases are similar, there does not seem to be a way to easily generalize the
argument in order to construct a more elegant proof.
For the conclusion of the analysis, all subsequent observations are made using
graphs. Here, I use the parameter p = 0.66. However, one can produce qualita-
tively equivalent graphs with other values of p such that 1
2
< p < 1.
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My first set of observations is about the extent of information transmission. Fig-
ure 3.3 shows the parameters such that information transmission social choice
functions are feasible both for majority rule and unanimity. The dark square
areas represent (cM , cm)-values such that qM = qm and M and m can therefore
fully share information. The outlined white rectangles represent (cM , cm)-values
such that |qM − qm| = 1. As established in Lemma 2, information transmission
is not feasible for (cM , cm)-values that don’t lie in either area. However, while
|qM − qm| ≤ 1 is a necessary condition for the Pareto-dominant social choice func-
tion to have information transmission, it is not a sufficient condition. The gray
areas in Figure 3.3 represent (cM , cm)-values with partial information transmission
and clearly only cover part of the areas with |qM − qm| = 1.
My second set of observations is about partial information transmission being more
prevalent with unanimity when compared to majority rule. In Figure 3.3, this fact
is reflected by the gray area being larger in the right panel when compared to the
left panel. This observation implies that if cM and cm are drawn independently
from a uniform distribution, information transmission is more likely to occur with
unanimity than with majority rule. Figure 3.4 also depicts this result. The dark
areas in its left panel show (cM , cm)-values for which there is information trans-
mission with majority rule but not with unanimity, and vice-versa in its right
panel. While the overall area is larger for unanimity, there are also dark areas for
majority rule. Therefore, it is not the case that there is information transmission
with unanimity, whenever there is information transmission with majority rule.
Figure 3.5 illustrates how unanimity in general benefits the minority. The dark
areas in the left panel depict (cM , cm)-values for which the majority strictly benefits
from majority rule when compared to unanimity. The dark areas in the right panel
depict (cM , cm)-values for which the minority strictly benefits from unanimity rule
when compared to majority rule. Both areas mostly overlap, implying that in most
cases in which the majority is worse off with unanimity compared to majority rule
the minority is better off, and vice-versa.
However, both areas do not overlap fully. Therefore, surprisingly, there are cases
in which both groups are better off with either majority rule or unanimity. The
(cM , cm)-values for both cases are depicted in Figure 3.6. Thus, depending on the
parameters, the majority can potentially benefit from relinquishing decision power
and the minority from relinquishing veto power. For emphasis, I state this fact in
Proposition 3.3.
Groups, cheap talk, and voting. 74
Proposition 3.3. There exist parameters cM , cm, and p, such that both M and m
strictly prefer majority rule over unanimity in terms of the ex-ante payoffs of the
Pareto-dominant social choice functions. Conversely, there exist parameters such
that both M and m prefer unanimity over majority rule.
A comparison of Figures 3.4 and 3.6 reveals that the result of Proposition 3.3 is not
or at least not entirely due to majority rule or unanimity allowing for information
transmission, where the other voting rule does not allow for it, i.e., it is not
due to making the outcome contingent on both groups’ outcome. Graphically,
the dark areas in Figure 3.6 do not lie within the dark areas in Figure 3.4. In
some cases, both majority rule and unanimity allow for information transmission,
while, nevertheless, the outcome with one of the voting rules strictly dominates
the outcome with the other voting rule for both groups.
Moreover, whenever majority rule or unanimity allows for information transmis-
sion, while the other voting rule does not, the outcome under the voting rule with
information transmission does not necessarily Pareto-dominate the outcome under
the voting rule without. Graphically, the dark areas in Figure 3.4 do not lie within
the dark areas in Figure 3.6.
Finally, one can directly observe that the outcome with majority rule and the
outcome with unanimity only differ when the minority is less pro-reform than the
majority, i.e., if qm > qM . Here, giving the minority m the power to veto the
reform does not change the outcome. Clearly, whenever M wants the reform, m
wants the reform as well and therefore does not veto. Consequently, switching
from majority rule to unanimity does not affect the outcome in those cases. In
Figures 3.3 - 3.6, this fact results in both the left panel and the right panel being
equal below an imaginary 45◦-line, or (cM = cm)-line. Below this line cM > cm
and thus qM ≥ qm. However, if unanimity was needed for keeping the status quo
instead of achieving the reform, this picture would be reversed, i.e., both panels
would be equal above the (cM = cm)-line.
Conclusion
In this paper, I contribute to the literature that investigates the interplay of cheap
talk and voting in the context of a common values setup. While this field in
general has been studied extensively, there is little research on how the presence of
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different groups affects these models, when each group consists of individuals with
the same preferences (think about political parties, hawks vs. doves, constitutional
originalists vs. constitutional evolutionists in US courts, etc.). To the best of my
knowledge, Thordal-Le Quement and Yokeeswaran (2015), Hummel (2012), and I
are the only ones that have this particular focus so far. My focus, in particular,
lies on the communication between homogeneous groups - that have previously
pooled their information - and how this communication interacts with their voting
strategies.
In my model, I consider two homogeneous groups who first communicate and
then vote on whether to pass a reform requiring either a majority or unanimity
in favor. Given potential equilibrium multiplicity, I analyze the model in terms
of implementable social choice functions. In particular, I derive conditions for
the implementability of information transmission social choice functions, social
choice functions with which the outcome is contingent on both groups’ outcome.
Not surprisingly, information transmission is only feasible when preferences are
sufficiently close.
Moreover, I find that there always exists a Pareto-dominant and thus focal social
choice function. This result allows me to compare the outcomes under two differ-
ent voting rules: unanimity and majority rule. For most parameters, unanimity
benefits the minority and majority rule benefits the majority. However, there ex-
ist parameters for which majority rule strictly Pareto-dominates unanimity and
vice-versa. Therefore, the majority can benefit from relinquishing decision power
or the minority can benefit from relinquishing veto power.
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Figure 3.2: An example of partial information exchange under majority rule:
cM = 0.7, cm = 0.5, p = 0.66. The top row illustrates the degree of conflict
of interest. The second row contains m’s and M ’s strategies. The third and
fourth rows illustrate the incentive compatibility of M ’s voting strategy and m’s
reporting strategy, respectively.
qM 6= qm ⇒ Full information exchange is not feasible.
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5
cMcm
m reports:
sm = 0⇒ rm = 0
sm ∈ {1, 2} ⇒ rm ∈ {1, 2}




sM ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} ⇒ rM ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
M votes:
rm = 0 ∨ sM < 2⇒ am = 0
rm ∈ {1, 2} ∧ sM ≥ 2⇒ am = 3
M ’s voting strategy is incentive compatible given m’s reporting strategy.
The message rm = 0 (light shaded circles) or rm ∈ {1, 2} (dark shaded
circles) shifts M ’s posterior. Combined with M ’s own signal, sM , this leads
to his voting strategy:
0 1 2
0 1
0 1 2 3
cM
0 1
0 1 2 3
cM
m’s communication strategy is incentive compatible given M ’s voting
strategy. m’s report is pivotal if sM ≥ 2 in which case m wants M to vote




Groups, cheap talk, and voting. 77
Figure 3.3: Degrees of information transmission under majority rule and una-
nimity (with p = 0.66). The dark squares along the diagonal represent pa-
rameters for which qM = qm, allowing for full information transmission. The
outlined white rectangles represent parameters for which |qM − qm| = 1 and
partial information transmission is potentially feasible. The gray rectangles
represent parameters for which social choice functions with partial information
transmission are actually implementable.




















Figure 3.4: Comparing information transmission with majority rule and with
unanimity (with p = 0.66). The dark areas in the left panel represent parameters
for which the social choice with majority rule has information transmission but
the social choice with unanimity does not. Conversely, the dark areas in the
left panel represent parameters for which the social choice with unanimity has
information transmission but the social choice with majority rule does not.
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Figure 3.5: Comparing payoffs with majority rule and with unanimity (with
p = 0.66). The dark area in the left panel represents parameters for which
M ’s payoff is higher with majority rule compared to unanimity. Conversely,
the dark in the right panel represents parameters for which m’s payoff is higher
with unanimity compared to majority rule.









(a) M ’s payoff higher with majority
rule









(b) m’s payoff higher with unanim-
ity
Figure 3.6: Comparing payoffs with majority rule and with unanimity (with
p = 0.66). The dark areas in the left panel represent parameters for which
the outcome under majority rule strictly Pareto-dominates the outcome under
unanimity. Conversely, the dark areas in the right panel represent parameters
for which the outcome under unanimity strictly Pareto-dominates the outcome
under majority rule.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. With the following strategies any α that is feasible given majority rule
(τ = 3) and any α that is feasible given unanimity (τ = 5) can be implemented in
equilibrium of the communication and voting game with the appropriate τ :
1. M babbles at the communication stage by mixing over all messages with
equal probability.
2. Given sm, m mixes over all messages rm ∈ {ŝm|α(sM , ŝm) = α(sM , sm)∀sM ∈
SM} with equal probability.
3. M votes aM = 3 if α(sM , rm) = 1 and aM = 0 if α(sM , rm) = 0.
4. m votes am = 2 at the voting stage unless α(sm, sM) = 0 for all sM ∈ SM
given sm.
Proof. It is easily verified that the stated strategies lead to the outcome prescribed
by α. Thus, to prove the lemma I need to show that (ICM), (ICm), (IR
1
M),





unanimity) are not only necessary conditions but also sufficient to guarantee that
the stated strategies are equilibrium strategies.
First, clearly M has no incentive to deviate at the communication stage since
deviating does not affect the outcome. With majority rule, m has no incentive to
deviate at the voting stage, as deviating again does not affect the outcome. With
unanimity, m deviating at the voting stage affects the outcome whenever the
equilibrium strategies require the reform to be implemented. Then, m’s expected
utility from voting yes conditional on sm and conditional on m’s vote being pivotal
is given by ∑
sM∈SM Pr(sM |sm)α(sM , sm)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cm)∑
sM∈SM Pr(sM |sm)α(sM , sm)
≥ 0
which is greater than zero, the expected utility of voting no, due to (IR1m). There-
fore, what remains to be shown is that m does not have a profitable deviation at
the communication stage and that M does not have a profitable deviation at the
voting stage.
Groups, cheap talk, and voting. 80
First, suppose to the contrary of what is to be shown that m, given sm, has a
profitable deviation r̂m. Then there must be some sM ∈ SM such that α(sM , r̂m) 6=
α(sM , sm). Thus, given M ’s voting strategy, m’s interim payoff is given by∑
sM∈SM
Pr(sM |sm)α(sM , r̂m)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cm).
But by (ICm), this payoff must be weakly lower than m’s payoff from following
his equilibrium strategy. Therefore, the deviation cannot be profitable.
Second, consider M ’s strategy at the voting stage. After having received message
rm, M can infer that sm must lie in the set X = {sm|α(sM , sm) = α(sM , rm)∀sM ∈
SM}.
Suppose M always votes no regardless of rm. Then, m babbles by construction.
With majority rule, the left-hand side of (IR0M) represents M ’s expected payoff
from deviating and voting yes, which is smaller than zero, M ’s expected payoff from
voting no. Thus, (IR0M) ensures that M ’s strategy is optimal. With unanimity,
whenever M always votes no m also always votes no by construction. Therefore,
deviating and voting yes does not affect the outcome. Now suppose M always
votes yes regardless of rm. Then again m babbles and the left-hand side of (IR
1
M)
represents M ’s expected payoff when always voting yes. So (IR1M) ensures that
M ’s strategy is optimal.
For the final case, suppose M sometimes votes yes and sometimes votes no depend-
ing on sM and rm. Now I can use (ICM) to show the optimality of M ’s voting
strategy. Suppose rm is such that M votes yes in equilibrium, α(sM , rm) = 1.
Define s−M := max{ŝ−M |ŝ−M < ψ(sm) ≤ sM , sm ∈ Sm}. In other words, s−M is the
signal just below the highest possible cutoff that can be induced by m so that M
votes yes given sM . The fact that M sometimes votes no ensures that s
−
M exists.
Now, notice that due to monotonicity, switching from sM to s
−
M only leads to a
different allocation for messages in the set X. Any other message r′m /∈ X must
induce a cutoff either even smaller than s−M or larger than ψ(rm) = ψ(sm), the
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m). Therefore, I get:∑
sm∈Sm








Pr(sm|sM)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cM) ≥ 0
Now, (ICM) implies that the first term of the difference is weakly larger than the
second term. This inequality in turn implies that the difference is weakly positive.
Finally, this result gives∑
sm∈X Pr(sm|sM)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cM)∑
sm∈X Pr(sm|sM)
≥ 0,
which states that the expected utility of M when voting yes conditional on rm and
sM is greater than zero, the expected utility of voting no.
For any message rm such that α(sM , rm) = 0, the optimality of voting no can
be shown analogously. Thus I have now established the optimality of M ’s voting
strategy in equilibria in which she always votes yes, in equilibria in which she
always votes no, and in all other equilibria.
Lemma 2. Information transmission can only occur in equilibrium as long as |qM−
qm| ≤ 1.
Proof. Given Lemma 1, it is sufficient to consider equilibria in which m affects
the outcome only through cheap talk and M affects the outcome only through
voting. As stated in Corollary 3.1, m can use one of four different communication
strategies in such an equilibrium.
Full information transmission is feasible only when qM = qm. Therefore what
remains to be shown is that the two partial information transmission strategies
cannot be sustained in equilibrium when |qM − qm| > 1. Then, the only strategy
that remains for m is babbling, in which case there is no information transmission.
Suppose qM > qm + 1, for example qM = 4 and qm = 2. Consider strategy (a).
After receiving rm = 0, M only votes yes if sM ≥ qM . After receiving rm ∈ {1, 2},
M only votes yes (aM = 3) either whenever sM +1 ≥ qM or whenever sM +2 ≥ qM ,
depending on M ’s preferences. But then m would always want to deviate when
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sm = 0. In terms of the example, M never votes yes when rm = 0 and either
votes yes whenever sM ≥ 3 or whenever sM ≥ 2 when rm ∈ {1, 2}. But then m
never wants to send message rm = 0. The same approach can be applied with
strategy (b) or when qM + 1 < qm. Therefore, partial information transmission
cannot occur in equilibrium.
Lemma 3. In an equilibrium that implements a social choice α with partial in-
formation transmission and which is constructed with the strategies described in
Lemma 1, the communication strategy of m depends on τ , qM , and qm in the
following way.
With majority rule (τ = 3):
• If qm < qM : m uses communication strategy (a).
• If qm > qM : m uses communication strategy (b).
With unanimity (τ = 5):
• If qm < qM : m uses communication strategy (a).
• If qm > qM : Either communication strategy can occur.
Proof. As babbling and full information transmission are ruled out in equilibria
with partial information transmission, Corollary 3.1 means that m must use either
communication strategy (a) or (b). Therefore, to prove the lemma it suffices to
show that in each of the first three cases that the other (i.e., the non-prescribed)
communication strategy cannot be used in equilibrium.
If qm > qM , then qm = qM + 1 and if qm < qM , then qm = qM − 1.
• Majority rule, qm = qM − 1:
Suppose m uses communication strategy (b). If rm = 2, then M votes
yes whenever sM ≥ ψM(2) = qM − 2. Since there is partial information
transmission, M votes differently if rm 6= 2. But then, whenever sm = 1, m
would want to deviate and report rm = 2, since M would vote yes whenever
sM ≥ ψM(2) = sM−sm−1 = qm−sm. In other words, M votes yes whenever
sM + sm ≥ qm, a strategy which m prefers over any other possible voting
strategy of M .
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• Majority rule, qm = qM + 1:
The argument that rules out communication strategy (a) is exactly analogous
to the above argument.
• Unanimity, qm = qM − 1:
Suppose m uses communication strategy (b). If rm = 2, then M votes
yes whenever sM ≥ ψM(2) = qM − 2. Since there is partial information
transmission, M votes differently if rm 6= 2. But then, whenever sm = 1, m
would want to deviate and report rm = 2, since M would vote yes whenever
sM ≥ ψM(2) = sM−sm−1 = qm−sm. In other words, M votes yes whenever
sM + sm ≥ qm, a strategy which m prefers over any other possible voting
strategy of M .
Proposition 3.2. If several social choice functions are implementable in equilibrium,
there is always a Pareto-dominant one.
Proof. This proof is a case-by-case proof. Both for majority rule and for una-
nimity I show that whenever several social choice functions can be implemented
in equilibrium, one social choice function Pareto-dominates the others.
Majority rule (τ = 3)
One social choice function that is always implementable is the one that corresponds
to no information transmission. With the strategies of Lemma 1 this social choice
is implemented by m babbling and always voting am = 2 and M voting aM = 3,
whenever she prefers the reform solely based on her own signal sM . Whenever
information transmission is not feasible, this social choice function is the only
implementable one, as no other social choice function without information trans-
mission can be implemented with the strategies of Lemma 1.
If information transmission is feasible, then Lemma 2 means that |qM − qm| ≤ 1.
With qM = qm the preferences of M and m are perfectly aligned. Therefore, the
social choice function that corresponds to full information transmission clearly
dominates any other social choice that is implementable.
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Thus, what remains to be shown is that, when only partial information transmis-
sion is feasible, the social choice function corresponding to information transmis-
sion is preferred by both M and m to the social choice function corresponding
to no information transmission. As m follows a different strategy depending on
whether qM > qm or qm < qM , I verify this statement for each case separately.
1. qM > qm, specifically qM = qm + 1.
Lemma 3 gives that m follows communication strategy (a). Information
transmission is not possible, whenever qm = 0, because m would always
want to lead M to vote pro reform, regardless of sm. Hence 1 ≤ qm ≤ 4.
Incentive compatibility gives that in the equilibrium with partial information
transmission the reform is implemented if
sM ≥ qM −
0 if rm = 02 otherwise.
Since M can perfectly infer sm = 0 if rm = 0, she can only vote aM = 3 if
sM ≥ qM . If rm > 0, she would either want to vote for reform if sM ≥ qM −1
or sM ≥ qM − 2. But in equilibrium it must be that she votes for reform
only if sM ≥ qM −2, otherwise m would want to deviate to rm = 0 whenever
sm = 1. With no information transmission the reform is implemented if
sM ≥ qM − 1, since β(qM , 5) = β(qM − 1, 3) ≥ cM .
Call the partial information social choice function α and the no information
transmission social choice α̂. Now only consider 2 ≥ qM ≤ 4. These social
choice functions differ only in cases: α(qM − 2, 2) = 1, α(qM − 1, 0) = 0, and
α(qM − 2, 1) = 1, with α̂ prescribing the opposite action.
M prefers α(qM − 2, 2) = 1 and α(qM − 1, 0) = 0 to α̂ but she prefers







Pr(sm|sM)α(sM , sm)(β(sm + sM , 5)− cM).
Now comparing α to α̂, M ’s ex-ante utility is higher with α since her utility
gains from α(qM − 2, 2) = 1 outweigh her losses due to α(qM − 2, 1) = 1,
since it is an equilibrium strategy for M to vote yes whenever sM = qM − 2
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and rm > 0, which implies
Pr(sm = 1|sM = qM − 2, rm > 0)(β(qM − 1, 5)− cM)+
Pr(sm = 2|sM = qM − 2, rm > 0)(β(qM , 5)− cM) ≥ 0.
m prefers α(qM − 2, 2) = 1 and α(qM − 2, 1) = 1 to α̂ but he prefers α̂(qM −
1, 0) = 1 to α(qM − 1, 0) = 1. However, similar to the argument for M , m’s
gains due to α(qM−2, 1) = 1 outweigh his losses due to α(qM−1, 0) = 0, since
the ex-ante probability of (sM , sm) = (qM − 2, 1) is higher than the ex-ante
probability of (sM , sm) = (qM −1, 0) and β(qM −2 + 1, 5) = β(qM −1 + 0, 5).
Finally, consider qM = 4 and qm = 5. Then the reform is never imple-
mented in the equilibrium without information transmission. With informa-
tion transmission, α(3, 1) = 1 and α(3, 2) = 1. Clearly, m prefers α to α̂. M
also prefers α since her gains from α(3, 2) = 1 must outweigh her losses due
to α(3, 1) = 1 from an ex-ante perspective, as she votes yes with rm > 0 and
sM = 3.
2. qM < qm, specifically qM = qm − 1.
The proof is similar to the proof for qM > qm. Lemma 3 gives that m fol-
lows communication strategy (b). Information transmission is not possible,
whenever qM = 0, because M always votes yes. Hence 1 ≤ qM ≤ 4. In-
centive compatibility gives that in the equilibrium with partial information
transmission the reform is implemented if
sM ≥ qM −
2 if rm = 20 otherwise.
Since M can perfectly infer sm = 2 if rm = 2, she can only vote aM = 3
if sM ≥ qM − 2. If rm < 2, she would either want to vote for reform if
sM ≥ qM − 1 or sM ≥ qM − 0. But in equilibrium it must be that she
votes for reform only if sM ≥ qM , otherwise m would want to deviate to
rm = 2 whenever sm = 1. With no information transmission the reform is
implemented if sM ≥ qM − 1, since β(qM , 5) = β(qM − 1, 3) ≥ cM .
Again, call the partial information social choice function α and the no in-
formation transmission social choice α̂. These social choice functions differ
Groups, cheap talk, and voting. 86
only in cases: α(qM − 2, 2) = 1, α(qM − 1, 0) = 0, and α(qM − 1, 1) = 0, with
α̂ prescribing the opposite action.
M prefers α(qM − 2, 2) = 1 and α(qM − 1, 0) = 0 to α̂ but she prefers
α̂(qM − 1, 1) = 1 to α(qM − 1, 1) = 0. Again comparing α to α̂, M ’s ex-ante
utility is higher with α since her utility gains from α(qM−1, 0) = 0 outweigh
her losses due to α(qM − 1, 1) = 0, since it is an equilibrium strategy for M
to vote no whenever sM = qM − 1 and rm < 2, which implies
Pr(sm = 0|sM = qM − 1, rm < 2)(β(qM − 1, 5)− cM)+
Pr(sm = 1|sM = qM − 1, rm < 2)(β(qM , 5)− cM) ≤ 0.
m prefers α(qM − 1, 0) = 0 and α(qM − 1, 1) = 0 to α̂ but he prefers α̂(qM −
2, 2) = 0 to α(qM − 2, 2) = 1. However, similar to the argument for M , m’s
gains due to α(qM − 1, 1) = 0 outweigh his losses due to α(qM − 2, 2) = 1,
since the ex-ante probability of (sM , sm) = (qM − 1, 1) is higher than the
ex-ante probability of (sM , sm) = (qM − 2, 2).
Unanimity (τ = 5)
The social choice function α(sM , sm) = 0 for all sM , sm is always implementable
with unanimity. In the corresponding equilibrium, no group has an incentive to
deviate at the voting stage and m babbles. Due to (IR1M) and (IR
1
m), I know
that any other implementable social choice function must Pareto-dominate this
no reform social choice. With qM = qm, the social choice corresponding to full
information transmission is implementable and again clearly Pareto-dominates any
other social choice. For other social choice functions, the analysis again depends
on whether qM > qm or qM < qm.
1. qM > qm.
There are three different cases in which α does not have information trans-
mission, i.e., α is contingent on at most one group’s signal. First, the social
choice with the reform never being implemented. Second, when qM = 1,
then the reform is a social choice such that the reform is always imple-
mented, since M always votes yes if m babbles, given β(qM , 5) = β(qM−1, 3).
Third, if qM > 1, then there is a social choice function corresponding to m
babbling and always voting yes in equilibrium and M voting yes whenever
sM > qM − 1. This social choice function, described for the majority rule
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case, is also feasible with unanimity. The reason is that m cannot meaning-
fully deviate at the communication stage and can only deviate at the voting
stage by voting am < 0 for some sm. But this deviation only matters if M
votes yes, in which case sM ≥ qM − 1, which implies that m would want the
reform regardless of sm. For qM > 1, it is possible to have α only contin-
gent on sM and not sm but not vice versa, since m can only always vote yes
because qm < qM .
In any information transmission social choice function, Lemma 3 gives that
m follows communication strategy (a). If both social choice functions are
implementable, then this communication social choice dominates the no com-
munication social choice. The underlying argument is exactly the same as
the above argument with majority rule.
2. qM < qm.
Apart from the reform never being implemented and the reform always being
implemented, the only social choice function without information transmis-
sion has α only depend on sm, i.e., M always votes yes. This social choice
function is feasible whenever cm is such that cm > β(qM − 1, 2). In this case,
M never has an incentive to vote no, even if sM = 0, since m already votes
no whenever M does not want the reform. Again, this social choice function
clearly Pareto-dominates never implementing the reform. However, when
partial information transmission is feasible, it is not so clear that a Pareto-
dominant social choice function must exist in the set of implementable social
choice functions. With unanimity and qM + 1 = qm, unlike with unanimity
and qM = qm + 1, Lemma 3 does not prescribe a communication strategy for
m. Thus there are up to four different implementable social choice functions
in this case. The social choice with which the reform is never implemented
(1), a social choice function with α(sM , sm) only depending on sm (2), an
information transmission social choice function in which m uses communica-
tion strategy (a) in equilibrium (3) or one in which m uses communication
strategy (b) in equilibrium (4). To show that one social choice function
always Pareto-dominates other implementable social choice functions I in-
vestigate each possible case separately:
• (qM , qm) = (0, 1)
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Apart from the reform never being implemented, the only other feasible
social choice has the reform always implemented. The latter is feasible
since M can clearly always vote yes and in this case m also wants to
to so, since β(0, 2) > β(0, 3) = β(1, 5). Thus m can babble and always
vote yes, even when sm = 0.
• (qM , qm) = (1, 2)
First, suppose that β(0, 2) ≥ cm. Then, as with (qM , qm) = (0, 1) there
exists a social choice function where both groups always vote yes. There
can only be a social choice function in which m uses communication
strategy (a), if the reform is never implemented whenever sm = 0.
Otherwise, when rm = 0, M would vote yes whenever sM ≥ 1, but then
m would want to deviate to rm = 0 when sm = 1. Now, let α˜ correspond
to the reform always being implemented and α̂ to the reform always
being implemented unless sm = 0. Notice that α˜ is not implementable
given β(0, 2) ≥ cm, as m would want to deviate whenever sm = 0 given
that
β(0, 2)− cm =
∑
sM∈SM
Pr(sM |sm = 0)(β(sM , 5)− cM) ≥ 0.
Suppose there is also a social choice in which m uses communication
strategy (b). Here it must be that the reform is always implemented
when rm = 2 and the reform is implemented when sM ≥ 1 when rm < 2.
Call this social choice α, which only differs from α˜ in that α(0, 0) =
α(0, 1) = 0. Now clearly m prefers α to α˜. M prefers α(0, 0) = 0
and does not prefer α(0, 1) = 0. However, her gains due to α(0, 0) = 0
must outweigh her losses due to α(0, 1) = 0 since she votes no whenever
rm < 2 and sM = 0.
Second, suppose that β(1, 2) ≥ cm > β(0, 2). Now α˜, the social choice
corresponding to always implementing the reform, does not exist. How-
ever, α̂ is now implementable and clearly dominates never implementing
the reform. If α, the information transmission social choice, is also im-
plementable, it Pareto-dominates α̂. α differs from α̂ in that α(0, 1) = 0
and α(1, 0) = α(2, 0) = α(3, 0) = 1, while α̂ has the opposite value in
those cases. Now both M and m prefer α(2, 0) = α(3, 0) = 1. M prefers
α(1, 0) = 1 to α̂ but not α(0, 1) = 0 and vice versa for m. M ’s gains due
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to α(1, 0) = 1 outweigh her losses due to α(0, 1) = 0 since the ex-ante
probability of (sM , sm) = (1, 0) is higher than the ex-ante probability
of (sM , sm) = (0, 1). For m, his gains due to α(2, 0) = α(3, 0) = 1
outweigh his losses due to α(1, 0) = 1 since he votes yes when sm = 0.
• (qM , qm) = (2, 3)
Now, since cM ≥ β(1, 5) = β(0, 3), always implementing the reform is
not a feasible social choice.
First, suppose β(1, 2) > cm. Again, m can only utilize communication
strategy (a) if the reform is never implemented whenever sm = 0. When
sm > 0 and thus rm > 0 the reform is either implemented always
or implemented whenever sM ≥ 1, depending on cM . Suppose the
latter is the case and call this social choice α̂, which dominates never
implementing the reform. If there is also a feasible social choice in
which m uses communication strategy (b) it must that when m reports
rm = 2 the reform is always implemented and when m reports rm < 2
the reform is implemented when sM ≥ 2. Call this social choice α.
It is not possible that when sm = 1 and thus rm < 2 the reform is
implemented when sM ≥ 1 since m would want to deviate when sm = 2.
It is similarly not possible that the reform is never implemented when
sm ≤ 1, since m would want to deviate to rm = 2 as β(1, 2) > cm. Now,
if both are implementable, α Pareto-dominates α̂. The social choice
functions differ in α(2, 0) = α(3, 0) = 1 and α(1, 1) = 0 with α̂ having
the opposite values. Both M and m prefer α(3, 0) = 1. M prefers
α(2, 0) = 1 and does not prefer α(1, 1) = 0 to α̂, while the opposite
is true for m. For m, his gains due to α(3, 0) = 1 outweigh his losses
due to α(2, 0) = 1, since he votes yes with sm = 0. For M , her gains
outweigh her losses since
Pr(sM = 3, sm = 0)(β(3, 0)− cM)
+ Pr(sM = 2, sm = 0)(β(2, 0)− cM)
≥ 2 Pr(sM = 2, sm = 0)(β(2, 0)− cM)
= Pr(sM = 1, sm = 1)(β(1, 1)− cM),
where the top row represents the utility gained with α compared to α̂
and the bottom row represents the utility lost. Now suppose cM is such
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that the reform is always implemented whenever m uses communication
strategy (a) and sm > 0. Call this social choice function α˜. Then the
social choice functions differ in α(2, 0) = α(3, 0) = 1 and α(0, 1) =
α(1, 1) = 0 with α˜ having the opposite values. Again clearly α Pareto-
dominates α˜. The only difference to the previous case is that here
α(0, 1) = 0 and α˜(0, 1) = 1. But both M and m prefer α(0, 1) = 0.
Second, suppose β(1, 2) < cm. Now, α˜ is not implementable, asm would
want to deviate to rm = 0 when sm = 1. However, now a social choice
function is implementable in which m uses communication strategy (b),
the reform is never implemented when sm ≤ 1 and always implemented
when sm = 2. Call this social choice α. If α is implementable as well,
α Pareto-dominates α. The two allocations differ in that α(1, 1) =
α(2, 1) = α(3, 1) = 1. Clearly M prefers α. m must also prefer α,
given that he must vote yes whenever sm = 1. Thus his gains from
α(2, 1) = α(3, 1) = 1 must outweigh his losses due to α(1, 1) = 0.
• (qM , qm) = (3, 4)
Suppose m follows communication strategy (a). Then it must be that
the reform is never implemented when sm = 0. Similarly, it must be
that the reform is only implemented when sm ≥ 1 and sM ≥ 2. There
can be no equilibrium in which M votes yes whenever sM ≥ 1 when
receiving rm 6= 0. The reason is that m’s posterior of the success of the
reform conditional on sM ≥ 1 and sm = 1 is smaller than cm as
Pr(s = 1|sm = 1, sM > 0) = 1− (1− p)
3
1− (1− p)3 + 1− p3 < p = β(3, 5) < cm
for all p ∈ (0.5, 1). Therefore, if M voted yes whenever rm 6= 0 and
sM ≥ 1, m would have an incentive to deviate and vote no when sm = 1.
Call this social choice α.
Suppose m follows communication strategy (b). Then it must be that
reform is never implemented when sm ≤ 1, since m never wants the
reform if sm = 0. If sm = rm = 2 the reform is implemented whenever
sM ≥ 1. Call this social choice α˜.
If only one of the two social choice functions α and α̂ is implementable,
it clearly Pareto-dominates the only other implementable social choice
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function, never implementing the reform. If both α and α̂ are imple-
mentable, α dominates. The two functions only differ in that α(2, 1) =
α(3, 1) = 1 and α(1, 2) = 0. m prefers α(1, 2) = 0 and α(3, 1) = 1
but not α(2, 1) = 1. However, his gains due to α(3, 1) = 1 outweigh
his losses due to α(2, 1) = 1 as he votes yes whenever sm = 1. M
prefers α(2, 1) = 1 and α(3, 1) = 1 but not α(1, 2) = 0. However, her
gains due to α(2, 1) = 1 outweigh her losses due to α(1, 2) = 0 since
(sM , sm) = (2, 1) is twice as likely as (sM , sm) = (1, 2) from an ex-ante
perspective.
• (qM , qm) = (4, 5)
In any social choice for which the reform is sometimes implemented,
m can only follow communication strategy (b). If such a social choice
is implementable, the reform is only implemented when sm = 2 and
sM ≥ 2.
• (qM , qm) >> (4, 5)
There is only one implementable social choice function. The reform is
never implemented.
4. In or Out - the effect of small





In legislative bodies with a proportional representation electoral system there are
often small parties that fail to win representation. This failure can be caused by
a minimum electoral threshold, or by the overall number of seats up for election
being too small for a small vote share to translate to at least one seat. In this
paper, I estimate the causal effect of parties winning representation at the extensive
margin, i.e., the effect of being in as opposed to being out. Identification of a causal
effect is a tricky issue, as winning representation is not random. Parties that win
representation are inherently different from parties that do not, and not only in
the sense that the former gain more votes.
To address this issue of causal identification, a lot of attention in empirical Eco-
nomics has been given to quasi-experimental research designs. A prominent ex-
ample of such a research design is the regression discontinuity (RD) design. It
exploits settings in which treatment is assigned based on a score relative to a cut-
off. The idea underlying this approach is to consider treatment assignment for
observations with a score close to the threshold as essentially random. The RD
approach has been particularly well received in Political Economy. Following the
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seminal work of Lee (2008), who estimates the incumbency advantage1 in close
US House elections, many researchers have used an RD approach to exploit close
elections as natural experiments. Almost all of these studies are based on the
threshold of winning at 50 percent in a majoritarian electoral system with two
parties or two candidates.
In proportional representation electoral systems there is no fixed threshold of win-
ning at 50 percent. Nevertheless, there are discontinuities stemming from the seat
allocation method that can be exploited for an RD design. Folke (2014) is the
first and only one, to my knowledge and not counting this paper, to build an RD
framework based on these discontinuities. He studies the effect of certain parties
winning representation on the intensive margin on policy, i.e., the effect of winning
an additional seat. In this paper, in contrast to his approach, I develop a similar
RD setup to study the effect of any party winning representation at the extensive
margin, i.e., of winning at least one seat. Winning representation at the extensive
margin potentially has a two-dimensional effect: First, an effect on policy, through
the effect on the overall composition of the municipal council. Second, an effect
on the party itself, such as an incumbency effect similar to the one estimated by
Lee (2008) in a majoritarian context.
With respect to the first dimension, I can investigate the relationship between
fractionalization and public spending. A party winning representation, in most
cases, increases the total number of parties in the legislature by 1 and thus in-
creases the fractionalization in the legislature. The Political Economy literature
generally predicts a positive relationship between fractionalization and spending,
either within an electoral system (Lizzeri and Persico, 2005), or with respect to
the dichotomy of a majoritarian system with two parties and a proportional repre-
sentation system with many parties (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno, 2002;
Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 2007).
With respect to the second dimension I can add to the Political Economy literature
on incumbency effects. The existence of incumbency effects is a well-established
fact for majoritarian electoral systems in many different contexts.2 The effect of
1The average advantage an incumbent has over a challenger in terms of the vote share.
2 Apart from the studies with an RD approach, such as Lee (2008), there are many more
studies with different methodological approaches that investigate incumbency effects. For exam-
ple, Gelman and King (1990), Alford and Brady (1993), and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) are are
some influential studies on incumbency effects in the US House not using an RD approach.
In or Out. The effect of small parties winning representation. 94
incumbency in a proportional representation system, i.e., the effect of winning
representation, has been studied much less by comparison.
For my estimation, I use data from municipal council elections in the German
state of Thuringia. Using the seat allocation method in these elections, I calcu-
late the counterfactual number of votes a party would have needed to safely win
representation in the municipal council. I use the difference in the actual number
of votes to this threshold as a measure of closeness of the election for a party. I
estimate a sharp RD design, where the discontinuous jump in an outcome can be
interpreted as the average causal effect of winning representation.
For public spending, measured by investment spending, I find a large and statis-
tically significant effect of a party winning representation and thus increasing the
overall number of parties in the municipal council by 1. With the additional party,
investment spending per capita per year increases by 142 Euros, representing an
increase of almost 50 percent. For the effect of incumbency on the individual party,
I find that small parties close to the extensive margin have a high probability of
dropping out and not running in the next election. However, I find a statistically
significant difference suggesting that parties that win seats are roughly 35 percent
less likely to drop out in the next election. This phenomenon precludes the exact
estimation of an incumbency effect with respect to the vote share. I only observe
the vote share in the next election for a selected sample and selection varies de-
pending on whether a party won seats or not. In a bounding exercise, I estimate
a lower bound and an upper bound for the incumbency effect. Both bounds are
relatively close to zero and not statistically significant. Therefore, I do not find
evidence of a vote share incumbency effect.
With respect to the estimated significant discontinuities for investment spending
and dropping out, I also attempt to disentangle the estimated average effect and
thus to identify potential channels of the effect. One potential channel is the effect
of winning representation on the composition of the municipal council. If a party
winning representation causes a larger change in the composition of the municipal
council, I expect a larger effect on outcomes as well. To test this prediction, I
interact the jump in treatment with a measure of the impact of the party close
to the threshold on the composition of the municipal council. As measures I use
both the change in the Herfindahl index attributable to that party and the baseline
number of parties that win seats, not counting that party. If the baseline number
of parties is small, one additional party represents a larger change. For investment
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spending, interaction effects are significant and have the expected sign, suggesting
that a greater impact on the composition of the municipal council is associated
with a larger effect on spending. For the probability of dropping out, I do not find
statistically significant interaction effects.
Overall, this paper contributes to the Political Economy literature by shedding
light on the effects of incumbency at the extensive margin. Compared to ma-
joritarian electoral systems, these effects are much less studied for proportional
representation systems. However, knowledge about them can help policy makers
to make informed decisions. For example, with respect to constitutional design,
policy makers can better answer whether an electoral system should include elec-
toral thresholds. Electoral thresholds are put in place to prevent very small parties
from gaining seats and thus to prevent the number of parties that win represen-
tation from becoming too large. My results suggest a considerable effect of an
additional party winning representation on political outcomes.
Related literature
The RD approach has been applied frequently in Political Economy with respect
to many different questions, mostly exploiting the discontinuity in close elections.
Tables listing some of the these works can be found both in Lee and Lemieux
(2010) and Caughey and Sekhon (2011).
The vast majority of works that apply the RD approach to close elections exploit
the 50-50 threshold. In majoritarian two-party systems, with only one seat in
contention within a district, this threshold of absolute majority is in fact the only
relevant discontinuity. In proportional representation systems with many parties,
there is no clear 50-50 threshold. In the context of municipal council elections
in Sweden, Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) and Liang (2013) overcome this obstacle
by lumping political parties into two-camps: left-wing and right-wing. This way,
they obtain a 50-50 threshold for overall control of the municipal council, despite
municipal council elections in Sweden having a proportional representation system
and generally more than two parties.
Instead of having a natural discontinuity at the 50-50 threshold, proportional rep-
resentation systems induce multiple discontinuities that can be exploited. This
feature is due to the fact that a continuous vote share is translated into a dis-
crete number of seats. Also in the context of Swedish municipal council elections,
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Carlsson, Dahl, and Rooth (2015) exploit this fact for a control-function approach,
which relies on the same discontinuities for identification that RD studies use but is
methodically different from the RD approach. Besides applying the RD approach
to the 50-50 threshold, Liang (2013) also uses a control-function approach. To
my knowledge, Folke (2014) was the first to develop an RD methodology specifi-
cally for the proportional representation context. Again, using Swedish municipal
council elections, he investigates how an additional seat for a certain party in a
municipality impacts policy. His approach to identifying the relevant thresholds
is methodically different, due to the different seat allocation rules in Sweden and
Thuringia, but conceptually very similar. One crucial difference of Carlsson, Dahl,
and Rooth (2015), Liang (2013), and Folke (2014) to this paper is that they pre-
dominately consider the intensive margin while I consider the extensive margin.
They focus on the effect of additional seats for a party while I look at the effect
of that party winning either some seats or no seats at all.
In the study that started the surge in the application of the RD approach to
elections, Lee (2008) finds a strong incumbency effect. Being the incumbent comes
with an advantage over the challenger in terms of votes in the next election.3 He
also finds that incumbent candidates are much more likely to run in the next
election than candidates that narrowly lost the last one. Trounstine (2011) finds
similar effects in the context of mayoral elections in California. However, they
encounter this phenomenon in the two-party majoritarian context of the US. If the
Democratic candidate decides not to run again, another candidate will take his or
her place. The effect I find in the proportional representation setup is with respect
to the party dropping out in the next election. Thus the aforementioned studies
do not encounter the same sample selection problems I face in the estimation of
an incumbency effect with respect to the vote share in the next election.
For the proportional representation context, Liang (2013) finds no evidence of a
“ruling effect”, an effect of belonging to the majority camp, on the vote share in the
next election, but he finds an intensive margin incumbency effect. Additional seats
on the municipal council lead to a higher vote share in the next election. Carlsson,
Dahl, and Rooth (2015) also find such an effect and link it to the impact of strength
in the municipal council on attitudes. Apart from these intensive margin effects,
3This advantage has been observed independently in many different contexts. Just for the
US, there are studies which, using an RD design, find an incumbency advantage in House elec-
tions (Lee, 2008), state legislature elections (Uppal, 2010), and mayoral elections (Ferreira and
Gyourko, 2009; Trounstine, 2011).
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using only parties that win 0 seats or 1 seat, Liang (2013) also finds an extensive
margin effect, i.e., the effect of winning representation at all. However, in both
papers the authors do not report a dropping out effect, as observed by Lee (2008)
and Trounstine (2011) in a majoritarian context and in this paper in a proportional
representation context. Consequently, Liang (2013) does not face a selection bias
issue in estimating the extensive margin incumbency effect.
There are several studies, both theoretical and empirical, according to which hav-
ing a proportional representation rather than a majoritarian electoral system is
associated with more public spending. Persson and Tabellini (2004) provide an
overview of these studies. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) develop a
model of electoral competition that predicts more targeted and inefficient rather
than diffused spending in proportional representation systems compared to ma-
joritarian systems. They also provide empirical evidence in support of their model
using a cross-country panel of OECD and Latin American countries. Persson,
Roland, and Tabellini (2007), on the other hand, propose a model that attributes
the difference between the systems to the higher incidence of coalition govern-
ments under proportional representation. Also using a cross-country panel, they
give some empirical evidence in support of their assertion. Finally, instead of
comparing the two electoral modes, Lizzeri and Persico (2005) provide a model
of electoral competition within a proportional representation system that predicts
more targeted spending with a larger number of parties.
Some researchers have used the RD approach to investigate public spending. Fer-
reira and Gyourko (2009) look at mayoral elections in the US and find no effect
of the mayor’s party on the amount of public spending. Albouy (2013) finds
that members of Congress in the US attract more federal spending to their dis-
trict if they belong to the party currently holding the majority. Republicans and
Democrats also differ in the type of spending they attract. The former attract more
spending for defense and transportation, the latter attract more spending for ed-
ucation and urban development. Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) finds a different effect
of left-wing and right-wing governments on spending. Left-wing governments are
found to spend more than right-wing governments. Again with regard to munic-
ipal councils in Sweden, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) does not look at elections but
exploits the thresholds that determine the size of the municipal council by pop-
ulation size. He finds that larger municipal councils lead to smaller government
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and explains this finding with the control function performed by the municipal
council.
In any application of the RD approach, it is prudent to investigate whether the
identifying assumption holds, i.e., if treatment is essentially random for observa-
tions close to the threshold. A large difference in pre-treatment observables or
in the mass of observations on either side of the threshold might indicate discon-
tinuous sorting, which would imply that the identifying assumption is violated.
Caughey and Sekhon (2011) raised this concern in the context of congressional
elections in the United States. They point out that even when investigating a
narrow window around the 50-50 threshold close races might not be random. For
example, they find that incumbents are more likely to win close elections than
challengers. Snyder, Folke, and Hirano (2015) address this finding. They point
out that this phenomenon is not necessarily indicative of manipulation. Instead, it
can easily arise as a result of electoral competition and the empirical distribution
of voting results. Eggers, Fowler, Hainmueller, Hall, and Snyder (2015) test the
validity of the RD setup in many different election contexts. In general they fail
to find problems due to sorting and argue that the concern raised by Caughey
and Sekhon (2011) may be a fluke. Both Caughey and Sekhon (2011) and Eg-
gers, Fowler, Hainmueller, Hall, and Snyder (2015) include recommendations for
tests of the identifying assumption which guide my robustness tests. Among those
tests, the test for a discontinuity in the histogram of the forcing variable was first
proposed by McCrary (2008).
In applying the RD methodology, I am guided largely by Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010). For bandwidth choice in local linear regression
I rely on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
The RD approach
In this section, I briefly describe the regression discontinuity (RD) approach in
general and how I apply it in this context. An RD design is a quasi-experimental
research method to identify the causal effect of a treatment. RD approaches can be
applied in settings in which treatment status is not assigned randomly - as it would
be in a controlled experiment - but assigned according to some characteristic, called
the forcing variable, in relation to a threshold.
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In this case, I am interested in the effect of party i making it into the municipal
council. The treatment Di is defined as
Di = 1 if party i holds at least one seat,
Di = 0 if party i holds no seat,
and the treatment effect on outcome Yi is Yi(Di = 1)−Yi(Di = 0). Unfortunately,
it is generally impossible to observe Yi(Di = 1) and Yi(Di = 0) for i at the same
time. Also, unlike in an experiment, one cannot simply divide the sample into
subgroups by treatment and compare outcomes to identify the treatment effect.
Parties with Di = 1 gain a larger number of votes than parties with Di = 0 due in
part to systematical differences between both groups. Consequently, differences in
outcomes cannot only be attributed to the effect of the difference in the treatment
Di.
An elegant way to address this problem is the RD approach. The underlying
idea is to exploit randomness in the realization of the forcing variable, so that
treatment status can be considered random for observations that lie close to the
threshold. Applied to this setting, whether Di = 1 or Di = 0 is close to random
if the number of votes for party i is in the neighborhood of the number of votes i
would need to win at least one seat. Consequently, parties that narrowly win seats
are comparable to parties that narrowly do not and differences between these two
groups can be attributed to the difference in Di. By comparing two groups, it
is possible to obtain a measure of the average treatment effect for these parties,
E[Yi(Di = 1)− Yi(Di = 0)|i close to threshold].
The crucial methodological step in applying the RD approach in a proportional
representation setting is to construct a one-dimensional forcing variable that quan-
tifies the closeness of an election outcome. Folke (2014) was the first to develop an
approach for the Sainte-Lague¨ seat allocation method. I use a conceptually slightly
different approach for the seat allocation method described in Section III.i, which
is based on the largest remainder method.
First, I calculate the counterfactual variable v̂i, the number of votes party i would
have needed to safely (without coin toss) win at least one seat, given that the
number of votes for all other parties had stayed the same. The difference between
party i’s actual number of votes vi and v̂i then measures how narrowly i won seats
or missed winning seats in terms of the number of votes. To construct a measure
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comparable across different municipalities of different sizes, I divide the difference
by the sum of votes for all other parties plus v̂i, the counterfactual number of votes
of party i. The resulting forcing variable xi is a normalization of the vote share




j 6=i vj + v̂i
· 100. (4.1)
Given the construction of xi, the relevant threshold determining treatment status
is at 0,
Di =
1 if xi ≥ 00 if xi < 0. (4.2)
The crucial difference between my forcing variable and the forcing variable pro-
posed by Folke (2014) is that I only look at a vote change for party i, keeping
the number of votes for all other parties equal, while he considers a vote change
in the entire vector of votes. For a detailed explanation why my much simpler
approach is appropriate for the largest remainder method but not for the Sainte-
Lague¨ method, see the Online Appendix of Folke (2014).
Specification
To estimate an RD design, I need to regress the outcome of interest on the forcing
variable allowing for a discontinuous jump at the threshold. This jump represents
the treatment effect. When using a parametric specification, RD estimates can be
very sensitive to a misspecification of the functional form. One possible remedy of
this problem is to use a semi-parametric estimation technique, such as local linear
regression. I follow this approach for the main analyses and report alternative
polynomial specifications as a robustness check.
In local linear regression at a point c, observations are weighted by closeness to
the point with a Kernel function. As recommended by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012), I use the triangular Kernel,
K(xi, c, h) = 1−
∣∣∣∣xi − ch
∣∣∣∣ . (4.3)
In the RD approach with local linear regression, how many observations around
the threshold are included in the estimation and how they are weighted is governed
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by the choice of bandwidth h. The trade-off in selecting the bandwidth is between
identification and variance. Including observations further away from the threshold
reduces the variance of the estimator but makes the identification assumption,
that treatment status can be considered random, less plausible. I calculate the
bandwidth according to a method proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012),
which yields a bandwidth that is asymptotically optimal under squared error loss.
Essentially, local linear regression can be described as a local and weighted ver-
sion of a linear least squares regression. With Yi as the outcome of interest, the





(Yi − α− τDi − βxi − γxiDi)2K(xi, 0, h). (4.4)
The effect of interest, the treatment effect, is captured by the discontinuity τ which
represents the shift of the intercept at the threshold. The intercept α, the slope
parameter β, and the change of the slope γ for treated observations control for the
relationship between forcing variable and outcome and are not interpreted.
Given the identification strategy of the RD approach it is not necessary to include
control variables in the specification. While an outcome of interest may be influ-
enced by many different variables, this effect biases τ̂ , the estimate of τ , only if
it itself is discontinuous at the threshold. In this case, however, the identifying
assumption, that observations slightly below and slightly above the threshold are






(Yi − α− τDi − βxi − γxiDi − δ′Zi)2K(xi, 0, h), (4.5)
where Zi represents a vector of controls. Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) also
provide a method for bandwidth calculation adjusted for control variables, which
I use.
There are two reasons why it may be useful to include controls. First, including
controls can reduce the variance of the estimator. Second, including controls can
also work as a basic check of the identifying assumption. If the inclusion of controls
has a large impact on the result of estimation, it casts doubt on the identifying
assumption.
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Municipal politics and data
The lowest level of geographical administrative division in Germany is the level of
the municipality (Gemeinde). I use municipal council elections in the East German
state of Thuringia in 1994, 1999, and 2004.4 In 1994, municipal elections were held
in 1247 municipalities in Thuringia. These municipalities are very heterogeneous
in terms of size, ranging from 47 inhabitants to 213,472 inhabitants.5
Municipalities in Germany perform a wide variety of functions. Among other
functions these typically include the maintaining of schools and kindergartens,
waste disposal, the provision of local infrastructure, emergency management, and
the provision of local facilities for cultural and sporting events. To finance these
functions, municipalities receive funding from higher level administrative units,
e.g., the state, charge fees for some of their services, e.g., waste disposal, and levy
certain taxes. Most importantly, in Germany the property tax (Grundsteuer) and
the business tax (Gewerbesteuer) are levied at the municipal level.
The voting method
Municipal councils in Thuringia are elected using a party list proportional repre-
sentation system.6 Every voter gets three votes which he or she can freely allocate
among the party lists running in the election. A seat allocation method is then used
to translate continuous vote shares into discrete numbers of seats. The method
applied in the elections in the data is the largest remainder method, also called
Hare-Niemeyer, or Hamilton method. In this method, in a first step, seats are
allocated according to the integer part of the vote share times the total number of
available seats. In the second step, the remaining seats are allocated in the order
of the size of the remainders.
Additionally, two adjustments are made to this basic largest remainder method
in the elections in the data. A majority clause is added to ensure that any party
4Election data for the elections in 2009 and 2014 is also available. However, from 2009 on
the election mode did not include a 5 percent minimum threshold. As this change affects the
threshold of necessary votes to win seats and the composition of parties at the threshold, I do
not include the 2009 election round. For 2014, outcome data is not yet available.
5Larger cities such as the capital Erfurt with 213,472 inhabitants are classified as Kreisfreie
Sta¨dte. As such, they perform the functions of a municipality and the next highest unit of
administration, the district (Kreis). I include them in my dataset.
6In some municipalities a majoritarian voting system was used instead. I address this issue
in Section III.iv.
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Figure 4.1: A flowchart describing the largest remainder seat allocation
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that wins a majority of votes also wins a majority of seats. Also, a 5 percent
minimum threshold prevents any party with a vote share below 5 percent from
winning any seats. For larger municipalities, this threshold implies that a party
crossing it might go from no seats to several seats instead of going from no seats to
one seat. Consequently, I do not refer to the effect at the extensive margin as the
effect of winning the first seat. The resulting seat allocation method is depicted
in a flowchart in Figure 4.1.
Politics on the municipal level
Politics on the federal or on the state level in Germany are dominated by major
political parties, such as the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU), the center-
left Social Democrats (SPD), the business-friendly Liberal Party (FDP), or the
Greens. On the municipal level this statement does not hold true. While the
traditional political parties also play a role, in many municipalities in Thuringia
politics are dominated by free voter groups and local clubs.
Free voter groups are associations of local voters that enter municipal elections as
a party list without formally having the legal status of a political party. They often
represent specific local interests that are unrelated to the ideological differences
between the major political parties. Chief among those voter groups are those
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formed by local clubs, such as local sports clubs, volunteer firefighters, community
gardening clubs, or clubs for the preservation of local heritage. In addition, there
are voter groups for the local church, or the PTA of the local school or local
kindergarten.
Clubs such as the local football club or the volunteer firefighter club are an impor-
tant part of the community, especially in more rural areas. Also, they are often
directly affected by municipal politics. For example, the municipality of Marksuhl
planned to spend 18,000 Euros on refurbishing local football pitchtes, 3,000 Euros
on equipment for local volunteer firefighters, and 2,000 Euros on equipment for the
kindergarten.7 Therefore, local clubs often have a direct interest in participating
in municipal politics.
The composition of parties running in a municipality is not necessarily stable over
time. Some parties drop out, some parties merge and run as a joint party list, or
parties that have previously formed a joint list split up again. The phenomenon
can be observed for free voter groups and major political parties alike. In some
cases major parties merge with free voter groups, e.g., one observation in the data
is the party list “Social Democrats and Volunteer Firefighters” winning one seat
on the municipal council of Oppurg in 2004.
Another major difference between municipal and state or federal level politics in
Germany is that the municipal council does not appoint the government of the
municipality. The mayor of a municipality is directly elected and does not need
the continuous support of a majority of the municipal council. Therefore, par-
ties in a municipal council do not formally form coalitions but cooperate on an
issue-by-issue basis to reach a majority. Nevertheless, parties with similar politi-
cal preferences often cooperate with each other, thus forming a type of informal
coalition.
Main outcomes
I am interested in the effect of the treatment on municipal politics, i.e., what
is the effect of a party narrowly winning or not winning representation in the
municipal council. In particular, I want to answer two questions. First, what is
7According to the municipal gazette of Marksuhl (“Marksuhler Nachrichten”, 1/2006,
“Gemeinsames Amtsblatt der Gemeinden Marksuhl, Wolfsburg-Unkeroda und Ettenhausen an
der Suhl”).
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the treatment effect through the resulting change in the number of parties in the
municipal council on policy in the municipality? Second, what is the effect of
holding or not holding seats on the party in question?
For the first question, I investigate realized investment spending between elec-
tion rounds. There are several reasons for choosing spending, and in particular
investment spending, as a policy measure. There is much more variation in the
spending level than in other policy dimensions, such as, for example, tax rates,
which are quite stable over time. Furthermore, as previously laid out, there is an
existing theoretical Political Economy literature on the relationship between the
number of represented parties and spending from which I can derive predictions. I
have picked investment spending rather than overall spending, because it is more
likely to reflect the policy of the current municipal council. For example, overall
spending contains wage payments, debt repayment, and accounting devices such
as internal loan repayment, which are likely to be directly caused by past poli-
cies rather than policies of the current municipal council. In addition, the type
of investment spending mentioned in Section III.ii is a type of targetable policy
that is likely to be affected by the size and composition of the municipal council.
An additional party representing specific local interests that makes it onto the
municipal council could lead to additional investment spending in line with these
interests.
For the second question, I look at a dummy variable of whether the party in
question drops out and does not run in the next election (t + 1). Parties that
merged with another party are not counted as having dropped out. This measure
is similar to the measures of Lee (2008) and Trounstine (2011) in the two-party
majoritarian context, who instead look at candidates who do not run again for
their party in the next election. Additionally, it is an indicator of the effect of
winning representation on the success of the party in municipal politics.
For parties that do run in the next election, I can ask whether and how winning
representation affects the success of the party in terms of votes. Unfortunately,
the effect of the treatment on the propensity to drop out in the next election
precludes the exact estimation of such an incumbency effect. The fact that parties
with seats on the municipal council have a different propensity to drop out in the
next election than parties without seats is likely to lead to a selected sample - as
the decision to drop out is probably also related to the potential to attract votes.
A party that decides to run again despite having narrowly missed winning seats
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in the last election is on average likely to be more optimistic about its prospects
compared to a party that decides to run and that has narrowly won seats.
I estimate an upper bound on the incumbency effect by assigning the value 0 for the
vote share in the next election to parties that drop out. Despite having dropped
out, those parties most likely would have received some votes. Given the higher
rate of dropping out to the left to the threshold, this procedure produces an upward
biased estimate of the discontinuity. Similarly, I estimate a lower bound on the
incumbency effect by substituting the missing vote share in the next election with
the current vote share for parties that drop out. Parties that drop out despite
having won representation might do so because they expect to do worse in the
next election. Parties that drop out after not winning representation, on the other
hand, might do so just because they did not win. As a result, the estimate of the
discontinuity would be biased downwards.
Constructing the dataset
All data I use is publically available at the statistical office of the state of Thuringia
(Thu¨ringer Landesamt fA˜1
4
r Statistik)8. I use municipal election data for the
1994, 1999, and 2004 election rounds, census data from 1994 to 2008, and data
on municipality finances from 1995 to 2008. For municipality spending outcomes,
I use the average per capita spending in the years between election periods. For
example, for an observation from the 1994 election round I investigate the average
of per capita investment spending in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998.
In some municipalities, only one party list or only individual candidates registered
for the election. In these cases, a majoritarian voting system was used instead of
proportional representation. I exclude these municipalities.
Moreover, throughout the nineties, municipalities in Thuringia were frequently
reorganized. Most of them merged to form larger municipalities. I exclude all
observations in which the relevant municipality was reorganized prior to the next
municipal election round.
Given the idea underlying the identifying assumption, the level of observation is
the party. In other words, one observation corresponds to one of potentially many
8www.statistik.thueringen.de
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party lists close to the threshold in a given municipality. However, one of my two
main outcomes, investment spending, is aggregated at the level of the municipality.
To allow me to estimate municipality effects, I construct the dataset such that one
observation corresponds to one municipality in an election round. To this end I
only pick the party closest to the threshold in any municipality. In most cases,
this party increments the total number of parties with seats on the municipal
council by 1 by narrowly winning or not winning seats. In other words, if the
party closest to the threshold narrowly won seats, it took these marginal seats
from larger parties that still remained on the municipal council. In a few cases, 22
in total, the party closest to the threshold simply replaced or would have replaced
another party compared to the counterfactual and thus did not affect the overall
number of parties with seats. By excluding these cases, I am able to estimate a
sharp RD design in which I can interpret treatment status as having an additional
party on the municipal council. Put differently,
Di = 1 b+ 1 parties with seats,
Di = 0 b parties with seats,
where b represents the baseline number of parties winning seats, without counting
the party closest to the threshold.
For the final dataset, I then take all observations with a value of the forcing variable
that is “sufficiently close” to the threshold. Naturally, there is a lower bound on
the distance to the threshold. If 5 percent of the vote would have been enough to
win representation, then xi ≈ −5. As most parties with xi < 0 are much closer
to winning seats, I define “sufficiently close” as values xi close enough to 0 so
that the support of xi exhibits no gaps. To this end, I pick the top 90 percent of
observations with xi < 0. For positive values of xi, I then use the same cutoff in
absolute terms.
Finally, there are some cases in which I cannot reproduce the reported seat al-
location from the election result. This problem might occur due to data entry
mistakes, the seat allocation might have been calculated wrongly, parties that
won seats might have refused to fill them, or the election result might have re-
quired a coin toss. As this problem affects only a small number of observations (7
in total), I exclude them.
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Summary statistics of the final dataset can be found in Table 4.8.
Trimming with respect to investment per capita
One of my two main outcomes of interest is investment spending per capita in
the municipality. The distribution of investment contains some large outliers.
While the average is 349 Euros, the municipality of Petersberg spent on average
7092 Euro per capita in 1995-1998. These large outliers pose a threat to my
estimation. To address this problem, I trim the data, trimming off the upper
tail of the distribution. For my main set of results, I trim the data at the 95th
percentile. I discuss the sensitivity of my results to this procedure in Section V.i.
Results
At the beginning of this section, I give my main set of empirical results. The
following subsections contain an investigation into the possible channels of the
treatment effect, in relation to the existing literature.
Table 4.1 reports the results for the number of parties that win seats in the munic-
ipal council. My results for my main outcomes of interest, investment per capita,
dropping out in the next election and the bounds on the incumbency effect, are
presented in Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. Graphically, the discontinuity for these
outcome variables are depicted in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for the baseline estimation.
In all three tables, the first column contains the baseline. In columns 2-4 either
population size, or an election round dummy, or both are added as control vari-
ables. In columns 5 and 6 the baseline specification is estimated with half and
twice the optimal bandwidth for comparison.
The results of Table 4.1 provide a first sanity check of the estimation strategy.
As I am interested in the effect of the number of parties in the municipal council
on investment spending, the dataset is constructed so that in the counterfactual
case where party i landed just on the other side of the threshold, the number of
parties in the municipal council would change by exactly 1 party, party i. Put
differently, for Yi being the number of parties winning seats, it is possible to know
both Yi(Di = 1) and Yi(Di = 0) at the same time due to the seat allocation rule.
For the treatment effect we have Yi(Di = 1)− Yi(Di = 0) = 1 by construction.
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Figure 4.2: Local linear regression conducted separately on both sides of the
threshold. Outcome: The number of parties winning seats in the election and
(trimmed) investment spending. The box in the bottom right corner of each
















































































t−stat   2.46
p−value
  0.02
IK bandwidth   0.74
(b) Investment per capita in Euro
(trimmed).
Consequently, if comparing observations to the left and to the right of the threshold
provides me with a good estimate of the average within-observation treatment
effect, the estimate of the treatment effect for the number of parties winning seats
should be close to 1. The estimate does not mechanically have to equal 1, as there
might be slight differences in the average of the baseline number of parties winning
seats, i.e., the number of parties without party i, for the compared subgroups on
both sides of the threshold. However, an estimate considerably different from 1
would point to a discontinuity in the baseline number of parties winning seats,
which in itself would cast doubt on the validity of the identification strategy.
The main estimate for the effect is 1.10. With the inclusion of controls or with a
variation of the bandwidth, the estimates range from 0.97 to 1.15. These estimates
suggest that the empirical strategy passes this first sanity check.
The panel for the number of parties winning seats in Figure 4.2 shows that on
both sides of the threshold the number of parties increases with proximity to
the threshold. This observation is not surprising, as the party closest to the
threshold out of many parties will generally be closer than the closest party out
of few. Nevertheless, this fact does not threaten the identification strategy, as the
successful sanity check demonstrates.
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Figure 4.3: Local linear regression conducted separately on both sides of the
threshold. Outcome: a dummy variable indicating whether the party dropped
out in t+ 1 and the vote share in the next election (to deal with selection bias,
I estimate bounds on the treatment effect by proxying for parties that dropped
out in t + 1 in a different way - for details see Section III.iii). The box in the
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IK bandwidth  1.52
(c) Party not running t+ 1.
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I find a considerable effect with regard to investment spending. One party gain-
ing enough votes to be represented in the municipal council, so that overall one
additional party is represented, leads to a statistically significant average increase
in per capita investment spending of about 142 Euros in the years after the elec-
tion. This estimate is an average effect. Given discontinuity for the number of
parties winning seats displayed in Figure 4.2, the average municipality close to
the threshold changes from 4 to 5 parties in the municipal council when gaining
an additional party. However, the effect of a third additional party is potentially
different from the effect of a sixth additional party. In Section IV.i I investigate
the composition of the average effect.
Compared to the average level of per capita investment spending in the trimmed
dataset of roughly 295 Euros, this treatment effect represents a sizable increase
of almost 50 percent. The estimated effect does not change significantly with the
inclusion of controls. The effect does however react to a variation of the bandwidth.
It ranges from 201 Euros with half the optimal bandwidth to 102 Euros with double
the optimal bandwidth, all the while being significantly different from zero. This
variation suggests that, in the data, the difference between parties that won seats
and those that did not is more pronounced for parties closer to the threshold.
The graphical representation of the discontinuity in Figure 4.2 also reveals that
this result seems to be driven by the observations within a 1-percentage point win-
dow around the threshold. Within this window, investment spending is lower for
municipalities with parties narrowly missing representation the closer the party
missed. The mirroring statement is true for municipalities with parties that nar-
rowly won. Further away from the threshold, there does not seem to be a shift in
the level of investment spending depending on treatment status. Put differently,
there does not seem to be a clear difference between municipalities that are on
different sides of the threshold but sufficiently far away from it.
Table 4.3 contains the estimation results with regard to the question whether
treatment status affects the propensity to run in the next election. The dependent
variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the party drops out in the next election.
I find a sizable and statistically significant effect of −0.35. Winning seats on
the municipal council reduces the propensity to drop out in the next election by
35 percent. Again, this effect remains virtually unchanged by the inclusion of
population and election round dummies as controls. And again, a variation of
the bandwidth does have an impact on the size, though not on the statistical
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significance of the effect, with estimates ranging from −0.49 for half the optimal
bandwidth to −0.33 for double the optimal bandwidth.
With regard to dropping out in the next election, the corresponding panel in Figure
4.3 shows a weak negative relationship between xi and the propensity to drop out.
As a larger value of xi corresponds to a larger vote share, this relationship is not
surprising. A party gaining more votes is more likely to run in the next election.
At the threshold, there is a clear shift in the level of parties dropping out. This
shift is relatively large, compared to the flat slope of the local linear fit. The
comparison of shift and slope suggests that, for a party close to the threshold, in
determining whether it should run again there is more weight on whether it was
able to win representation compared to the relative success in the election in terms
of votes .
For treatment effects on the vote share in the next election, Table 4.4 contains
the estimate for the lower bound and Table 4.5 contains the estimate of the upper
bound. The baseline point estimate of the lower bound, −1.65, is not statistically
significant. Estimates remain not significant with the inclusion of controls or with
a variation of the bandwidth. All point estimates remain negative, except the
estimate with half the optimal bandwidth. For the upper bound estimate, results
are similar. The baseline estimate of 0.56 is not statistically significant, and nor
are the estimates with controls and different bandwidths. All point estimates are
positive.
The graphs for the lower bound and the upper bound estimation of the vote share
incumbency effect in Figure 4.3 show a clear positive relationship of the forcing
variable and the vote share in the next election. This result is not surprising, as
the forcing variable represents a normalized version of the vote share in the current
election, which should be a good predictor of the vote share next election. Both for
the lower bound and upper bound estimation, the path of the local linear estimate
seems comparatively smooth and continuous at the threshold, compared to the
overall variation away from the threshold. Hence, the graphical representation
does not suggest the existence of an incumbency advantage.
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Table 4.1: Estimating the treatment effect using local linear regression - Out-
come: Number of parties winning seats.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect 1.10 ** 1.02 * 1.15 ** 1.08 * 0.99 0.97 **
(0.55) (0.56) (0.55) (0.56) (0.81) (0.35)
Bandwidth 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.32 1.28
Within bandwidth
Obs 143 142 142 142 68 269
Clusters 123 122 122 122 63 210
Overall
Obs 571 571 571 571 571 571
Clusters 371 371 371 371 371 371
Controls
Population No Yes No Yes No No
Election round No No Yes Yes No No
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Estimates are
obtained using local linear regression with a triangular kernel. The treatment effect
corresponds to the τ̂ that solves (4.4). The estimates α̂, β̂, γ̂, and δ̂ are not reported.
Bandwidth in columns 1-4 is computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). The
bandwidth in columns 5 and 6 is half and twice the bandwidth of column 1, respectively.
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Table 4.2: Estimating the treatment effect using local linear regression - Out-
come: Investment per capita in Euros (trimmed).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect 142.06 ** 141.53 ** 140.80 ** 142.30 ** 201.05 ** 102.10 **
(57.80) (58.76) (52.97) (53.66) (76.00) (40.09)
Bandwidth 0.74 0.74 0.67 0.67 0.37 1.48
Within bandwidth
Obs 154 154 145 145 77 292
Clusters 129 129 122 122 71 218
Overall
Obs 542 542 542 542 542 542
Clusters 358 358 358 358 358 358
Controls
Population No Yes No Yes No No
Election round No No Yes Yes No No
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Estimates are
obtained using local linear regression with a triangular kernel. The treatment effect
corresponds to the τ̂ that solves (4.4). The estimates α̂, β̂, γ̂, and δ̂ are not reported.
Bandwidth in columns 1-4 is computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). The
bandwidth in columns 5 and 6 is half and twice the bandwidth of column 1, respectively.
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Table 4.3: Estimating the treatment effect using local linear regression - Out-
come: Party not running t+ 1 (dummy variable).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect -0.35 ** -0.33 ** -0.34 ** -0.33 ** -0.49 ** -0.31 **
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.08)
Bandwidth 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.49 0.76 3.04
Within bandwidth
Obs 303 303 303 295 158 494
Clusters 226 226 226 222 132 327
Overall
Obs 549 549 549 549 549 549
Clusters 353 353 353 353 353 353
Controls
Population No Yes No Yes No No
Election round No No Yes Yes No No
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Estimates are
obtained using local linear regression with a triangular kernel. The treatment effect
corresponds to the τ̂ that solves (4.4). The estimates α̂, β̂, γ̂, and δ̂ are not reported.
Bandwidth in columns 1-4 is computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). The
bandwidth in columns 5 and 6 is half and twice the bandwidth of column 1, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Estimating a lower bound on the treatment effect using local linear
regression - Outcome: Vote share t+ 1 (lower bound: parties that dropped out
in t+ 1 are assigned value 0).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect -1.65 -1.48 -1.66 -1.51 0.96 -1.62
(2.08) (2.05) (1.99) (1.97) (2.43) (1.44)
Bandwidth 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.38 1.52
Within bandwidth
Obs 158 158 158 158 79 301
Clusters 132 132 132 132 73 225
Overall
Obs 549 549 549 549 549 549
Clusters 353 353 353 353 353 353
Controls
Population No Yes No Yes No No
Election round No No Yes Yes No No
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Estimates are
obtained using local linear regression with a triangular kernel. The treatment effect
corresponds to the τ̂ that solves (4.4). The estimates α̂, β̂, γ̂, and δ̂ are not reported.
Bandwidth in columns 1-4 is computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). The
bandwidth in columns 5 and 6 is half and twice the bandwidth of column 1, respectively.
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Table 4.5: Estimating an upper bound on the treatment effect using local
linear regression - Outcome: Vote share t+1 (upper bound: parties that dropped
out in t+ 1 are assigned vote share t for vote share t+ 1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect 0.56 0.63 0.49 0.55 2.97 0.11
(2.54) (2.52) (2.44) (2.44) (3.12) (1.73)
Bandwidth 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.38 1.53
Within bandwidth
Obs 158 158 158 158 79 303
Clusters 132 132 132 132 73 226
Overall
Obs 549 549 549 549 549 549
Clusters 353 353 353 353 353 353
Controls
Population No Yes No Yes No No
Election round No No Yes Yes No No
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Estimates are
obtained using local linear regression with a triangular kernel. The treatment effect
corresponds to the τ̂ that solves (4.4). The estimates α̂, β̂, γ̂, and δ̂ are not reported.
Bandwidth in columns 1-4 is computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). The
bandwidth in columns 5 and 6 is half and twice the bandwidth of column 1, respectively.
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Determinants of the average treatment effect
As previously discussed, my main set of estimation results for the treatment effects
represent average effects. However, the effect of a party narrowly making it onto
the municipal council might differ depending on whether the change in treatment
status changed the number of parties in the municipal council from 2 to 3 parties
or from 6 to 7 parties. Similarly, there might be a different effect depending
on whether an additional party considerably changed majorities and therefore
potential coalitions in the municipal council. In this section, I try to disentangle
the estimated average treatment effects and look into potential channels behind
my results.
Technically, I am interested in how the treatment effect varies conditional on some
covariate, such as, for example, the number of parties. To investigate this question,
I estimate a specification in which zi, the covariate in question, is also interacted





(Yi−α−τDi−βxi−γxiDi−β2zi−γ2ziDi)2K(xi, 0, h). (4.6)
The crucial difference to specification (4.5) is the interaction term ziDi, which
allows me to estimate the treatment effect conditional on zi:
Yi(Di = 1|zi)− Yi(Di = 1|zi) = τ + γ2zi.
This specification means that the estimated treatment effect varies linearly in zi
by construction.
To obtain a heterogeneous treatment effect by the number of parties winning seats
I use the baseline number of parties with seats, which is the number of parties win-
ning seats without counting the party in question. If party i enters the municipal
council as the fifth party winning seats, then the baseline number of parties is 4
and the treatment effect for party i is τ + γ2 · 4. I would expect treatment effects
to be stronger with a lower baseline number of parties, as treatment comes with
larger change to the number of parties winning seats in relative terms, giving more
bargaining power to a party narrowly entering the municipal council. For invest-
ment per capita, the coefficient of the interaction effect is −37, which therefore
has the expected sign, and is statistically significant. According to the coefficient,
one additional baseline party would imply a decrease of the treatment effect of 37
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Euros, which however remains positive in all cases but the extreme case with 9
baseline parties. In contrast, with regard to how treatment affects the propensity
to drop out in the next election, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect
does not vary by the baseline number of parties. Apart from not being statistically
significant, the estimate for dropping out in the next election is 0. The treatment
effects by baseline number of parties are depicted in the left panels in Figure 4.3.
The number of baseline parties can be considered a measure of how an additional
party affects or would affect the political setup on the municipal council. Next,
I use the Herfindahl index as an alternative measure of the political setup. The
Herfindahl index is a measure of concentration. In the context of Economics it
is more commonly used in the field of Industrial Organization to measure market
concentration. In Political Science and Political Economy it is used to measure the
concentration or fractionalization of a legislature. To capture the concentration in








∈ (0, 1], (4.7)
where si represents the seats obtained by party i in municipality M and sM rep-
resents the total number of seats in the municipal council.
By measuring fractionalization, the Herfindahl index captures the extent of dif-
ferent interests represented in the municipal council. A lower Herfindahl index
indicates a more fractionalized municipal council, where the maximal Herfindahl
index of 1 indicates that the council is not fractionalized and all seats are held
by a single party. Achieving a majority in a vote might be more difficult in a
more fractionalized municipal council and in which compromise might be more
important. However, the Herfindahl index does not account for variations in the
political compatibility between parties. While an ideal measure of the political
setup in the municipal council would account for political compatibility, I do not
think a sensible measure can be constructed for the municipal election context
with the available data.
Calculating the counterfactual allocation of seats, I can measure how much an
individual party list affected the setup on the municipal council. Much in the
same way as for the number of parties winning seats, I can observe Yi(Di =
1) − Yi(Di = 0) for an individual party i for the Herfindahl index. With Yi
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Figure 4.3: Differential treatment effects obtained by interacting the treat-
ment dummy variable with the baseline number of parties winning seats (with-
out counting the party in question) or with ∆ Herfindahl index, the change in
the Herfindahl index attributable to the party in question. Dots/the solid line
represent/s the point estimate of the treatment effect. Bars/the dashed line
represent/s the 95 percent confidence interval.
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(d) Effect on not running in the next
election by ∆ Herfindahl index.
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Table 4.6: Estimating differential treatment effects using local linear regres-
sion - Outcome: Investment per capita in Euros (trimmed). The baseline num-
ber of parties winning seats (without the party in question) and ∆ Herfindahl
index (the change in the Herfindahl index attributable to the party in question)
are included with and without an interaction effect.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect 142.39 ** 302.34 ** 141.60 ** 81.88
(58.22) (101.72) (58.18) (60.19)
Baseline n. of parties w. s. 3.91 23.85 *
(8.79) (12.32)
Baseline n. of parties w. s. ×Di -37.00 **
(17.88)
∆ Herf. ind. 82.07 1007.55 **
(375.55) (287.30)
∆ Herf. ind. ×Di -1683.25 **
(593.89)
Bandwidth 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74
Within bandwidth
Obs 154 154 154 154
Clusters 129 129 129 129
Overall
Obs 542 542 542 542
Clusters 358 358 358 358
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Estimates are
obtained using local linear regression with a triangular kernel. Estimates in columns 1 and 3
are the solutions to (4.5). Estimates in columns 2 and 4 are the solutions to (4.6). The
treatment effect corresponds to τ̂ . The estimates α̂, β̂, and γ̂ are not reported. Bandwidth is
computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011).
standing for the Herfindahl index, the variable “∆ Herfindahl index” measures the
individual treatment effect Yi(Di = 1)− Yi(Di = 0).
With respect to the interaction effect of treatment and ∆ Herfindahl index I would
expect a larger effect in absolute terms for larger absolute values of ∆ Herfindahl
index. Put differently, I would expect parties which, by narrowly making it onto
the municipal council, cause a larger change in its political setup to also cause
a larger change in investment spending in that municipality. Similarly, I would
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Table 4.7: Estimating differential treatment effects using local linear regres-
sion - Outcome: Not running in t+ 1 (dummy variable). The baseline number
of parties winning seats (without the party in question) and ∆ Herfindahl index
(the change in the Herfindahl index attributable to the party in question) are
included with and without an interaction effect.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect -0.35 ** -0.34 * -0.35 ** -0.28 **
(0.11) (0.21) (0.11) (0.13)
Baseline n. of parties w. s. -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Baseline n. of parties w. s. ×Di 0.00
(0.04)
∆ Herf. ind. -0.42 -1.27
(0.75) (1.02)
∆ Herf. ind. ×Di 1.52
(1.47)
Bandwidth 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52
Within bandwidth
Obs 303 303 303 303
Clusters 226 226 226 226
Overall
Obs 549 549 549 549
Clusters 353 353 353 353
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Estimates are
obtained using local linear regression with a triangular kernel. Estimates in columns 1 and 3
are the solutions to (4.5). Estimates in columns 2 and 4 are the solutions to (4.6). The
treatment effect corresponds to τ̂ . The estimates α̂, β̂, and γ̂ are not reported. Bandwidth is
computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011).
expect the probability that those parties drop out in the next election to be more
affected by treatment.
For the interaction effect of treatment and ∆ Herfindahl index with respect to
investment per capita I find a statistically significant coefficient with the expected
sign. For observations with the average value of ∆ Herfindahl index −0.06, i.e., for
observations which by making it onto the council lower the Herfindahl index by
0.06, the treatment effect is roughly 183 Euros. The coefficient of the interaction
effect with respect to dropping out next election is not statistically significant. It
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does have the expected sign, however, which would imply that the treatment effect
for the propensity to drop out is larger in absolute terms if treatment status leads
to a larger change in the Herfindahl index. The treatment effects by ∆ Herfindahl
index are depicted in the right panels of Figure 4.3.
Robustness checks
As pointed out by Caughey and Sekhon (2011) and Eggers, Fowler, Hainmueller,
Hall, and Snyder (2015), among others, it is important to test the validity of the
identifying assumption when applying the RD methodology to an election setting.
One test they propose is to check for a discontinuity in the density of the sorting
variable at the threshold. Such a discontinuity would cast doubt on the identifying
assumption.
I test for a discontinuity in the density using methods proposed by McCrary (2008).
The idea of this test is to test for a discontinuity in the histogram of the forcing
variable. One bin corresponds to an observation, the value of the forcing variable
is given by the bin center and the outcome variable is given by the number of
observations within the bin. As in the baseline specification for my main estimation
results, the test uses local linear regression with a triangular kernel. McCrary
(2008) comments on bandwidth selection but his test does not require a specially
tailored bandwidth. Again, as in my baseline specification, I use the bandwidth
selection method of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
The results of the test are reported in Table 4.9. The test does not reject the null
hypothesis, no discontinuity in the density, for any of the three test bin sizes, and
with either the full dataset or the trimmed dataset. A graphical representation of
the test for bins with a 0.1 percentage point size can be found in Figure 4.3, the
p-values of the tests of Table 4.9 can also be found in Figure 4.4.
Another important test of the identifying assumption is to check for discontinuities
in pre-treatment covariates. Covariates that should not be affected by the treat-
ment and exhibit a discontinuity at the threshold would indicate that observations
close to the threshold but on different sides are not comparable, contrary to the
identifying assumption.
I test for a discontinuity in election variables, such as the number of people eligible
to vote, the total number of seats in the municipal council, whether the party list in
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question belongs to a major political party in Germany, and the population of the
municipality.9 The results of these tests are presented in Figure 4.4. The panel
on the left contains the regression for turnout in the election, as an example.
The panel on the right contains the p-values for the examined covariates. The
null hypothesis, no discontinuity at the threshold, is not rejected for any of these
covariates.
Ideally, I would also test for discontinuities in lags of the main outcome variables.
In other words, I would test for discontinuities in whether a party was running in
the previous election and in investment spending in the years prior to the election.
Unfortunately, I cannot conduct these tests, as the necessary data is not available
for a large part of my sample. This part includes the 1994 election round, as
there was no municipal election of this kind prior to 1994 and as the data for
municipal finances is only available from 1995 onwards. Similarly, it also includes
municipalities that underwent reorganization in the years prior to the election.
An important robustness check when using local linear regression is to investigate
the sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of the bandwidth. I use the
optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). My main set
of estimation results in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 also contain results for half and twice the
optimal bandwidth. The sensitivity of the estimate with respect to the bandwidth
is depicted in Figure 4.5. Point estimates of the treatment effect are smaller for
larger bandwidths but remain statistically significant for all bandwidths in that
range, suggesting that my results are not critically driven by the bandwidth choice.
When using an RD approach, a common robustness check is to estimate the model
at pseudo-thresholds, at which treatment status does not change, as it does at the
true threshold. If there is a significant effect at many pseudo-thresholds, it is
questionable whether a significant effect at the true threshold can be attributed
to the change in treatment status. Including the estimation at the true threshold
0, I estimate the baseline model for 21 different thresholds, going from −2 to 2 in
0.1 increments. Figure 4.6 contains the z-statistics for these regressions. For in-
vestment spending as the outcome, I find one statistically significant discontinuity
at 0.9. For not running in the next election as the outcome, I find one statistically
significant discontinuity at the 10 percent level at 1.7. However, under the null
9 As major parties I classify the previously mentioned Christian Democratic “CDU”, the
Social Democratic “SPD”, the Greens, the pro-business “FDP”, and the far-left successor of the
ruling party of the GDR: “PDS”. Where a major political party merged with another party in
a municipality, the resulting joint party list is not classified as major.
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hypothesis, in which the z-statistic is distributed according to a standard normal
distribution, i.e., with mean 0, finding one significant value in 20 regressions is
expected.
Interestingly, the estimate of the discontinuity is not significant for pseudo-thresh-
olds close to the true threshold, i.e., for −0.1 and 0.1. This result indicates that
there are observations10 both very close to the threshold and with a substantial
difference in the average outcome variable contributing to the results of the baseline
estimation.
Instead of local linear regression, many researchers use polynomial regression in
RD frameworks. For robustness, I also estimate a polynomial regression. The
results can be found in Tables 4.10 and 4.11. For polynomials of order 3 to order
6 I find statistically significant effects, at least at the 10 percent level, that are
comparable to the estimates in the local linear regression in terms of magnitude.
In Section III.iii I present the reasons for choosing investment spending rather than
overall spending as my measure of public spending. Nevertheless, I should find at
least comparable effects for overall spending, as investment spending contributes
to overall spending. In Table 4.12 I report estimation results with (trimmed)
overall gross spending as the outcome variable instead of investment spending.
For the baseline specification I do not find a statistically significant treatment
effect. The point estimate of 114 Euros is, however, comparatively close to the
point estimate of 142 Euros for investment spending. The fact that the point
estimate is slightly lower might be caused by the somewhat larger bandwidth
selected for overall spending. At half the optimal bandwidth, the treatment effect
is significant at the 10 percent level and similar in size to the treatment effect for
investment spending. It is considerably smaller and not significant at twice the
optimal bandwidth. With respect to controls, I find that the baseline estimate
for overall spending is only limitedly robust. Unlike the estimate for investment
spending, the estimate for overall spending reacts much more strongly to the
inclusion of population size and election year dummies. All in all, keeping in mind
the link between the point estimate and the bandwidth, I find similar effects for
overall spending and investment spending. This result suggests that the overall
spending effect reflects the investment spending effect, though with added noise,
which provides some justification for the choice of investment spending as my
measure of public spending.
10There are 22 observations within xi ∈ [−0.1, 0.1].
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Sensitivity to trimming
As mentioned in Section III.v, for the estimation with investment per capita as
the outcome variable I trim the data at the 95th percentile. This procedure might
cause some concern that the estimated effects are biased or that I only find sig-
nificant effects because, through trimming, I investigate a sample in which finding
an effect is more likely. This phenomenon is referred to as “selection on the de-
pendent variable”. I need to be careful in this regard, as the number of parties in
the municipal council might be more likely to affect the small and medium level
type of investment spending described in Section III.ii than very large investment
projects.
Graphically, the distribution of investment per capita and some robustness checks
with regard to trimming are presented in Figure 4.7. As depicted in the upper left
panel, estimating the baseline specification with the untrimmed dataset leads to
an estimate that is not too far in magnitude from the main estimation result for
the treatment effect of 142 Euros, though it is not statistically significant. The
distribution of the untrimmed investment per capita is shown in the top right
panel of the figure. The 95th percentile roughly coincides with Tukey’s upper
fence, i.e., the set of outliers in Tukey’s sense roughly coincides with the top 5
percent of the data. The bottom left panel shows how the point estimate changes
if a percentile other than the 95th is chosen for trimming, ranging from trimming
at the 90th percentile to no trimming at 100 percent. Other than when the data
is not trimmed or trimmed at a percentile higher than the 99th, the estimate of
the treatment effect is relatively stable in size and significant. The bottom right
panel contains an estimation of the discontinuity at the threshold with a dummy,
whether the observation was kept or trimmed. The null hypothesis, that the data
is not discontinuously trimmed at the threshold, is not rejected.
An alternative to trimming is to use investment in logs. The results of this esti-
mation are reported in Table 4.13. The estimates of the baseline specification and
the specifications with population as control are positive and significant at the 10
percent level. However, the estimates are no longer significant with the inclusion
of controls and at half the optimal bandwidth. While not very robust, these results
at least give some indication that the estimates obtained for the trimmed dataset
are not just spurious, and are not due to trimming.
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Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the data is trimmed and repre-
sents the bottom 95 percent of the sample when interpreting the main result.
Consequently, for my main result, I find an average effect of 142 Euros of addi-
tional investment spending with one additional party in the municipal council for
municipalities that do not have a very large amount of investment spending.
Conclusion
Recently, many researchers have used close elections as natural experiments. In
majoritarian election systems with two parties, elections with an almost 50-50
outcome are used to identify the causal effect of incumbency. In proportional
representation electoral systems, discontinuities in the seat allocation method can
also be used for identification. In a proportional representation context, there are
two margins of incumbency: the intensive margin, capturing how many seats a
party won, and the extensive margin, capturing whether the party won seats at
all. While intensive margin effects have been studied to a wide extent, there is
little evidence with regard to extensive margin effects. My paper is the first study
focused on the causal estimation of the effect of a small party winning represen-
tation in a proportional representation system. I apply a regression discontinuity
(RD) approach to municipal level data from the German state of Thuringia.
On the municipal level, I estimate the effect it has on public spending if a small
party narrowly wins seats and thereby increases the overall number of parties
with seats on the municipal council. The Political Economy literature generally
predicts a positive relationship of legislative fractionalization and spending and
therefore a positive effect. Using (trimmed) investment spending as my measure
of public spending, I find a large and statistically significant positive effect. One
additional party increases investment spending by 50 percent of the average level
of spending in my dataset. Decomposing this average effect, I find that the effect
is stronger where a party winning seats leads to a larger change to the composition
of the municipal council. A graphical inspection of the discontinuity reveals that
the estimated effect is driven by observations within a relatively narrow window
around the threshold. Therefore, I believe that further research to investigate
this relationship is warranted. Nevertheless, a large variety of robustness checks
and the fact that the decomposition of the effect produces results in line with
theoretical predictions give me confidence that the estimated effect is not just a
statistical anomaly.
On the party level, I find that parties that narrowly won representation are 35
percent less likely to drop out in the next election. Similar effects have been ob-
served in RD studies for individual candidates in the majoritarian context but not
for parties in the proportional representation context. This discontinuity leads to
a sample selection problem that precludes me from obtaining an unbiased esti-
mate of a potential vote share incumbency effect. Conducting a bounding exercise
instead, I find no evidence of an incumbency effect on the vote share in the next
election. The lower bound point estimate is negative, the upper bound point esti-
mate is positive, and neither is statistically significant. This result is in contrast to
Liang (2013), who finds an incumbency advantage of approximately 0.7 percent at
the extensive margin in the proportional representation context. However, given
the magnitude of his estimate, it could be that I simply lack statistical power to
find a similar sized statistically significant effect.
Overall, I find sizable effects at the extensive margin. This finding suggests that a
small shift in the election outcome reflecting only a slight shift in the preferences
of the electorate can have a comparatively large impact, if it leads to an additional
party winning seats. A better understanding of these effects can be useful in the
design of political institutions.
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Table 4.8: Summary statistics.
Mean Median SD Min Max Obs
Forcing variable - distance to the threshold in Percent: xi 0.44 0.41 1.77 -3.65 3.67 571
Number of parties winning seats 4.04 4.00 1.29 1.00 10.00 571
Baseline number of parties winning seats 3.45 3.00 1.23 1.00 9.00 571
Number of parties running 4.74 5.00 1.51 2.00 11.00 571
Number of parties running t+ 1 4.23 4.00 1.50 2.00 11.00 549
Herfindahl index 0.38 0.34 0.14 0.12 1.00 571
∆ Herfindahl index -0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.28 0.00 571
Major political party 0.38 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 571
Party dropped out in t+ 1 (dummy variable) 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 549
Party merged with other party in t+ 1 (dummy variable) 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 549
Party split up in t+ 1 (dummy variable) 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 549
Population (election year) 7061.00 2614.00 17913.85 125.00 202400.00 571
Number of seats on council 15.25 14.00 8.03 6.00 50.00 571
Eligible to vote 5676.00 2083.00 14402.43 101.00 164800.00 571
Voters 3210.00 1364.00 7321.18 90.00 79970.00 571
Turnout 68.23 69.45 12.06 38.32 100.00 571
Turnout t+ 1 60.60 60.41 10.52 38.32 98.13 549
Percentage of invalid votes 4.50 4.06 2.05 0.00 20.66 571
Percentage of invalid votes t+ 1 4.45 3.89 2.21 0.00 20.66 549
Investment per capita in Euros (trimmed) 295.40 271.10 157.44 19.26 752.10 542
Investment per capita in Euros (untrimmed) 348.60 277.40 381.25 19.26 7092.00 571
Log Investment per capita in Euros 5.60 5.63 0.70 2.96 8.87 571
Gross spending per capita in Euros (trimmed) 1187.00 1141.00 296.21 550.50 2058.00 542
Gross spending per capita in Euros (untrimmed) 1301.00 1162.00 727.14 550.50 9600.00 571
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Table 4.9: Histogram test, as proposed by McCrary (2008). Columns 1-3
contain tests of the full dataset with various bin sizes. Columns 4-6 contain
tests of the data trimmed with respect to investment per capita.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect -0.18 0.64 0.66 0.35 0.88 1.22
(0.47) (1.88) (1.90) (0.63) (1.75) (1.77)
Bin size 0.025 0.050 0.100 0.025 0.050 0.100
Bandwidth 2.82 1.04 1.04 1.47 1.03 1.03
Within bandwidth
Obs 226 42 20 118 42 20
Overall
Obs 320 160 80 320 160 80
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are robust. Estimates are obtained using
local linear regression with a triangular kernel. The treatment effect corresponds to a potential
discontinuity in the density of the sorting variable at the threshold. The data for the test is
based on a histogram of the forcing variable on the support [-4,4]. Each observation
corresponds to a bin. The value of the outcome variable is the number of observations within a
bin, the value of the forcing variable is the bin center. Bandwidth is computed according to
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011).
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Table 4.10: Estimating the treatment effect using polynomial regression in-
stead of local linear regression - Outcome: Investment per capita in Euros
(trimmed).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect 125.12 ** 161.08 ** 166.79 ** 196.91 **
(49.14) (60.66) (72.11) (85.40)
Degree of polynomial 3 4 5 6
Obs 542 542 542 542
Clusters 358 358 358 358
AIC 7026.451 7029.470 7033.453 7036.709
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality.
Table 4.11: Estimating the treatment effect using polynomial regression in-
stead of local linear regression - Outcome: Party not running in t+ 1 (dummy
variable).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect -0.43 ** -0.31 * -0.54 ** -0.66 **
(0.14) (0.17) (0.21) (0.25)
Degree of polynomial 3 4 5 6
Obs 549 549 549 549
Clusters 353 353 353 353
AIC 720.8352 723.0383 723.5698 726.6073
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality.
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Table 4.12: Estimating the treatment effect using local linear regression -
Outcome: Gross spending per capita in Euros (trimmed).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect 114.42 90.93 94.79 73.04 176.04 * 49.64
(79.29) (77.78) (76.77) (76.32) (93.87) (61.56)
Bandwidth 1.09 1.03 1.08 1.00 0.54 2.17
Within bandwidth
Obs 220 208 220 201 120 391
Clusters 179 171 179 165 108 284
Overall
Obs 542 542 542 542 542 542
Clusters 360 360 360 360 360 360
Controls
Population No Yes No Yes No No
Election round No No Yes Yes No No
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Estimates are
obtained using local linear regression with a triangular kernel. The treatment effect
corresponds to the τ̂ that solves (4.4). The estimates α̂, β̂, γ̂, and δ̂ are not reported.
Bandwidth in columns 1-4 is computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). The
bandwidth in columns 5 and 6 is half and twice the bandwidth of column 1, respectively.
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Table 4.13: Estimating the treatment effect using local linear regression -
Outcome: Log Investment per capita in Euros.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect 0.38 * 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.52 0.27 *
(0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.32) (0.16)
Bandwidth 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.45 1.79
Within bandwidth
Obs 187 187 187 187 101 355
Clusters 156 156 156 156 94 263
Overall
Obs 571 571 571 571 571 571
Clusters 371 371 371 371 371 371
Controls
Population No Yes No Yes No No
Election round No No Yes Yes No No
Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Estimates are
obtained using local linear regression with a triangular kernel. The treatment effect
corresponds to the τ̂ that solves (4.4). The estimates α̂, β̂, γ̂, and δ̂ are not reported.
Bandwidth in columns 1-4 is computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). The
bandwidth in columns 5 and 6 is half and twice the bandwidth of column 1, respectively.
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Figure 4.3: Robustness check - checking for a discontinuity in the density of
the forcing variable as proposed by McCrary (2008). Panels contain a histogram
of the forcing variable overlaid with a local linear regression on both sides of
the threshold. Estimates of the discontinuity are also reported in Table 4.9.
Histogram: Number of observations
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(a) Bin size 0.1 - full dataset.
Histogram: Number of observations in 0.1 % bin
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(b) Bin size 0.1 - data trimmed with
respect to investment per capita.
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(a) One example of a variable that
should not vary discontinuously (i.e.,
exhibit a significant treatment effect)
at the threshold: Turnout t+ 1.
Histogram test (0.1 bins)
Histogram test (0.05 bins)
Histogram test (0.025 bins)
Major pol. party
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(b) p-values of the estimated dis-
continuity at the threshold for some
election variables that should not ex-
hibit a significant discontinuity at
the threshold. Circles represent the
full dataset, triangles represent the
dataset trimmed with respect to in-
vestment per capita. The last three
rows contain tests for discontinuities
in the density, as in Figure 4.3, for
different bin sizes.
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Figure 4.5: Robustness check - estimated treatment effect for different band-
widths.
















(a) Investment per capita in Euros
(trimmed).










(b) Party not running t+ 1 (dummy
variable).
Figure 4.6: Robustness check - checking for significant discontinuities at other
values of xi besides the true threshold. z-value on the vertical axis. Dashed lines




























































(b) Party not running t+ 1 (dummy
variable).
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Figure 4.7: Robustness check - sensitivity of the estimation results for invest-














































IK bandwidth  1.03
(a) Local linear regression with
(untrimmed) investment per capita
as outcome variable.
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(b) Graphical representation of the
outliers for investment per capita.
Boxplot at the top. Histogram over-
layed with a density plot at the bot-
tom. The dashed line represents the
95th percentile.

















(c) Estimated treatment effect with
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(d) Investigating whether data is dis-
continuously trimmed at the thresh-
old. Local linear regression with
a trimming dummy as the outcome
variable.
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